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The first essay researches the impact of the board characteristics on earnings 
management. Earnings management is a dependent variable and a proxy for discretionary 
accruals, which is predicted by applying three discretionary accruals models that include Jones 
model, modified Jones model and Kothari model. Independent variables comprise of board 
characteristics. The sample comprised of all listed companies on FTSE-350 from 2007 to 2018.  
Based on the results and findings of the Jones model, modified Jones model Kothari 
model and earnings management model, this research study provides empirical evidence 
proving the impact of the board size, board independence and gender diversity on the earnings 
management which is shown to be negative, implying larger boards with higher number of 
independent directors and female directors are in a better position to oversee the management 
activities and ensure higher quality of financial information. However, the impact of the CEO 
duality and board activity on earnings management is positive, illustrating that boards in which 
both positions CEO and board chairman are holding by one person and the board meets more 
frequently loses its control over necessary practices such as controlling earnings management.  
The prime objective of second research study is to study and understand the impact of 
the audit committee characteristics on the discretionary accruals in the companies listed on 
FTSE 350 from 2007 to 2018. The chosen period important because, the chosen period 
provides a window to test the Smith Report’s recommendations for audit committees following 
the issue of the UK Code and to understand to what extent; the recommended characteristics 
of the audit committee can help the companies to improve the quality of financial reporting. In 
this research study, earnings management is a dependent variable, whereas audit committee 
characteristics comprise of independent variables that include audit committee size (ACS), 
audit committee independence (ACI), members on the audit committee having a background 
in accounting or finance or both (ACFEX) and the frequency of the audit committee meetings 
during a year (NACM). The empirical findings of the relationship between earnings 
management and audit committee characteristics show that ACS is negatively associated to 
earnings management, ACI is positive related to earnings management, ACFXP and earnings 
management are negative related, and the number of audit committee meetings (NACM) is 
negatively related to earnings management.  
Third essay empirically tests the impact of the CEO’s and executive’s compensation on 
the discretionary accruals. To better understand the relationship of the CEO’s and executive’s 




impact of each component of the total compensation is tested on the discretionary accruals. 
Earnings management is the dependent variable, which is the proxy for the discretionary 
accruals. The components of the CEO’s and executive’s compensation are independent 
variables, which include the CEO’s total compensation, executive total compensation, CEO’s 
equity-based compensation, executive’s equity-based compensation, CEO’s salary, executive’s 
salary, CEO’s bonus, executive’s bonus, CEO equity to total compensation ratio and 
executive’s equity to total compensation ratio. For this, a sample comprising of all listed 
companies on FTSE 350 is used. The sample period is from 2007 to 2018 and employs the 
annual data because most of the companies prepare and publish their financial statements 
annually. The empirical results and findings of this research study show that the CEO equity-
based compensation, CEO bonus, CEO equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio, 
executive’s equity-based compensation, executive’s salary and executive’s equity-based 
compensation to total compensation ratio are positively related to earrings management, 
whereas, CEO total compensation, CEO salary, executive total compensation and executive’s 














1. Chapter One – Introduction 
Corporate governance mechanisms have always held great importance when assessing 
and monitoring financial reporting effectiveness. Corporations have a vital responsibility in 
preparing financial reports and are a significant part of the corporate governance system (Klein, 
2002). Financial reporting holds a key position in the corporate sector, as it is a major medium 
of communication between companies and stakeholders.  
Nevertheless, despite the presence of a corporate governance system consisting of 
board of directors and sub committees including an audit committee and compensation 
committee, there have been several cases of earnings management and financial statements 
manipulation such as Enron and WorldCom (Demaki, 2011; Norwani, et al. 2011), which raises 
questions on the role of corporate governance. This suggests that the mere presence of these 
committees is not sufficient to control and to mitigate the tendencies for unethical accounting 
practices such as earnings management. Rather, an important element is to understand what 
the vital attributes of these committees are which can help mitigate and control undesired 
accounting practices such as earnings management. Therefore, research in recent times is not 
just concerned about the formation of the board of directors or audit and compensation 
committees, rather, the concern and emphasis are on the attributes and effectiveness of these 
committees in improving the quality of financial information by closely monitoring and 
enhancing the stakeholder’s confidence in financial statements. Therefore, this research study 
is initiated to investigate and understand the role of corporate governance in controlling 
earnings management.  
Earnings management and board characteristics researches the role of the board 
characteristics in controlling the earnings management. According to scholars and market 
participants, one of the major reasons for the financial crisis of 2008 was the distortion of 
financial numbers created by applying practices such as earnings management by the 
management itself. However, another opinion held is that the corporate governance system and 
board of directors were not effective in controlling such practices leading to collapse of the 
entire financial market. This juxtaposition raises the question of whether the board of directors’ 
role alone is effective in controlling earnings management.   
Discretionary accruals proxied by earnings management is the dependent variable in all 
the three essays. In terms of measuring earnings management, it is difficult to identify a single 
discretionary accruals model measure on which all scholars agree. Moreover, each model 




minimize the error possibility, the first principal component rule is applied on the results of the 
three discretionary accrual models that comprises of Jones model (JM), modified Jones model 
(MJM) and Kothari model (KM) to measure the earnings management. As far as I know, this 
is the first research study that applies the first principal component rule to measure earnings 
management. The application of the first principal component rule is highly significant 
because, this model carries the components of more than one model and is more inclusive of 
other methods, which as a result enhances the validity and explanatory power of the model. 
There are research studies that are conducted to understand the role of corporate 
governance in relation to earnings management in UK (Peasnell et al. 2000; Peasnell et al. 
2005). Moreover, a few research studies examine and research the role of the corporate 
governance in relation to real earnings management in UK (Osma and Young 2009; 
Athanasakou et al. 2011), however, I was unable to identify any research studies conducted 
which are able to present a comparative analysis of the discretionary accruals-based earnings 
management and real earnings management in relation to corporate governance committees in 
UK. In addition, the research investigating the role of corporate governance in relation to 
discretionary accruals-based earnings management is heavily conducted, however, research 
investigating the role of corporate governance in relation to real earnings management is 
minimal, thus, there is a substantial gap in the literature in relation to the role of corporate 
governance for real earnings management (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Lemma et al. 2013; Kuo 
et al. 2014; Sellami, 2015). Therefore, this thesis does not exclusively research and examine 
discretionary accruals-based earnings management, whereas, in addition, it investigates the 
role of corporate governance by examining and studying the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
corporate governance on real earnings management and presents a comparative analysis of the 
discretionary accruals-based earnings management and real earnings management, which is 
one of the major contributions of this research study. As far as I know, this PhD research is the 
first research study that that presents a comparative analysis of the discretionary accruals-based 
earnings management and real earnings management in relation to board characteristics, audit 
committee characteristics and the components of CEO’s and executive compensation. 
Earnings management and audit committee attributes provides research on the 
association between audit committee characteristics and earnings management in the 
companies listed on FTSE 350 from 2007 to 2018. The main concern of an audit committee is 
to oversee and supervise the corporate financial reporting practices and improve the quality of 
financial reporting and earnings by closely monitoring and overseeing the accounting practices 




important for the quality of financial information. Moreover, it is important to understand 
which characteristics of the audit committee significantly improve the performance and 
effectiveness of an audit committee in terms of mitigating and controlling unethical accounting 
practices such as earnings management. The chosen period is significant because it provides a 
window to test the Smith Report’s recommendations for audit committees following the issue 
of the UK Code and to understand the extent to which the recommended characteristics of the 
audit committee can help the companies to improve the quality of financial reporting. To better 
understand the role of the audit committee in mitigating and controlling unethical accounting 
practices, the characteristics and attributes of the audit committee are evaluated to understand 
its role in mitigating or controlling unethical accounting practices such as earnings 
management. The impact of the audit committee characteristics is tested on the earnings 
management by applying the new earnings management model (EM).  
Many of the research studies on earnings management and corporate governance 
attributes are conducted by using FTSE 100 in the UK, whereas I was unable to find any 
research study which used FTSE 350. Therefore, this research uses FTSE 350, for the first time 
according to my understanding, to test the impact of the audit committee on the EM. In 
addition, FTSE 350 is a highly significant sample because, FTSE 350 is the combination of 
FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 companies, therefore, I believe that FTSE 350 carries the attributes 
of all kinds of firms listed in UK and therefore, better represents the British market as compared 
to just conducting research on FTSE 100 or FTSE 250. The attributes of audit committee that 
are examined in this research study comprise of audit committee size (ACS), audit committee 
independence (ACI), members on the audit committee with a background in accounting or 
finance or both (ACFEX) and the frequency of the audit committee meetings during a year 
(NACM).  
Shareholders finance the company; therefore, ownership lies in the hands of the 
shareholders, with little or no control. However, management runs the company’s operations, 
therefore, control lies in the hand of the management. Managers are in a position to control the 
company allowing them the opportunity to manipulate the financial information by applying 
the managerial discretion provided in the accounting standards, which directly jeopardizes the 
interest of the shareholders. To overcome the consequences of the mismatch between the 
ownership and control between shareholders and management respectively, one of the devices 
employed in the corporate governance structure is the executive’s compensation plan. This 
aims to align the interest of the management with the shareholders, and internally motivate the 




manipulate the financial information diminishes and therefore directly enhances the quality of 
the financial reporting and in turn the transparency of the financial reporting processes 
increases. However, the question arises whether the management still works in the best interest 
of the shareholders? And if the management is working in the best interest of shareholders, 
then the question arises as to why, cases such as Enron (2001), WorldCom (2002), Tyco (2002), 
Freddie Mac (2003), AIG (2005), Lehman Brothers (2008) etc. happened, which were 
primarily caused by earnings management or fraudulent financial reporting (Gunz and Thorne, 
2017). In addition, despite evidence of earnings manipulation, little research has examined the 
influence of executive compensation on earnings management. Moreover, most of the research 
studies used executive compensation as one value or used a few components from executive 
compensation (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Jones and Wu, 2010; Sun, 2012). However, 
executive compensation consists of many elements such as salary, bonuses, stock options, 
stocks granted, long-term incentive plans and short-term incentive plans. Therefore, this 
research study has decomposed the entire executive compensation into fixed and variable 
components (salary and bonus), in cash and equity-based compensation, and in short-term and 
long-term compensation and examined the impact of the each compensation components on 
the earnings management to better understand what form of executive compensation 
significantly or insignificantly, and positively or negatively affects the discretionary accruals 
in the listed companies on FTSE 350 during 2007 to 2018. 
In addition, the research that addresses the impact of the executive compensation on 
earnings management in the UK is minimal, therefore, this research study makes a significant 
contribution, as this research study is among the pioneer research studies that decomposes the 
entire executive compensation and individually tests the impact of each component of the 
executive compensation on the discretionary accruals. The components of the executive 
compensation comprise of CEO and executive’s total compensation, CEO and executive’s 
equity-based compensation, CEO and executive’s salaries, CEO and executive’s bonuses, and 







2. Chapter Two – Earnings Management and Board Characteristics 
2.1. Introduction  
In accounting, earnings management is typically described as the opportunistic 
behaviour of financial managers to exploit managerial discretion provided by accounting 
standards (Bergstresser and Philipon, 2006). According to McKee (2005), earnings 
management is a technique applied by management to manipulate financial information and 
communicate the desired message to the market. Leuz et al. (2003) defines earning 
management as the alteration of a company’s reported economic performance and financial 
position by the management of a company in order to mislead the stakeholders or to influence 
the contractual outcome. The role of corporate governance is paramount in addressing earnings 
management practices so as to enhance transparency. To understand the role of corporate 
governance, it is important to decompose the board of directors based on its characteristics and 
to understand the impact of each characteristic on the earnings management.  
On the one hand, according to scholars and market participants, one of the major 
reasons for the financial crisis of 2008 was the distortion of financial numbers created by 
applying practices such as earnings management by the management itself. However, another 
opinion is that the corporate governance system and board of directors were not effective in 
controlling such practices leading to collapse of the entire financial market. This juxtaposition 
raises the question of whether the board of directors’ role alone is effective in controlling 
earnings management.   
I conduct this study to examine the impact of the board of director’s characteristics on 
earnings management. The board characteristics examined comprise of board independence, 
board size, CEO duality, gender diversity, and board activity. The research questions for this 
study are as follows: 
• Is the role of the board of directors effective in controlling the earnings management 
practices in FTSE 350 companies? Specifically, how do different board characteristics 
i.e., board independence, board size, CEO Duality, gender diversity, and board activity 
affect the practices of earnings management in companies listed on FTSE 350? 
• Which discretionary accruals model better explain the relationship between the board 
characteristics and earnings management? 
Although there are a number of research studies conducted to understand and explore 
the impact of the board characteristics on discretionary accruals in the UK (see Peasnell et al. 




impact of the board characteristics on real earnings management (Osma and Young 2009; 
Athanasakou et al. 2011). Therefore, this research contributes to the existing literature by 
investigating empirically the relationship of board of director’s characteristics with the 
discretionary accruals and real earnings management in Britain’s market and explains which 
board characteristics positively or negatively affect the earnings management and real earnings 
management in the UK. This research also sheds light on the effectiveness of the recent 
corporate governance recommendations on enhancing financial reporting quality in the UK.  
The sample for this study is comprised of companies listed on the FTSE350 index. 
FTSE350 index is selected because it includes, by capitalization, the largest 350 companies, 
which are primary listed on the London stock exchange. Moreover, FTSE350 account for a 
significant portion of the UK economic output. The sample period starts from 2007 to 2018 
and uses annual data because most of the companies prepare and publish their financial 
statements annually. The chosen period is important as it enables the research study to 
understand the impact of board of director’s characteristics on earnings management in the 
post-recession period. The data for earnings management and board of directors (BOD) is 
retrieved from Bloomberg.  
My hypotheses examine the impact of different BOD characteristics on earnings 
management in the UK. The BOD characteristics examined comprises of board independence, 
board size, CEO Duality, gender diversity, and board activity.  
The findings are presented based on the results of four empirical models comprising of 
Jones model (JM), modified Jones model (MJM) Kothari Model (KM) and earnings 
management model (EARNMGT). EARNMGT is estimated by applying the first principal 
component methodology. The results show that there is a negative and statistically significant 
association between board size (BS), board independence (BI) and gender diversity (GENDIV) 
with earnings management. Whereas, CEO duality (CEOD) and number of board meetings 
(NOBM) are positively related with earnings management, moreover, the results are 
statistically significant. 
Academic scholars present a number of models predicting earnings management. Each 
model of earnings management carries pros and cons; therefore, this research study aims to 
detect the earnings management by applying the principal component approach that uses the 
weighted average earnings management of the three models comprised of Jones model (1991), 
modified Jones model (1996) and Kothari model (2005). This research study is among the 





2.2. Literature Review 
2.2.1. Background on earnings management 
Financial standards such as international financial reporting standards (IFRS) or 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) provides flexibility in choosing from among 
alternative accounting treatments that is known as managerial discretion (Bergstresser and 
Philipon, 2006). These alternative methods and policies for reporting the financial information 
impacting the firm’s profitability (McKee, 2005). Academics in past literature present the view 
that financial managers mostly employ those accounting standards and policies having 
economic benefit for the company, for the management or for both (Schipper, 1989). Moreover, 
these opportunistic practices intensify in the absence of a strong governance structure 
deteriorating the quality of reported earnings and investors’ confidence in the financial reports 
published by companies (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). In accounting, the opportunistic 
behavior that the financial managers apply by exploiting managerial discretion provided by the 
accounting standards is known as earnings management (Bergstresser and Philipon, 2006). 
According to McKee (2005), earnings management is a technique applied by management to 
manipulate financial information and communicate the desired message to the market. 
Schipper (1989) is the first to define earnings management and states that management 
for their private gain adjusts financial statement by manipulating the financial information. In 
addition, Leuz et al. (2003) defines earning management by stating that earnings management 
is the alteration of a company’s reported economic performance and financial position by the 
management of a company in order to mislead the stakeholders or to influence the contractual 
outcome. Furthermore, they state that accounting standards and policies provide managerial 
discretion and flexibility to management providing them with the power to exercise their 
judgment and discretion over accounting estimates and policies, and to choose the allowable 
accounting method to change the financial information. Xiong (2006) says that managerial 
discretion in accounting standards provides opportunities to managers to apply their judgment 
and to manipulate the financial information. McKee (2005) states that managers manipulate 
financial information mostly through alteration of estimates and values of bad debts, changing 
the assumptions for estimating depreciation, using desired estimates for useful life of non-
current assets, using estimates for assets valuation which meet their desired objective and 
applying those methods for inventory valuation which helps improve financial performance.  
From the above definitions, it can be inferred that accounting standards allow managers 




to achieve personal or the firm’s objectives. In addition, it can also be stated that the 
prerequisite for earnings management is the management intention behind the alteration of 
financial information. 
2.2.2. Measurement Models 
In the past three decades, numerous research studies have been conducted which detect 
earnings management by employing different models.  These models are as follows.  
2.2.2.1. The Healy Model (1985) 
Healy (1985) decomposes the total earnings into cash flow from operations, non-
discretionary accruals (NDA) and discretionary accruals (DA). Cash flow from operations 
represents the net cash flow generated by operating activities of the business. Operating 
activities are primarily comprised of sales and expenses arising from the core activities of the 
business.  
 
Non-discretionary accruals are “accounting adjustments to the firm's cash flows mandated by 
accounting standard-setting bodies (e.g., the Securities Exchange Commission and the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board)” (Healy, 1985, p, 89). 
 
Discretionary accruals represent adjustment by the managers to cash flows by 
exploiting the managerial discretion in the accounting standards with the intention to achieve 
personal or company’s desired objectives. Healy states that DA is an unobservable variable, 
therefore, Healy’s model relies on total accruals, which are presented in the following way.  
 
					 	"##!	=	−&'(!	+	'*+,-.,/0!	+	∆234!	-	∆"(!	-	(∆7(!	+&'8!)						 (2.1) 
 
Where: 
"##!  ACC is the difference between reported earnings and cash flow from operations 
&'(!  Depreciation  
'*+,-.,/0!    Extraordinary items   
∆234!   Change in Investments  
∆"(!   Change in Accounts Payables 
∆7(!   Tax Payable 




Healy (1985) assumes that NDA are stable over years and across the firms, however, 
both these assumptions are unrealistic. In the real world, a firm’s operations are dependent and 
influenced by their economic environment and therefore, NDA vary amongst firms and over 
years. For example, when there is an increase in the revenues of a firm, their NDA increases 
as well without manipulating the financial information. It shows that these two assumptions 
cannot hold in the real world. Therefore, Healy model produces a biased value for DA (Lee 
and Vetter, 2015). 
2.2.2.2. The DeAngelo Model (1986) 
DeAngelo (1986) defines total accruals with a different method; he took the average 
changes of discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals by applying the following 
model. 
 
("#" - "##) = (3&"" -3&"#) + (&"" -&"#)           (2.2)	
 
Where: 
("#" -"##)   Average change in total accruals 
(3&"" -3&"#)  Average change in non-discretionary accruals 
(&"" -&"#)   Average change in discretionary accruals 
 
DeAngelo (1986) suggests the use of the following model as an alternate model to 
Healy’s model to estimate the total accruals. In this model, total accruals are estimated by 
taking the difference of the change in net income and operating cash flow.  
 
("#" - "##) = (32" -32#) + (#8" -#8#)    (2.3) 
 
Where: 
(32" -32#)  Average change in net income  
(#8" -#8#)  Average change in operation cash flow 
 
The empirical findings of the above model present the view that on average, the value 
from the above model is approximately zero, which lead to the conclusions that change in DA 
is positive and the change in the NDA is negative. It can be observed from both i.e. Moreover, 




mean is zero in the estimation period. However, if NDAs are not constant and changes from 
period to period, then there is a possibility that both models estimate the NDAs with error. In 
this situation, then the model that is the best and is more appropriate to measure the NDAs 
depends on the nature of the time-series process that is applied to estimate the NDAs.  
Both models assume that NDAs are constant across the time; however, empirical 
evidence shows that it is highly unlikely that the NDAs could be constant. Kaplan (1985) states 
that the NDAs are directly related to the economic circumstances in the economy and should 
change when there is a change in the economic circumstances in the economy. By not including 
the economic circumstances in nondiscretionary accruals in the Healy and DeAngelo models, 
the standard errors increase. Moreover, those firms that are included in the sample 
systematically experience abnormal economic circumstances, and then not including the 
economic circumstances on nondiscretionary accruals in the model causes biased estimates of 
the coefficients. 
2.2.2.3. The Jones Model (1991) 
One of the major limitations of the Healy and DeAngelo model is that they assume that 
the non-discretionary accruals are zero or constant. However, Jones (1991) states that 
nondiscretionary accrual is a linear function of change in sales and non-current assets and 
therefore, NDA should be included in the accruals model. Moreover, he states that the 
nondiscretionary accruals stem from depreciation and change in the accruals arises from the 
business activities of the company.  
The academic literature states that total accruals are comprised of NDA and DA. NDA 
are economically determined whereas DA determines by the managers. According this 
explanation of DA, it can be stated that DA provides an opportunity for managers to exercise 
their discretion over accounting principles and estimates to practice earnings management 
(Kasznik, 1999; Dechow et al. 1995; Warfield et al. 1995; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Sweeny, 1994; Cahan, 1992; Jones, 1991: Healy, 1985). Based on the above assumptions and 
explanations, Jones presented the following accruals model, which estimates the total accruals.  
 
7"$,!/"$,!&" = :"(1/"$,!&") + :'(∆;<=$,!	/"$!&") + :)((('$!	/"$!&") + ε!     (2.4) 
 
Where: 
7"$,!   Total Accruals for firm ? ̇at period + 




∆;<=$,!	  Change in Revenue for firm ? ̇at period + 
(('$,!   Property Plant and Equipment for firm ?̇ at period + 
:" - :)  Coefficients estimates 
ε!   Error term  
 
7"$,! are estimated in the following manner. 
7"$,!  = (∆#A,,<B+	-00<+0 – ∆#-0ℎ –∆#A,,<B+	DE-FEDE+E<0) – Depreciation and         
amortization expenses 
 
In the above model, total assets of the company scale all the variables at the beginning 
of the year. The prime objective to scale all variables by the total assets is to minimize or 
reduces the problem of the heteroscedasticity. The residual term from the total accruals model 
represents the discretionary accruals (DA). 
The discretionary accruals model (DA) presented by Jones attracted a significant 
number of research studies and scholars including Subramanyam (1996) and Guay et al. (1996). 
They state that compared to the DeAngelo and Healy models, Jones’s model is more powerful 
as it produces the discretionary accruals consistent with the opportunistic accruals and measure 
performance hypotheses. Additionally, they state that the Jones model provides more control 
in a cross-section model as compared to time series data. Moreover, Dechow et al. (1995) says 
that the most powerful and effective model measuring earnings management is Jones model. 
However, Dechow et al. (1995) states that it is assumed in the Jones model that the entire sales 
in the period are non-discretionary, whereas, in the real world, the total sales are comprised of 
cash sales and credit sales. Theoretically, the accruals part of the sales is exposed to 
manipulation; therefore, the entire sales are not non-discretionary. In this situation, if the 
managers exercise their discretion over sales, it leads to the misspecification of the 
discretionary accruals model. Also, the Jones model is criticized for not including expenses in 
the non-discretionary model.  
In addition, Kothari, et al. (2005) citing White (1980) criticizes the Jones model by 
claiming that scaling all variables may reduce the Heteroscedasticity problem; however, it 
cannot fully eliminate the Heteroscedasticity issue. In addition, Sweeney (1994) states that 
Jones’s model may produce a biased estimate for DA because in the real world, it is difficult 




2.2.2.4. The Modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) 
Dechow et al. (1995) highlight that one of the major limitations of the Jones model 
arises from its assumptions that the total revenue is non-discretionary. Dechow et al. (1995) 
model is primarily based on the assumption that total revenue is not non-discretionary, whereas, 
a certain part of the revenue is discretionary, this occurs where managers exercise discretionary 
power over revenues to manipulate revenues. Based on this new development, Dechow et al. 
(1995) modified the Jones model by adjusting the change in revenue to change in receivables 
and presents the evidence that their model is more powerful in comparison to Jones model as 
their model is good at detecting cases of revenue manipulation.  
 
      7"$!/"$!&" = :"(1/"$!&") + :'(∆;<=!&	∆;<G!	/"$!&") + :)((('!	/"$!&") + ε! (2.5) 
 
Where:  
7"$!   Estimated total accruals for firm ? ̇at period + 
∆;<=!	  Change in revenue for firm ? ̇at period + 
∆;<G!	  Change in receivables for firm ?̇ at period + 
(('!  Property, plant and equipment for firm ?̇ at period + 
"$,!&"  Total assets in the prior year for firm ? ̇ 
ε!   The Residual 
Numerous studies apply the Jones and modified Jones models in order to measure the 
earnings management and most of the scholar’s state that both of the models are the most 
effective and efficient models to measure and detect earnings management (Kasznik, 1999; 
Becker et al. 1998; Beneish, 1997; Guay et al. 1996; Dechow et al. 1995 and DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994). Moreover, both models i.e., Jones and modified Jones models are primarily 
presented as time series. However, Subramanyam (1996) and Bartov et al. (2002) tests both 
models under time series and cross-sectional data and concludes that both i.e., Jones and 
modified Jones models are more powerful in cross sectional as compare to time series in 
measuring the earnings management. They support this view by arguing that the Jones and 
modified Jones models can be controlled for year and industry specific influence and therefore, 
both models outperform other models in cross sectional data. In addition, the cross sectional is 
known for larger samples and higher number of observations and cross-sectional data does not 
assume the stationarity of the discretionary accrual models (Subramanyam 1996; Peasnell et 




sectional data are the same for each firm in the industry, moreover, the discretionary accruals 
are the same regardless the operating strategy or its product life cycle for all the firms. Under 
this assumption, the results of the non-discretionary models are unbiased and efficient if all the 
firms in the industry are homogenous. However, if the firms are not homogenous and the firms 
are different from each other in terms of operating strategy or product life cycle, then, the 
earnings management estimated by the modified jones model might involve measurement 
errors (Dechow et al. (1995).  
2.2.2.5. Dechow and Dichev Model (2002)  
Dechow and Dichev (2002) state that although the managers do not exercise their 
managerial discretion to manipulate earnings, accruals are still related to the firm and industry. 
Therefore, Dechow and Dichev (2002) present a new model in which, they include working 
capital as a dependent variable whereas operating cash flow as an independent variable. They 
support their model by the view that both factors are short term and reverses within one year.  
 
 ∆H#$,!	 = I# + I*#8J$,!&"	 +	I'#8J$,!	+ I)#8J$,!+"	 + ε$,!  (2.6)	
 
Where: 
∆H#$,!	  Change in Working capital in the year + for firm E scaled by "$!&" 
I#   Constant 
#8J$,!&"	  Cash flow from operations for the year +-1 for firm E scaled by "$!&" 
#8J$,!	  Cash flow from operations for the year + for firm E scaled by "$!&" 
#8J$,!+"	  Cash flow from operations for the year ++1 for firm E scaled by "$!&" 
ε$,!   Error term in the year + for firm E 
 
The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model studies the earnings quality by examining the 
relationship between accruals and operating cash flow, the standard deviation of residuals 
represents the earnings quality. The Dechow and Dichev model assumes that there is a negative 
relationship between accruals and current cash flows, whereas the relationship between 
accruals and past and future cash flows are positive. Moreover, the error term captures accruals. 
Dechow and Dichev model states that the future cash flow is judgmental and is an estimate, 




There are a number of limitations of the Dechow and Dichev model. McNichols (2002) 
criticizes the model and states that if the explanatory variables contain a measurement error as 
stated by Dechow and Dichev, the explanatory variable coefficients are then biased. McNichols 
states that this model does not help in explaining the impact of the discretionary accruals on 
the total accruals. 
2.2.2.6. McNichols Model (2002): An Integrated Approach 
McNichols (2002) states that the Jones model (1991) is good in terms of splitting the 
entire accruals in discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, however, the Jones model is 
miss-specified, and some important explanatory variables are missing. Regarding the Dechow 
and Dichev model (2002), she states that this model estimates the accruals as a whole, which 
does not explain how discretionary accruals may affect total accruals. McNichols (2002) tests 
both model and concludes that there are evidences of misspecification in both models. Her 
analysis shows that Jones model is statistically significantly correlated with current, past and 
future cash flows. Moreover, she states that in the Dechow and Dichev model, the residuals 
and changes in revenue are significantly correlated. Based on the above discussion, McNichols 
(2002) incorporates the strengths of both models by developing a new model that combines the 
Jones and Dechow and Dichev models.  
 
∆H#$,!	 = I# + I*#8J$,!&"	 + I'#8J$,!	+ I)#8J$,!+"	 + I,∆;<=$,!	 + I-(('$!	+ ε$,!  (2.7) 
Where: 
∆H#$,!	  Change in Working capital in the year + for firm E scaled by "$!&" 
#8J$,!&"	  Cash flow from operations for the year +-1 for firm E scaled by "$!&" 
#8J$,!	  Cash flow from operations for the year + for firm E scaled by "$!&" 
#8J$,!+"	  Cash flow from operations for the year ++1 for firm E scaled by "$!&" 
∆;<=$,!	  Change in Revenue scaled by "$!&" 
(('$!	   Gross property, Plant and Equipment in the year + for firm E scaled by  
"$!&"   Total assets in year +-1 for firm E 
I#   Constant 
ε$,!   Error term in the year + for firm E 
To know the efficiency and effectiveness of each model, McNichols (2002), applies 
Jones model, Dechow and Dichev model and the McNichols (2002) model by using data from 




that the Jones model R square (;') is 7%, Dechow and Dichev’s ;' is 20% and McNichols 
model ;' is 30%. From these results it can be inferred that among all the three models i.e., 
Jones model, Dechow and Dichev model and McNichols model, McNichols (2002) model 
explanatory power and goodness of fit are highest. Moreover, the signs and relationship of the 
variables in the McNichols (2002) model are consistent with both Jones and Dechow and 
Dichev model. Additionally, the coefficients of all the explanatory variables in the McNichols 
(2002) model are statistically significant.  
Nevertheless, there are a few limitations of the McNichols model. According to 
McNichols, his model is more effective and useful for understanding the relationship of 
earnings management, corporate governance and external audit attributes. However, Kothari 
(2005), states that although, these models may produce good outcomes, they all lack inclusion 
of performance based independent variables in their models.  
2.2.2.7. Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals, Kothari (2005) 
A number of research studies raise concerns regarding the performance and estimation 
of earnings management. Dechow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999) applied the Jones model to 
detect and measure earnings management. According to their research findings, there is a 
positive statistically significant relationship between the discretionary accruals and return on 
assets (ROA), which cause misspecification in the model. Numerous research studies are 
conducted to overcome the miss-specification problem (Kasznik, 1999; Bartov et al. 2002 and 
Kothari et al. 2005). In these research studies, they exclude the potential effects of the 
correlation between the discretionary accruals and earnings performance by applying a 
matched-firm method to adjust the discretionary accruals. Kothari et al. (2005) is among the 
pioneer academics and researchers who states that performance-based variables need to be 
included in the modified jones model to estimate the earnings management, therefore, he 
suggests including the return on assets (ROA) as a performance variable in the modified jones 
model and presented the following model. 
 
7"$!/"$!&" = :"(1/"$!&") + :'(∆;<=!&	∆;<G!	/"$!&") + :)((('!	/"$!&") +  
:);J"$!&" + ε!         (2.8) 
Where:  
7"$!   Estimated total accruals at time t. 
∆;<=!	  Change in revenue at time t  




(('!  Property, plant and equipment at time t  
"!&"  Total assets in the prior year 
;J"$!&"  Return on assets of the previous year 
 
Kothari et al. (2005) adjusts the Jones and modified Jones model for firm performance 
and examines the effectiveness and reliability of each model. Their findings state that by 
including the performance as an independent variable in the Jones and modified Jones model, 
the reliability of the discretionary accruals models enhances. Their findings can also be 
interpreted in a different way that earnings management varies with the performance of the 
firm.  
2.2.2.8. Absolute Abnormal Accruals Model (ABS_AA) (2007) 
Larcker and Richardson (2007) apply the absolute abnormal accruals model (ABS_AA) 
to measure earnings management. The ABS_AA is the extension of the modified Jones model, 
which adds the cash flow from operations (CFO) and book value of common stock (BV) to the 
modified jones model so as to minimize the measurement error related to discretionary 
accruals. He states that based on accrual basis of accounting, the accrual revenue is less reliable 
and highly exposed to earnings management when compared to cash component of revenue 
and therefore, adds the CFO to measure the non-discretionary revenues (Larcker and 
Richardson, 2007).  
On the basis of modified Jones model, which assumes that the difference between the 
change in revenue and the change in receivables is not exposed to managerial discretion. 
Therefore, the difference between the change in revenue and the change in receivables is free 
from managerial discretion. In addition, the capital intensity of a firm drives normal accruals. 
ABS_AA model includes the difference between the change in revenue and the change in 
receivables and the gross value of the property, plant and equipment to control for the expected, 
economic based components in the total accruals.  
Larker and Richardson (2004) state that the benefit of engaging in earnings 
management depends upon the growth opportunities and operating performance. Of particular 
significance is the incentive for the management to manage earnings, which is higher when the 
market expectations are higher for future growth (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). Therefore, book 
value to market value (BM) and cash flow from operations (CFO) is included in the accruals 
model. BM controls for growth in operations, if BM is not controlled and left uncontrolled in 




accruals. Whereas CFO is included in the accruals model to control for the effects of the current 
operating performance of the company because firms with extreme levels of operating 
performance are highly likely to miss-specify their discretionary accruals (Dechow, Sloan, and 
Sweeney, 1995). 
 
              7"$!/"$!&" = I#(1/"$!&") + I"(∆;<=$!	 − ∆;<G$!	/"$!&") + I'(K(('$!	/"$!&") +  
           I)LM$! + I,(#8J$!	/"$!&") + ε$!    (2.9) 
Where:  
7"$!  The total accruals, calculated as firm’s net income minus operating cash flows 
in year t taken from the statement of cash flows,  
"$!&"   The total assets for firm ?̇ at period + − 1  
∆;<=$!	  The change in revenues for firm ?̇ from + − 1 to year t  
∆;<G$!	  The change in accounts receivable for firm ? ̇from + − 1 to year t 
K(('$!	  The gross property, plant and equipment for firm ? ̇for year t  
LM$!  Ratio of value book value of equity for firm ? ̇for year t to market value of equity 
for firm ?̇ for year t  
#8J$!	  The operating cash flows for firm ? ̇for year t  
ε$! The error term for firm ? ̇for year t 
 
To estimate the non-discretionary accruals (NDA), the coefficients from equation (9) are 
ploughed back in equation (10) to measure the firm specific non-discretionary accruals.  
 
                   3&"$! =  I#(1/"$!&") + I"(∆;<=$!	 − ∆;<G$!	/"$!&") + I'(K(('$!	/"$!&") +  
 I)LM$! + I,(#8J$!	/"$!&")                (2.10) 
Where: 
3&"$!  The Non-discretionary accruals for firm ?̇ for year t 
I# - I,  The industry specific estimated coefficient which are estimated from the first 
equation  
 
Once the total accruals and non-discretionary accruals are estimated, then the discretionary 






                      &"$!	=	7"$!/"$!&"	−	3&"$!	 	 	 	 						 	(2.11)	
Where: 
&"$!   Discretionary Accruals  
7"$!/"$!&" Total Accruals scaled by total assets at beginning of the year    
3&"$!  Non-discretionary accruals for firm ?̇ for year t 
 
The findings and results of Larker and Richardson (2007) are consistent with the 
findings of prior research studies. The coefficient on (∆;<=$!	 − ∆;<G$!	) is positive whereas, 
GPPE coefficient is negative. Moreover, the findings show that the coefficients on the BM and 
CFO are both negative, from which, it can be inferred that there is an inverse relationship 
between the total accruals with BM and CFO. The ;' of the model is approximately 31% that 
shows that 31% of the variations in the total accruals are explained by the independent variables 
in the model. McNichols (2002) findings show that Jones model ;'  is 7%, Dechow and 
Dichey’s ;' is 20% and McNichols model ;' is 30%. In comparison to McNichols (2002), the 
Larker and Richardson (2004), ABS_AA Model ;' is highest.  
Moreover, according to Larker and Richardson (2007), the ABS_AA model effectively 
measures the earnings managements as compared to modified Jones model because ABS_AA 
model explanatory power, as compare to modified Jones model is higher. Moreover, the 
ABS_AA model helps to identify the unexpected accruals, which is less persistent as compare 
to other components in the total earnings and the estimated discretionary accruals that detect 
and measure the earnings management.  
2.2.3. Discussion on earnings management models 
Healy (1985) is among the pioneers who initiated research on the topic of earrings 
management and presented a model to detect earnings management. His model is based on the 
assumptions that the NDA are stable over years and across the firms, however, both these 
assumptions are unrealistic. In real world, a firm’s operations are dependent and influenced by 
their economic environment and therefore, NDA vary among firms and over years.  
DeAngelo (1986) presents a model that estimates the total accruals as Healy. However, 
he defines total accruals by taking the average changes of discretionary accruals and non- 
discretionary accruals. Moreover, both models estimate the NDA without error if NDA are 
constant across time and DA mean is zero in the estimation period. However, if NDAs are not 
constant and changes from period to period, then there is a possibility that both models, 




Jones (1991) states that the non-discretionary accruals cannot be zero or constant, 
however, Jones (1991) states that nondiscretionary accrual is a linear function of change in 
sales and non-current assets and therefore, NDA is included in the accruals model. Moreover, 
he states that the nondiscretionary accruals stem from depreciation and the change in the 
accruals arises from the business activities of the company. Jones model assumes that sales are 
not exposed to managerial discretion and therefore, managers do not exercise discretion over 
sales. However, Dechow et al. (1995) states that if the managers exercise their discretion over 
sales, it leads to the misspecification of the discretionary accruals model.  
Therefore, Dechow et al. (1995) presents modified Jones model to estimate NDA and 
DA by assuming that total revenue is not non-discretionary whereas, a certain part of the entire 
revenue is discretionary, where managers use discretionary power to manipulate revenues. 
Some assumptions of the modified Jones model are unrealistic such as the discretionary accrual 
for cross sectional data which are the same for each firm in the industry, moreover, the 
discretionary accruals are the same regardless of the operating strategy or its product life cycle 
for all the firms. Under these assumptions, the results of the non-discretionary model are 
unbiased and efficient if all the firms in the industry are homogenous. However, if the firms 
are not homogenous rather, are different from each other in terms of operating strategy or 
product life cycle, then, the earnings management which is estimated by the modified Jones 
model carries measurement errors.  
Therefore, Dechow and Dichev (2002) present a new model to estimate the accruals by 
applying short term variables in the model and, to justify their model, state that although the 
managers do not exercise their managerial discretion to manipulate earnings, accruals are still 
related to the firm and industry and vary from firm to firm and industry to industry. Therefore, 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) presents a new model, in which they include working capital as a 
dependent variable and operating cash flow as an independent variable. The Dechow and 
Dichev model assume that there is a negative relationship between accruals and current cash 
flows, rather in contrast, the relationship between accruals and past and future cash flows are 
positive. Dechow and Dichev model also states that the future cash flow is judgmental and is 
an estimate, from which, it can be inferred that future cash flow estimate might be inaccurate. 
McNichols (2002) criticizes the model and states that if the explanatory variables carry a 
measurement error as stated by Dechow and Dichev, then the explanatory variable coefficients 
are biased. McNichols states that this model does not help in explaining the impact of the 




McNichols (2002) presents a new model by combing the Dechow and Dichev model 
(2002) and Jones model (1991). According to McNichols (2002) the Jones model (1986) is 
good in terms of splitting the entire accruals into discretionary and non-discretionary accruals; 
however, the Jones model is miss-specified because some important explanatory variables are 
missing. Regarding the Dechow and Dichev model (2002), she states that this model estimates 
the accruals as a whole that does not explain and shows how discretionary accruals may affect 
total accruals. In addition, McNichols (2002) tests both models and concludes that there are 
evidences of misspecification in both models. Based on the above discussion, McNichols 
(2002) incorporated the strengths of both models by developing a new model combining the 
Jones model and the Dechow, and Dichev model. However, there are a few limitations of the 
McNichols model. According to McNichols, his model is more effective and useful for 
understanding the relationship of earnings management and corporate governance and external 
audit attributes. However, Kothari (2005) states that although these models might produce good 
outcomes, however they all lack the inclusion of performance based independent variables in 
their models.  
To overcome one of the major limitations of the McNichols model (2002), which is 
ignoring the firm performance in the accruals model, Kothari et al. (2005) adjusts the Jones 
and modified Jones models for firm performance and examines the effectiveness and reliability 
of each model. Their findings present the view that by including performance as an independent 
variable in the Jones and modified Jones model, the reliability of the discretionary accruals 
models is enhanced. Their findings can also be interpreted in a different way that earnings 
management varies with the performance of the firm.  
Larker and Richardson (2007) disagree with Kothari et al. (2005) and recommend 
adjusting the model for cash flow from operation (CFO) and book value of the common stock 
(BV) and present an extended version of the modified Jones model called absolute abnormal 
accruals model (ABS_AA). The ABS_AA is the extension of the modified Jones model, which 
add the cash flow from operation (CFO) and book value of the common stock (BV) to the 
modified jones model to minimize the measurement error related to discretionary accruals.  
Based on the above empirical findings, it can be stated that each model of earnings 
management carry pros and cons, in addition, there is no consensus among the researchers on 
the earnings management model, therefore, this research study aims to detect the earnings 
management by applying the principal component approach that uses the weighted average 
earnings management of the three models comprised of Jones model (1991), modified Jones 




2.2.4. Board Characteristic and Hypothesis development 
2.2.4.1. Board Independence (BI) and Earnings Management 
One of the most important functions of the board is to reduce the manager’s discretion 
and opportunism. The most important factor in achieving this goal is to establish an 
independent board. A board is more independent when the independent directors (outside 
directors) compared to inside directors are higher in proportion. 
Empirical studies show an association between the fraction of independent directors 
and the board effectiveness in monitoring the earnings management. Dechow et al. (1996) 
looked at firms violating the GAAP and compared their board of independent directors to those 
who do not violate GAAP. The findings show that those companies, in which the percentage 
of independent directors is lower, violate GAAP by overstating their earnings.  Dechow et al. 
(1996) states that there is a negative relationship between the percentage of the independent 
directors and the earnings management. Research on U.S. companies by Klein (2002) supports 
the findings of Dechow. Peasnell et al. (2000) conducts similar studies into studying the 
relationship between upwards earnings management and board independence in British firms 
and concludes similar finding by stating that there is a negative relationship between the 
earnings management and board independence. The findings of the Donnelly and Lynch (2002) 
show that a lower percentage of independent director’s results in a higher level of earnings 
management in Mexico. Cornett, et al. (2009) states that enhancing the independence of the 
board can control the earnings management. In contrast, Wang (2007) states that the role of 
independent directors on the board of directors is not effective and efficient in China. In 
addition, according to Li and Ang (2000) and Sarkar et al. (2008), just increasing the number 
of independent directors on the board of directors does not affect the director’s performance in 
monitoring management and especially in those cases which require the director’s expertise. 
Considering the contradictory findings of scholars and unclear relationship of board 
independence with earnings management, this area requires further research. Therefore, the 
following (non-directional) hypothesis is presented.   
Hypothesis 1: Board Independence is associated with earnings management. 
2.2.4.2. Board Size (BS) and Earnings Management 
Literature relating to corporate governance is largely interested in understanding the 
role of the board size in the effectiveness of the BOD. Beasley (1996) state that the size of the 




(2004), there are three different views describing the impact of board size on earnings 
management. According to the first view, a large board is in a better position to control the 
management and managerial operations and therefore, when the board size is high, the earnings 
management is lower, suggesting that there is an inverse relationship between board size and 
earnings management (Ahmed et al. 2006). In addition, Xie et al. (2003) studied the 
relationship between the size of the board and earnings management by using a sample of US 
companies and present the view that a larger board is more effective in controlling practices 
such as earnings management. Defond et al. (1994) findings show that there is an inverse 
relationship between the board size and earnings management. Cheng and Warfield (2005) 
state that there is a negative relation between earnings management and board size in the USA. 
Fama et al. (1983) indicated a larger board size allows board members to communicate with 
each other in a more appropriate manner. As per the second view, the BOD should not be either 
too small or too large, an optimal size is between around five and nine members. Whereas 
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that the optimum size is between seven and eight members. 
According to the third view, small sized of boards are more effective in monitoring and 
controlling management and better represent the shareholders as compared to larger boards 
(Klein 2002; Ikechukwu 2013 and Peasnell et al. (2000). Most of the researchers’ state that the 
earnings management is negatively associated with the size of the BOD. Therefore, the 
following (non-directional) hypothesis is proposed to be tested: 
Hypothesis 2: Board size is associated with earning management.  
2.2.4.3. CEO Duality (CEOD) and Earnings Management 
Another vital characteristic of the board is CEO duality. CEO duality refers to when 
the company CEO also holds the position of the board chairman; it means that one person holds 
two vital roles, which are management and control. Past literature suggests that the BOD is 
usually more effective when one person does not hold both positions, i.e., chairman of the BOD 
and CEO of the company’s management. Jensen et al. (1976) states that the chairman of the 
board has a very important role in its responsibility for running board meetings, hiring or firing 
and compensation and evaluation of the CEO and management. Therefore, if the chairman of 
the board and the CEO are one person then it is a one-man show and there is a real risk that the 
board will not be independent from management. In addition, The Cadbury report (1992) 
emphasizes the importance of separating the role of CEO and chairman.  Furthermore, the 





According to Jensen et al. (1976), earnings management practices are controlled by 
separating management from control decisions, this also helps in minimizing agency costs.  
Similarly, the Cadbury report (1992) also strongly advises separation of these two roles. 
Previous studies use the CEO duality as a determinant of earnings management. They state that 
the combination may affect the board effectiveness in monitoring management. For example, 
Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms are more likely to be subject to accounting enforcement 
actions by the SEC for alleged violations of GAAP if the CEO also serve as the chair of the 
board. Peasnell et al. (2000) investigates the impact of the separation between the functions of 
the CEO and that of the chairman of the board on the earnings management. They find a 
significant negative association between these two variables; therefore, this research study aims 
to test the following (non-directional) hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: CEO duality is associated with earnings management. 
2.2.4.4. Number of Board Meetings (NOBM) and Earnings Management 
Another important characteristic is the board activity; this function is measured by the 
frequency of board meetings. The Cadbury report (1992) suggests that it is important for boards 
to meet between four to six times a year, this frequency is considered enough to allow for the 
progress of the firm to be sufficiently monitored and for important and key decisions to be 
taken. Concerning board effectiveness, board activity is an important function. The consensus 
is that the more active the board, the better for the shareholders’ interests because the directors 
are compelled to invest greater energy and time into participation of the affairs of the firm 
(Conger et al. 1998). However, there is an opposing view that board meetings are not 
necessarily useful because routine tasks absorb much of the limited time that directors and 
CEO’s spend together to set the agenda for board meetings, and therefore, the impact of higher 
number of board meetings positively affects the earnings management (Lorca, et al. 2011). 
Gulzar and Wang (2011) and Metawee (2013) find a significant positive relationship between 
the board activity and the profit management. Their results indicate that the board meetings 
more often help to increase the earnings management. According to Jensen (1993), the impact 
of the number of board meetings on the earnings management is positive. Jensen states that 
management of a company that holds board meeting too often waste too much time in the 
meeting instead of overseeing management's performance. Therefore, numbers of the meeting 
cannot reduce earning management, whereas higher number of meetings accelerate earnings 





Hypothesis 4: The number of board meetings is associated with the earnings management. 
2.2.4.5. Gender Diversity (GENDIV) and Earnings Management  
Gender diversity is a proxy for the presentation of women directors on the board. 
Gender diversity is estimated by taking the women as a percentage of board size (Lakhal, et al. 
2015). Moradi et al. (2012) study the impact of gender diversity on the earnings management 
and conclude that the impact of gender diversity on earnings management is insignificant. 
Whereas, according to Man and Wong (2013), the impact of gender diversity on earnings 
management is positive. Moreover, they state that female directors are more risk averse towards 
earnings management. However, Lakhal et al. (2015) investigated the impact of gender 
diversity on earnings management and concludes that increasing the percentage of female 
directors on the board of directors helps in controlling earnings management and therefore, the 
relationship between the percentage of female directors and earnings management is negative. 
Based on the above discussion, the research study proposes the following (non-directional) 
hypothesis to be tested.   
Hypothesis 5: The gender diversity is associated with earnings management. 
2.2.5. United Kingdom (UK) Capital Market  
Most of the research explaining the relationship between board characteristics and 
earnings management is based on the United States (US). Research conducted on United 
Kingdom (UK) is relatively sparse. The few studies that examine this relationship in the UK 
context uses older data (Peasnell et al. 2000a and 2005). Therefore, they do not cover some 
corporate governance mechanisms, as these were not applicable during their sample time. In 
addition, this research also sheds light on the effectiveness of the recent corporate governance 
recommendations on enhancing financial reporting quality in the UK.  
Moreover, Hofstede (2001) states that although UK and US are similar in many 
respects, there are many corporate governance elements that are different in both systems such 
as differences regarding the composition of boards, executive compensation levels and audit 
committee functions (Monks and Minow, 2004). Moreover, UK and US follow different 
accounting standards. UK prepares financial statements by using international financial 
reporting standards (IFRS) whereas the US uses generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP). Therefore, the extent of earnings management differs between these systems. Brown 




significantly higher than that by their counterparts in the UK. It is therefore useful to extend 
previous empirical evidence by reference and comparison to the UK context.  
An important objective of this study is to understand the effectiveness of corporate 
governance in controlling accounting practices such as earnings management and in enhancing 
financial reporting quality and transparency, which ultimately allows investors to make well-
informed decisions, moreover, enhances the confidence of the investors in the capital market. 
Therefore, selecting a country which adheres to the Anglo-Saxon model, which is a 
shareholder-oriented model adds significant value to this research (Luo, 2007). As compared 
to most of the European countries such as Germany, Finland and Netherland which follow the 
stakeholder-oriented model (Palmer, 2011), UK is an Anglo-Saxon country (Maassen, 2002). 
UK being part of the Anglo-Saxon countries and common law countries taking its foundation 
from shareholder-oriented model is shareholder-oriented model makes the selection of UK is 
the most appropriate sample for a research that addresses the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance in relation to the quality of financial reporting.  
The focus of this research study is to understand the association between earnings 
management and corporate governance attributes in listed companies. Therefore, a strong 
equity market adds significant value to the research study. According to Nobes and Parker, 
(2008), in France and Italy, banks are the major sources of financing, therefore, in these 
countries, debt markets are very strong. Whereas in the UK, US and Germany, equity is the 
major source of financing, therefore, the equity markets are stronger here. According to Nobes 
and Parker, there are 4.7 million, 7.9 million, 18 million and 44.4 million listed companies in 
Italy, Germany, US and UK respectively. Moreover, the ratio of equity market capitalization 
to GDP of Italy, Germany, US and UK are 0.60, 0.56, 1.57 and 1.75 respectively, which 
suggests that based on the number of domestic listed companies and equity market 
capitalization to GDP ratio, UK is the strongest equity market. Therefore, this research 
contributes to the existing literature by empirically investigating the relationship of the 
corporate governance attributes with the earnings management in Britain’s market and explains 
which corporate governance attributes positively or negatively affect the earnings management 






2.3. Data and Methodology 
This research study uses the quantitative approach and secondary data obtained from 
various sources. It is an explanatory research examining and investigating the relationship 
between dependent variables (earning management) and independent variables (board 
characteristics).  
2.3.1. Data Sample 
The sample for this research study comprised of listed companies on FTSE-350 index. 
FTSE-350 index is selected because it includes, by capitalization, the largest 350 companies, 
which are primarily listed on the London stock exchange. Moreover, FTSE 350 account for a 
significant portion of the UK economic output. There are a number of reasons for focusing on 
large companies.  
Firstly, some provisions of the corporate governance code do not apply to small 
companies that lay outside this index. Secondly, stakeholders are more concerned regarding 
large firms compared to small ones. Thirdly, it is important to mention here that the research 
study conducted in UK on the topic of board characteristics and its impact on the earnings 
management is minimal. Most of the research on the above-mentioned topic is conducted in 
US. Therefore, conducting a research study on this topic bridges the gap and make the UK 
market participants able to understand the importance and significance of board characteristics 
in relation to earnings management in the UK.  
This sample period spans from 2007 to 2018 and uses the annual data because most of 
the companies are preparing and publishing their financial statements annually. This period is 
also important because a research study conducted from 2007 to 2018 enables the research 
study to understand the impact of board of director’s characteristics on earnings management 
in the post-recession period.  
Moreover, a criterion is set for the firms to be included in the sample study. The first 
criteria are that a firm must meet the criterion of being listed on the FTSE 350 within 2007-
2018 and should not be delisted within the period. The second criterion is that a firm, which is 
included in the data sample, must publish their director’s profile. Therefore, the sample size 
that covers the span of this study and satisfies the criteria of having information on all the 





Those companies are dropped from the sample size whose board of director’s 
information are not available or do not provide complete financial statements within the period 
to get the information related to accounting figures required for computation of discretionary 
accruals, ROA and firm size. The secondary sources used for data collection comprised of 
listed companies’ annual reports and Bloomberg.  
2.3.2. Measuring Earnings management 
Earnings management is a proxy for discretionary accruals that is estimated by applying 
three models including Jones model (JM), modified Jones model (MJM) and Kothari model 
(KM). Finally, earnings management is measured based on the results of the above three 
models by applying the first principal component function (the detailed explanation of the 
earnings management measurement is provided in appendix 1).  
  
'M$,! = (&"P$,!* 0.577351) + (&"MP$,!*0.577354) + (&"Q$,!*0.577354)    (2.12) 
2.3.3. Independent variables  
2.3.3.1.  Board Independence (BI) 
One of the most important functions of the board is to reduce as much as possible 
manager’s discretion and opportunism. The most important factor in achieving this goal is to 
establish an independent board. A board is independent when the independent directors 
(outside directors) are higher in proportion as compared to inside directors. 
Board Independence (BI) 
BI = 3ARF<,	.S	2B/<T<B/<B+	&E,<G+.,0 L.-,/	UEV<W  
2.3.3.2. Board Size (BS) 
Literature relating to corporate governance is largely interested in understanding the 
role of the board size in the effectiveness of the BOD. Beasley (1996) state that the size of the 
board is an important factor for the effectiveness of the board. The logarithm of the board size 
is used to estimate the board size.  
Board Size (BS) 




2.3.3.3.  CEO Duality (CEOD) 
CEO duality is a dummy variable, which is one (1) if the CEO and board chairman are 
the same person, otherwise it is zero if the roles of the CEO and board Chairman are holding 
by two different persons.  
1 = CEO and board chairman are the same person 
0 = CEO and board chairman positions are held by different persons 
2.3.3.4.  Number of board meetings in a year (NOBM) 
Board activity is the number of board meetings that take place in a year. The logarithm 
of the board activity is used as a proxy for the number of board meetings.  
Board activity (NOBM) 
NOBM = Ln (Number of board meetings during a year) 
2.3.3.5.  Gender diversity (GENDIV) 
Gender diversity refers to the percentage of women directors on the board of directors. 
Gender diversity is estimated by taking the number of women directors as a proportion of the 
board size.  
%Gender diversity (GENDIV) 
K'3&24 = Number of Women directors / Board Size 
All variables are defined in Table 2.1.  
[TABLE	2.1] 
2.3.4. Control Variables 
2.3.4.1.  Leverage (LEV) 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) report that managers use 
discretionary accruals to satisfy debt covenant requirements. Because highly leveraged firms 
are more likely to increase earnings when the management and executive’s incentives are high. 
Trueman and Titman (1986) argue that managing earnings enables managers to reduce 
estimates of various claimants of the firm about the volatility of its earnings process and so 
lowers their assessment of the probability of bankruptcy. Consequently, this provides an 
opportunity to borrow at lower interest rates and decreases cost of capital. Consistent with debt 
hypothesis, it is believed that managers in more leveraged firms are more likely to adopt 
aggressive earnings management techniques to prevent violation of debt covenants (Watts and 




included, as a proxy for risk, because mangers are more likely to exercise their accounting 
discretion when they are closer to default on debt covenants (Press and Weintrop, 1990).  
Leverage (LEV) 
LEV = Total Debt / Total Assets 
2.3.4.2.  Firm Size (FS) 
Firm size is used in most earnings’ management studies as a control variable. Earlier 
studies show that firm size impact on earnings management is negative (Dechow, et al. 1995; 
Defond and Jiambalvo 1994). According to past literature, smaller companies are subject to 
less control from authority and therefore, engage in earnings management activities but some 
argue that earnings management activities increase as the size of a company increases (Guthrie 
and Sokolowsky, 2010 and Badolato et al. 2014). The empirical findings of the past research 
state that the relationship of a firm’s size with earnings management is positive. They claim 
that large firms face greater scrutiny from investors, and thus are more likely to manage 
earnings to satisfy their forecast (Gonzalez and Meca, 2014, and Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). 
Whereas Lee and Vetter (2015) state that the impact of a firm’s size   on earnings management 
is not significant. However, most of the scholars and researchers hold the opinion that the firm 
size impact on earnings management is significant and there is a relationship between the firm 
size and earnings management, therefore, this research study is including the firm size as a 
control variable.  
Firm Size (FS) 
FS = a3(8U$,!) 
2.3.4.3.  Return on Assets (ROA) 
According to Klein (2002), Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) and Ali and Zheng (2015), 
ROA is a control variable for earnings management. ROA gives an idea as to how efficient 
management is at using its assets to generate earnings. Dechow et al. (1995) suggest that firm 
performance is supposed to have a positive association with discretionary accruals. Without 
controlling for ROA, discretionary accruals may reflect changes in the sample firm 









2.3.4.4.  Audit Quality (AQ) 
Audit quality is measured by taking the natural log of the audit fees that is paid by the 
company to the external audit company. Higher audit fees paid suggests that the quality of the 
audit is high, and the company hired good audit companies for auditing their financial 
reporting. Theoretically, higher audit companies are in a better position to control unethical 
accounting practices and therefore, improves the quality of financial reporting (Becker, 
Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Zang, 2012).		
2.3.4.5.  Sales growth ratio (SG) 
Sales growth ratio is added in the empirical model as a control variable. Firms with 
higher sales growth have more growth prospects, therefore, a possibility arises that these firms 
might get engaged in earnings management to meet the stakeholder’s expectations (Hribar & 




2.3.4.6.  Change in operating Cash Flow (OCF) 
According to (Becker et al.1998), the impact of the operating cash flow on earnings 
management is negative.  They state that the management engage in earnings management 
when the operating cash flow is lower. Operating cash flows are estimated by taking the natural 
log of the operating cash flows.  
JT<,-+EBb	#-0ℎ	SD.c$,! = LN (∆JT<,-+EBb	#-0ℎ	SD.c$,!)/	JT<,-E+Bb	#-0ℎ	SD.c$,!&" 
2.3.4.7.  Loss (LOSS) 
Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ROA is negative and 0 
otherwise. Those companies that are making losses are highly likely to engage in earnings 
management and manipulate the financial information. Therefore, LOSS is included in the 
empirical regression model as a control variable (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). 
1 = ROA is negative 
0 = ROA is zero or positive 
TOBINQ is initially included in the regression model as the control variable, however, 
the correlation between ROA and TOBINQ is significantly high approximately 0.79. One of 
the reasons for this could be that both variables i.e., TOBINQ and ROA are the firm’s 




the problem of multicollinearity in the regression model. Therefore, to address the issue, 
variance inflation factor (VIF) test is conducted (Neter et al. 1996). According to Akinwande 
et al. (2015), if the VIF is equal to 1, there is no multicollinearity among the regressors, 
however, if the VIF is greater than 1 and is between 1 to 5, the regressors may be correlated. 
According to the VIF test, the VIF for TOBINQ and ROA are 3.50 and 3.19 respectively which 
indicates the problem of multicollinearity between the TOBINQ and ROA. To resolve the issue 
of multicollinearity, one of the remedies is to remove the highly correlated variable (O'Connell 
and Ann, 2005). Consistent with this, TOBINQ is removed from the regression model to rectify 
the regression model for multicollinearity and enhance the validity and efficiency of the model. 
2.3.5. Real Earnings Management 
To examine the consistency of our results, I run robustness tests to test the impact of 
the board characteristics on real earnings management. Dechow and Skinner (2000) said that 
real earnings management takes place once the management build intentionally operational 
selections, which as a result changes the earnings as per the desire of the management, for 
example, the management may reduce the price by offering higher discounts or offering easy 
credit terms to enhance the revenue. In addition, according to Zang (2012), management 
sometimes delay maintenance expenditures to increase the earnings in the current year. Cohen 
and Zarowin (2010) said that real earnings management do not exploit the accounting standards 
as discretionary accruals, however, the management takes purposeful actions to deviate from 
the traditional business practices and manipulate the earnings.  
To measure the real earnings management, the Roychowdhury (2006) methodology is 
followed. In this method, the real earnings management are measured in three steps. In the first 
step, the normal level of production costs is estimated by applying the Roychowdhury (2006) 
methodology which is as follows: 
 
(;J&$,!/7"$,!&" = I# + I"(1/7"$,!&") + I'(;<=$,!	/7"$!&")+ I)(∆;<=$,!	/7"$!&") + 
I,(∆;<=$,!&"	/7"$!&") + e$,!   (2.13) 
Where: 
(;J&$,!  The sum of the cost of goods sold in year + and the change in inventory from 
+ − 1	+.	+	for firm E 
7"$,!&"  Total assets for firm E in the previous year 




∆;<=$,!	  Change in sales revenue for firm ! in year " 
∆;<=$,!&"	  Change in Sales revenue for firm E in year + − 1	
I" to I, Coefficient values for explanatory variables  
I#   Intercept or Constant 
e$,!  Residual term which represents the abnormal level of production costs or more 
specifically the real earnings management component of the production cost 
;'M_(;J&$,! 
In equation 2.13, residuals from the model represent the abnormal level of production 
costs (REM_(;J&$,!), which is the first component of the real earnings management. Higher 
residual would suggest that there is higher inventory overproduction, which as a result 
decreases the cost of goods sold and eventually causes higher reported earnings. In the second 
step, equation 2.14 is applied by using the normal level of discretionary expenditures to 
estimate the residuals from the model which represent the abnormal level of discretionary costs 
or more specifically the real earnings management component of the discretionary cost 
(;'M_&2Ug$,!). The abnormal level of discretionary costs is then multiplied by minus one 
because, higher values of the abnormal level of discretionary costs show higher amounts 
discretionary expenditures cut by firms to increase reported earnings. 
 
&2Ug$,!/7"$,!&" = I# + I"(1/7"$,!&") + I'(;<=$,!&"	/7"$!&")+ e$,!  (2.14) 
Where: 
&2Ug$,!  The sum of R&D, advertising, and SG&A expenditures in year + 
7"$,!&"  Total assets for firm E in the year + − 1 
;<=$,!&"	  Sales Revenue for firm E in year + − 1  
I" to I' Coefficient values for explanatory variables 
I#   Intercept or Constant  
e$,!   Residual term which represents the abnormal level of discretionary costs or 
more specifically the real earnings management component of the discretionary 
cost (;'M_&2Ug$,!) 
Finally, in the third step, the real earnings management are estimated by aggregating 
the two real activities manipulation measures into one proxy, REM, by taking the sum of the 
abnormal level of production costs and abnormal level of discretionary costs.  




2.4.  Results 
This section of the research study provides analysis of the relationship between the 
board characteristics and earnings management. The findings and results are presented based 
on the results of four empirical regression models that comprise of Jones model, modified Jones 
model, Kothari model and earnings management model. 
2.4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2.2 presents the results of the descriptive statistics for the board characteristics, 
earnings management and control variables. The discretionary accruals mean is approximately 
zero and standard deviation is 0.89, from which it can be inferred that the discretionary accruals 
are highly diverse among companies. In contrast to earnings management, the standard 
deviation for board size, board independence and number of board meetings is lower, which 
suggests, that the board size, number of independent directors on the board and the frequency 
of the board meetings data is more centred and concentrated and do not change substantially 
from company to company. Women representation on the board is a about 14% on average. 
The average ROA is approximately 7% and the standard deviation is 13%, from which it can 
be inferred that that on average, the earning’s risk is higher and there is higher variation in 
earnings in FTSE 350 companies. 
[TABLE	2.2] 
2.4.2. Correlation 
It can be observed from the correlation matrix (Table 2.3) that the relationship of the 
earnings, management with board size, board independence, CEO duality and number of board 
meetings is positive, which suggests that companies with larger board size, higher board 
independence, both position i.e. board chairman and CEO are holding by one person and those 
boards in the members meet more frequently are highly likely to engage in earnings 
management and encourages earnings management practices. In contrast, the correlation of the 
gender diversity with the earnings management is negative, from which it can be inferred that 
the presence of the female directors on the board helps in controlling earnings management 
practices. Moreover, earnings management is positively correlated with financial leverage and 
firm size, which suggests that large companies heavily financed with debt are more likely to 






2.4.3. Empirical Model 
Applying three (3) regression models that comprised of Jones model (1991), modified 
Jones model (1996) and Kothari model (2005) tests the impact of board characteristics on 
earnings management. Finally, earnings management are estimated by applying the first 
principal component approach, which is estimating the discretionary accruals by taking 
weighted average of the discretionary accruals of the three models that comprised of Jones 
model (1991), modified Jones model (1996) and Kothari model (2005) and tested the impact 
of board characteristics on earnings management by applying the following empirical model. 
 
'M$,! = I0 + I1LU0,1−1 + I2L20,1−1 + I3#'J&0,1−1 + I43JLM0,1−1 + I5K'3&240,1−1 + 
j1a'40,1−1 + j'8U$,!&" + j);J"$,!&" + j,"k$,!&" + j-UK$,! + j7∆J#8$,! + j8aJUU$,!&" + 
∑j9m&9 +	e$,!       
 
Where: 
'M$,!    Earnings management for firm E in year + 
LU$,!&"   Board Size for firm E in the previous year 
L2$,!&"   Board Independence for firm E in the previous year 
#'J&$,!&"   CEO Duality for firm E in the previous year 
3JLM$,!&"   Number of Board Meeting for firm E in the previous year 
K'3&24$,!&"   Gender Diversity for firm E in the previous year 
a'4$,!&"   Leverage for firm E in the previous year 
8U$,!&"   Firm Size for firm E in the previous year 
;J"$,!&"   Return on asset firm E in the previous year 
"k$,!&"   Audit Quality for firm E in the previous year 
UK$,!&"   Sales growth for firm E in the current year 
∆J#8$,!   Change in Operating Cash flow for firm E in year + 
aJUU$,!&"  Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if ROA is negative and 0 
otherwise firm E in the previous year 
∑j9m&9  Year Dummy fixed effect Variable from 2008 to 2018 represents the 
number of years 
I#    Constant or intercept  




j" To j:  Coefficient values for control variables 
e$,!    Residual or error term 
All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
2.4.4. Regression Analysis – Discretionary Accruals 
The coefficient value of the board size based on the results of Jones model, modified 
Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management model are negative and statistically 
significant at 1% of significance level, which suggests that there is a negative association 
between the board size and earnings management. The results are consistent with the previous 
empirical findings of the Ahmed et al. (2006), Fama et al. (1983), Defond et al. (1994), Cheng 
and Warfield (2005) and Xie et al. (2003) however, based on the results of all the four models, 
the impact is insignificant.  
The impact of the board independence on earnings management is negative and 
statistically significant at 1% based on the results of Jones model, modified Jones model, 
Kothari model and earnings management model. Based on the findings, it can be inferred 
boards with higher percentage of independent directors are more effective in controlling 
earnings management practices. This is consistent with previous empirical findings of the 
Dechow et al. (1996) Peasnell et al. (2000), Donnelly and Lynch, (2002) and Cornett et al. 
(2009), which study the impact of board independence on earnings management.   
The CEO duality coefficient value is positive and statistically significant at 1% based 
on the results of Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management 
model. The results suggest that when both positions i.e., CEO and board chairman is held by 
one person, the board of directors’ role in controlling earnings management is ineffective. The 
results are consistent with the previous empirical findings of the Jensen et al. (1976) and 
Dechow et al. (1996). 
The results show that the NOBM and earnings management are positively related based 
on the results of Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management 
model, moreover, based on the results of all the four regression models, the impact is 
statistically significant at 1% of significance level. Based on the results, it can be inferred that 
when the board meets for a higher number of times, the board loses its control over unnecessary 
practices such as earnings management to control. This is consistent with the previous 
empirical findings of the Jensen (1993), Lorca, et al. (2011), Gulzar and Wang (2011) and 





Based on the findings of the Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and 
earnings management model, there is a negative association between gender diversity and 
earnings management, moreover, the impact is statistically significant at 1% of significance 
level. The results and findings suggest that when the percentage of women is higher on the 
board, the board role become more effective in terms of controlling earnings management. This 
is consistent with the previous empirical findings of the Lakhal, et al. (2015).  
[TABLE	2.4] 
2.4.5. Robustness test – Real Earnings Management 
To examine the consistency of our results, I run the robustness tests by testing the 
impact of the board characteristics on real earnings management. The real earnings 
management are measured by applying the Roychowdhury (2006) model.  
 
;'M$,! = I0 + I1LU0,1−1 + I2L20,1−1 + I3#'J&0,1−1 + I43JLM0,1−1 + I5K'3&240,1−1 + 
j1a'40,1−1 + j'8U$,!&" + j);J"$,!&" + j,"k$,!&" + j-UK$,! + j7∆J#8$,! + j8aJUU$,!&" + 
∑j9m&9 +	e$,!             (2.14) 
Where: 
;'M$,!   Real Earnings management for firm E in year +	
LU$,!&"   Board Size for firm E in the previous year 
L2$,!&"   Board Independence for firm E in the previous year 
#'J&$,!&"   CEO Duality for firm E in the previous year 
3JLM$,!&"   Number of Board Meeting for firm E in the previous year 
K'3&24$,!&"   Gender Diversity for firm E in the previous year 
a'4$,!&"   Leverage for firm E in the previous year 
8U$,!&"   Firm Size for firm E in the previous year 
;J"$,!&"   Return on asset firm E in the previous year 
"k$,!&"   Audit Quality for firm E in the previous year 
UK$,!&"   Sales growth for firm E in the current year 
J#8$,!    Operating Cash Flow for firm E in year + 
aJUU$,!&"  Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if ROA is negative and 0 
otherwise firm E in the previous year 
∑j9m&9   Year Dummy fixed effect Variable from 2008 to 2018 represent the 




I0    Constant or intercept  
I1 To I5   Coefficient for independent variables 
j1 To j8  Coefficient values for control variables 
e$,!    Residual or error term 
All variables are defined in Table 2.1. 
The results and findings of the real earnings management model show that there is a 
positive association between the board size and real earnings management. In addition, the 
result is statistically significant at 5% of significance level, which suggests that the larger the 
board size, the more ineffective the board is in controlling real earnings management. The 
board independence is positively related to real earnings management, moreover, the result is 
statistically significant at 1%. Based on the findings, it can be inferred that boards with higher 
percentage of independent directors are not effective in controlling real earnings management 
practices. There is a positive association between the CEO duality and real earnings 
management. The association is statistically significant at 1%.  The results suggest that when 
both positions i.e., CEO and board chairman is held by one person, the board of directors’ role 
in controlling real earnings management is ineffective. The results show that the NOBM and 
real earnings management are negatively related, however, the result is statistically 
insignificant. Based on the results, it can be stated that a board role becomes more effective in 
controlling real earnings management when the board members meet more frequently. Based 
on the real earnings management model, there is a positive association between gender 
diversity and earnings management, however, the impact is statistically insignificant, which 
suggests that higher percentage of women makes the board ineffective in controlling real 












The prime objective of this study was to investigate and study the impact of board 
characteristics on the earnings management. Board characteristics in this research study 
comprised of five characteristics that includes board independence, board size, CEO duality, 
number of board meetings and gender diversity. Earnings management is predicted by applying 
four empirical regression models that comprised of Jones model (1991), modified Jones model 
(1996) and Kothari model (2005) and principal component earnings management model. To 
test the impact of the board characteristics on earnings management, five (5) hypotheses are 
developed.  
The association of board size and board independence with earnings management is 
negative, which suggests that larger boards with higher percentage of independent directors on 
the board are more effective in controlling earnings management practices. CEO duality and 
earnings management are positively related. The number of board meetings is also positively 
associated with earnings management. Based on the results, it can be inferred that when the 
board meets frequency, the board loses its control over unnecessary practices such as earnings 
management to control. There is a negative association between gender diversity and earnings 
management, from which it can be inferred that when the percentage of women on the board 
is higher, the board role become more effective in terms of controlling earnings management. 
The collective impact of all board characteristics on earnings management is statistically 
significant, which suggests that there is statistically significantly association between earnings 
management and board characteristics in FTSE 350 listed companies. In comparison to the 
results of the discretionary accruals models, the results of the real earnings management model 
show that board size, board independence, CEO duality and gender diversity are positively 
associated with real earnings management, however, the number of audit committee meetings 








3. Chapter Three – Earnings Management and Audit Committee  
3.1. Introduction  
In corporate governance, the transparency and reliability of the financial information 
through reporting practices carries significant importance as it allows the stakeholders to make 
well-informed decisions, draw valid conclusions and protect their interests (Tricker, 2000; 
Cadbury, 2000). To improve the quality of corporate financial reporting and control unethical 
accounting practices such as earnings management, the role of the audit committee is integral 
and significantly important (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). The main purpose of the audit 
committee is to oversee and supervise the corporate financial reporting practices and improve 
the quality of financial reporting by closely monitoring and overseeing the accounting practices 
(Klein, 2002).  
Earnings management is the use of management’s discretion provided by the 
accounting standards and practices to increase, decrease or stabilize the reported earnings for 
various reasons and purposes, such as to convey the desired message to the market, beating the 
financial analysts’ expectations, to avoid takeover attempts and to increase the managers 
compensation (Brealey et al. 2011; Drever et al. 2007). According to McKee (2005), earnings 
management is a technique applied by management to manipulate financial information to 
communicate the desired message to the market. 
The primary concern is that despite the presence of audit committees, a number of cases 
of earnings management and financial statements manipulation have been reported. This 
suggests that just having an audit committee is not sufficient by itself to control and mitigate 
the tendencies for earnings management and the financial statement manipulation by 
management. Instead, the most important element is to understand what the vital attributes of 
an audit committee are which can help mitigate and control undesired accounting practices 
such as earnings management. Therefore, the research in recent times is not just concerned 
about the formation of an audit committee, whereas the concern and emphasis are on the 
attributes and effectiveness of an audit committee in improving the quality of financial 
information by closely monitoring and enhancing the stakeholder’s confidence in financial 
statements. Therefore, the questions that arise are: 
• Is the audit committee role effective in improving the quality of financial information 
by closely monitoring the financial reporting and management? 
• What are the significant attributes and characteristics of an audit committee regarding? 




o Those which allow improvement of the quality of financial reporting and  
o Those, which are supportive in enhancing the stakeholder’s confidence in 
financial statements. 
Klein (2002) states that to better evaluate the effectiveness of the audit committee either 
the audit committee is effective in accomplishing its objectives, it is highly important to 
decompose the characteristics and attributes of the audit committee and evaluate its role in 
mitigating or controlling unethical accounting practices. According to Klein, the most 
prominent and important attributes of the audit committee which are highly associated with the 
effectiveness of financial reporting comprises of audit committee size, audit committee 
independence, audit committee members holding accounting and finance degrees, knowledge 
and experience, and the frequency of meetings in a year. In addition, Goodwin (2003) states 
that the audit committee is more effective in enhancing the quality of financial reporting when 
the audit committee members carry expertise in accounting and finance background and 
concludes that independent non-executive directors with financial and accounting expertise 
adds more value to the effectiveness of the audit committee. 
However, recently corporate collapses and financial scandals brought the role of the 
audit committee under harsh criticism. One of the reasons for financial scandals and the 
corporate collapse of some of the multi-national corporations are the unethical accounting 
practices such as earnings management (Drever et al. 2007). Another major and perhaps the 
most prominent reason the financial scandals emerged is the ineffective role of the audit 
committee in monitoring and controlling the opportunistic earnings management practice. 
Therefore, this research study aims to decompose the features and characteristics of the audit 
committee, research its impact on the earnings management, and understand that up to what 
extent, the role of an audit committee is effective in monitoring and controlling the earnings 
management and in improving the quality of financial information.  
This study period starts from 2007 to 2018 and uses the annual data. The reason, annual 
data is applied is most of the companies prepare and publish their financial statements annually. 
The chosen period is post-financial crisis; it, therefore, carries significant importance as this 
research study explains the role of the audit committee in controlling unethical accounting 
practices in post-financial crisis period. In addition, the chosen period provides a window to 
test the Smith Report’s (2003) recommendations for audit committees following the issue of 
the UK Code and to understand the extent to which the recommended characteristics of the 
audit committee can help the companies improve the quality of financial reporting. The data 




Based on the literature, four hypotheses are developed. The null hypotheses state that 
the impact of the audit committee attributes on the earnings management is insignificant, 
whereas alternative hypotheses state that the impact of the audit committee attributes on the 
earnings management is significant. The attributes of audit committee that are examined in this 
research study comprise of audit committee size (ACS), audit committee independence (ACI), 
members on the audit committee with a background in accounting or finance or both (ACFEX) 
and the frequency of the audit committee meetings during a year (NACM). In addition, seven 
control variables are included in the empirical model that includes leverage (LEV), return on 
assets (ROA), firm size (FS), audit quality (AQ), sales growth ratio (SG), change in operating 
cash flow (∆J#8) and loss (LOSS). 
The empirical results and findings of this research study based on the four discretionary 
accrual models that include Jones model (1991), modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1996), 
Kothari model (2005) and earnings management model suggests that the impact of the ACS on 
the earnings management is negative, from which it can be inferred that those companies in 
FTSE 350, having large size are more effective in controlling earnings management. The 
impact of the ACI on the earnings management is positive, from which, it can be inferred that 
the audit committee role is inefficient in controlling earnings management, when the proportion 
of independent directors on the audit committee is higher. The impact of the ACFXP on the 
earnings management is negative, suggesting that those audit committees in which, the 
proportion of the audit committee member’s financial expertise in accounting or finance is 
higher, are more effective in controlling earnings management practices. The impact of the 
NACM on the earnings management is negative, from which, it can be concluded that the audit 
committee is more effective in controlling earnings management, when the audit committee 
members meet more frequently. In a nutshell, the impact of the ACI on the earnings 
management is positive, whereas, the impact of the ACS, ACFXP and NACM on the earnings 








3.2. Literature Review 
3.2.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical, empirical and academic view on the relationship 
between the earnings management and audit committee attributes. Finally, based on the 
analytical analysis of the literature and empirical results, the research hypotheses are 
developed.  
3.2.2. Audit committee and UK Corporate Governance Code 
Evidence from prior research studies on audit committees suggest that effective 
monitoring and overseeing of the audit committee plays a significant role in corporate 
governance (Smith Report, 2003), and results in improving the quality of financial reporting 
(Pomeroy and Thornton, 2008; Marra et al. 2011; Beasley et al. 2009). The quality of financial 
reporting is improved through strengthening governance, promoting conservatism and 
controlling or reducing opportunistic earnings management (Xie et al. 2003; Bedard et al. 2004; 
Leventis and Dimitropoulos, 2012). In addition, the audit committee role is significant in 
developing a strong internal control system (Chambers and Weight, 2008), oversight of risk 
management, the extent of voluntary disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001) and ensuring the 
regulatory compliance (Barako et al. 2006), which results in lower error and higher financial 
reporting quality.  
The role of the audit committee is significant for corporate governance; however, it is 
important to understand the possible characteristics of an ideal audit committee. The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, Guidance on Audit Committees, 
2012) provides discretion as to their adoption; however, it recommends the ideal characteristics 
of the audit committee. According to the UK Corporate Governance Code, it is recommended 
that there should be at least three independent non-executive directors in the audit committee. 
In addition, there should be at least one member on the audit committee who holds financial 
experience, which is both recent and relevant. Furthermore, the number of audit committee 
meetings should be at least three times in a year. In addition, UK Corporate Governance Code 
states that firms are required to comply with or explain non-compliance (Ghafran and 
O'Sullivan, 2013). Rules and regulations that are concerned with audit committee scrutiny of 
disclosures that also includes the risk management processes are set out in only general terms 




3.2.3. Theoretical framework 
3.2.3.1. Agency theory 
Theoretical support for the formation and setting up of an audit committee can be found 
in agency theory. According to the agency theory, firms are financed by shareholders but are 
controlled by the management. Therefore, it can be stated that management works as agents of 
the shareholders, with shareholders acting as principals. As a result of separation between 
ownership and management, shareholders cannot monitor the management directly (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). At the same time, as shareholders hold position as investors of the company, 
they are primarily concerned with obtaining maximum utility from their investments by 
ensuring that the management works in the best interest of the shareholders (Kalbers and 
Fogarty 1998). In addition, assuming economic self-interest, the possibility arises that instead 
the management works in the best interest of the shareholders; the agents work towards 
achieving their personal desired objectives, and therefore, engage in opportunistic actions. 
Therefore, the corporate governance system installed in the company’s structure to oversee the 
actions of the management, ensure that the management is efficiently utilising the shareholders’ 
funds and working in the best interest of the shareholders. In addition, to make corporate 
governance more effective, sub-committees that includes audit committee, nomination 
committee and compensation committees are established to better monitor and oversee the 
management activities and ensure that the management is working in the best interest of the 
shareholders. These corporate governance control systems aim to either align managers' and 
shareholders' incentives or to limit managers’ opportunistic activities (Dellaportas et al. 2005). 
One of the examples of these corporate governance controls is the audit committee. Kalbers 
and Fogarty (1998) state that the audit committee is a vital component of the decision control 
system allowing board of directors to monitor financial reporting internally.    
Bradbury (1990) states that the quality of information flowing between the stakeholders 
and management can be improved by employing an audit committee, whereas, in addition an 
audit committee can oversee the financial reporting internally, which can minimize the agency 
costs. In a nutshell, employing the agency theoretical framework, one can propose that the 
attributes of the audit committee can substantially limit accrual-based distortion of financial 
reporting and accounting practices such as earnings management and thus improves the quality 




3.2.3.2. Earnings management  
According to Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Kinnunen and Koskeka (2003), 
earnings management is the technique applied by management to manipulate the financial 
information by exploiting the managerial discretion provided by the accounting standards and 
conveys the desired message instead of the actual picture of the company through manipulated 
financial information to the stakeholders. In addition, Healy and Wahlen, (1999) states that the 
management engage in earnings management when the management is unable to meet 
investor’s expectations during periods of volatile earnings. Moreover, they state that although, 
the management do not violate the accounting standards as management exploits managerial 
discretion, however, the standards are used in such a manner which helps management to 
present the financial information in a way the management wants to show to the stakeholders 
instead of the actual performance of the company. Furthermore, Cheng and Warfield (2010) 
conclude from their research on earnings management that earnings management is the 
opportunistic behaviour of the managers, in which, the managers manipulate the financial 
information to maximize their compensation. According to Iturriaga and Hoffmann (2005), 
earning management arises as a result of agency problems. Managers are expected to efficiently 
generate and invest shareholders’ funds, effectively manage the company’s operations and 
meet investor’s expectation. However, there is a possibility that the management performance 
is not as per the investor’s expectation, and to conceal the inefficiency and poor performance, 
the managers engage in earnings management. Additionally, Kinnunen and Koskeka (2003) 
state that it can be inferred from the most recent accounting scandals that the managers 
sometimes mislead the stakeholders on the economic performance of their company by 
producing financial statements that provide manipulated financial information.  
In summary, earnings management is the manipulation of financial information by 
exploitation of the discretion in accounting policies provided by accounting standards with the 
intention to mislead the stakeholders and communicate the desired message to the stakeholders. 
In addition, as a result of earnings management, Dechow et al. (2010) state that the practices 
of earnings management destroy the quality of earnings and financial information, and 
consequently the quality of financial reporting will lose out to illusion.  
3.2.3.3. Earnings management and audit committee 
The collapse of some of the multi-national corporations, the recent financial scandals 




management, therefore, there is ever increasing need to look up indicators of earnings 
reliability (DeZoort et al. 2002). 
Accounting earnings of any given firm are important to all stakeholders as the entire 
faith in the stakeholders and consequently of its firm rely on it (Germon and Meek, 2001). 
Importantly, from the accounting perspective, the final product of the entire accounting process 
is the accounting earning (Brealey et al. 2001). Therefore, earnings and relevance of earnings 
is the major concern for researchers and scholars to study and research if earnings continue to 
maintain its relevance in the decision making of various stakeholders. In addition, Bugshan 
(2005) states that the relevance of accounting earnings and its reliability is reduced by unethical 
accounting practices such as earnings management. Therefore, to maintain the relevance of 
accounting earnings and enhance the reliability of earnings, there is hence the need to devise 
ways such as employing a strong corporate governance system through board of directors and 
board committees, which can be applied in relation to enhance the practices of reporting quality 
earnings.  
Among all the board committees, the audit committee’s role is significant for enhancing 
the relevance and reliability of financial information and earnings by closely supervising and 
monitoring the financial reporting process and ensuring the compliance of accounting standards 
and principles (Ramsay, 2001). In addition, audit committees oversee manager’s tendencies to 
manipulate earnings. However, as a result of the most recent financial scandals such as 
ENRON, WorldCom, Global Crossing and Rank Xerox (Demaki, 2011; Norwani, et al. 2011), 
the regulators questioned the role and effectiveness of audit committees in ensuring that 
financial statements are fairly stated and are without earning management. A number of studies 
are conducted to understand the effectiveness and role of audit committee for enhancing the 
reliability and transparency of corporate financial reporting, however, the results are mixed and 
contradictory.   
3.2.4. Earnings Management, Audit Committee and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.4.1. Audit committee size (ACS) and earnings management 
Audit committee size (ACS) indicates the number of directors appointed as members 
of the audit committee (AC). According to Financial Reporting Council (FRC, 2016), the audit 
committee size should be at least three members, however, in case of smaller companies, its 
size should be at least two members consisting of independent non-executive directors. Menon 




performing their job. In addition, Abbott et al. (2004) and Xie et al. (2003) state that the 
minimum size of an AC should be between three to four members to better perform their duties 
and to control undesired accounting practices in the organization. The findings and results in 
the literature on the relationship between the earnings management and audit committee are 
mixed and contradictory. According to Vafeas (2005), a too small board is ineffective to 
exhaust and discharge their duties efficiently and therefore, the AC ability to monitor the 
financial reporting and internal control system diminishes. However, Jensen (1993) disagrees 
with Vafeas and states that too large size of the AC has an adverse impact on the performance 
of the AC, because the coordination and process problems intensify and therefore, AC 
performance results in weak monitoring. Yang and Krishnan (2005), Lin et al. (2006), Baxter 
and Cotter (2009), Lin and Hwang (2010) and Fodio et al. (2013) research studies conclude 
that the impact of the ACS on the Earnings management is significantly negative. Whereas Xie 
et al. (2003), Bedard et al. (2004), Abbott et al. (2004), and Soliman and Ragab (2014) research 
findings state that there is no impact of the ACS on the earnings management. It can be 
observed from the above discussion that the literature provides mixed results on the impact of 
the ACS on the earnings management. The intuition is that when the ACS is larger, the AC’s 
skills, background and power increases, which as a result enhances the ability of the AC to 
better control the undesired practices such as earnings management in the organizations, 
therefore, the study hypothesizes that: 
o" The audit committee size is associated with the earnings management.  
3.2.4.2. Audit committee independence (ACI) and earnings management 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) states that an independent AC is more effective in 
monitoring the internal control systems, the financial reporting and risk management, therefore, 
it strongly recommends that all the members of the AC should be independent. Klein, (2002) 
and Abbott et al. (2000) research studies conclude that practices such as financial 
misstatements and earnings management are better monitored and controlled when most of the 
members of the AC are independent directors. Therefore, the relationship between the board 
independence and earnings management is negative. In addition, past research results and 
literature states that a more independent AC is in a stronger and better position to protect the 
interest of the shareholders and better perform their monitoring role (Bedard et al. 2004; 
Abbott, et al. 2004; Yang and Krishnan, 2005). According to Xie et al. (2003), an independent 
AC is more effective in governance as compared to a less independent AC. In addition, 




independent AC is in a stronger position to control opportunistic earnings management practice 
in an organization and therefore, the relationship between the ACI and earnings management 
is negative. Whereas Lin et al. (2006) states that the impact of the AC independence on the 
earnings management is insignificant and there is no impact of the ACI on the earnings 
management. It can be observed that the research findings are contrary; therefore, this research 
study proposes the following hypothesis: 
o' The audit committee independence is associated with the earnings management.  
3.2.4.3. Audit committee financial expertise (ACFEX) and earnings 
management 
One of the strongest and important features of an AC that enhances the ability and 
efficiency of the AC to be more conversant with the financial statements and operational 
reports is the expertise, knowledge and experience of the AC members in accounting and audit 
related issues. It enables the members of the AC to better execute their oversight duties and 
improves the quality of the financial reporting. According to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) 
mandates, at least one member of the AC must be a financial expert. In addition, Bedard and 
Gendron (2010) state that the financial expertise of the AC members enhances its ability to ask 
knowledgeable questions detect and prevent undesired accounting practices and ensures high 
quality of financial information and reporting. Bedard et al. (2004) and Abbott et al. (2004) 
research shows that the presence of the financial experts on the AC improves the effectiveness 
of the AC in terms of controlling and discouraging earnings management practices, which 
suggests that the relationship between the AC having at least one member with financial 
expertise and earnings management is negative. In addition, Xie et al. (2003) states that those 
companies, in which the AC members are experts in accounting and financial matters 
experience less problems discretionary accruals. Moreover, research shows that the impact of 
the AC financial expertise on earnings management is negative and helps the organizations 
detect and prevent the earnings management within the organization and improve the quality 
of the financial information (Choi et al. 2007; Lin and Hwang, 2010; Soliman and Ragab, 
2014). Based on the above discussion, this research study proposes the following hypothesis: 
o) The relationship between the ACFEX and the earnings management is negative.  
3.2.4.4. Number of audit committee meetings (NACM) and earnings 
management 
According to Menon and Williams (1994), the frequency or number of AC meetings is 




likely to perform their monitoring duties more effectively and therefore, results in poor 
diligence and is less effective in controlling opportunistic earnings management practice such 
as earnings management. Li et al. (2012) state that an AC, which is more active and meets more 
frequently, provides greater opportunities to the AC members to monitor, evaluate and discuss 
issues related to financial reporting processes. Xie et al. (2003) suggest that more frequent 
meetings of the AC members are associated with effective monitoring. Abbott et al. (2004) 
mention that a minimum of four AC meetings significantly helps in controlling the incidence 
of financial misstatement. According to Lin and Hwang (2010), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) 
and Klein (2002), when the members of the AC meet more frequently, they are in a better and 
stronger position to monitor the financial reporting processes and are more likely to effectively 
detect and prevent undesired practices such as earnings management. Therefore, they state that 
there is a negative relationship between the number of AC meetings and earnings management. 
These findings are also supported by the research results of Lin and Hwang (2010) by 
concluding that there is a negative significant relationship between the earnings quality and 
number of AC meetings. Upon the critical analysis of the literature and research studies, this 
research study proposes the following hypothesis: 
o, The relationship between the frequency of the AC meetings and earnings management 












3.3. Data and Methodology 
3.3.1. Data Sample  
The data sample for this study comprises of companies that are listed on FTSE-350 
index. The reason that FTSE-350 index is selected is because it includes, by capitalization, the 
largest 350 companies, which are primarily listed on the London stock exchange. In addition, 
FTSE 350 account for a significant portion of the UK economic output. This study sample 
period is from 2007 to 2018 and uses the annual data because most of the companies prepare 
and publish their financial statements annually.  
Moreover, a criterion is followed in the data collection. The first criteria is that a firm 
must meet the criterion of being listed on the FTSE 350 within 2007-2018 and should not be 
delisted within this period. The second criterion is that a firm included in the data sample must 
publish their audit committee’s data. Therefore, the sample size that covers the span of this 
study and satisfies the criteria of having information on all the variables at the time of 
conducting this research are included in the data sample. The secondary sources which are used 
for data collection comprised of listed companies’ annual reports, Bloomberg and Data Stream.  
3.3.2. Measuring earnings Management 
Earnings management is a proxy for discretionary accruals that is estimated by applying 
three models that include Jones model (JM), modified Jones model (MJM) and Kothari model 
(KM). Finally, earnings management is measured based on the results of above three models 
by applying the first principal component function (the detailed explanation of the earnings 
management measurement is provided in Appendix 1).  
 
'M$,! = (&"P$,!* 0.577351) + (&"MP$,!*0.577354) + (&"Q$,!*0.577354) (3.1) 
Where: 
'M$,! Average discretionary accruals estimated by applying the principal component 
function. 
&"P$,!  Discretionary accruals estimated by applying the Jones model.  
&"MP$,!  Discretionary accruals estimated by applying the Modified Jones model. 




3.3.3. Independent variables 
The independent variables comprise of audit committee attributes that include the audit 
committee size, audit committee independence, Audit Committee members accounting and 
financial expertise and audit committee meetings frequency of meeting in a year.  
3.3.3.1. Audit Committee Size (ACS)  
Audit committee size (ACS) is the total number of the audit committee members in an 
audit committee. ACS is estimated by taking the natural logarithm of the total number of audit 
committee members in an audit committee, which is as follows: 
Audit Committee Size (ACS)  
= (Ln (1+"#U$,!)) 
3.3.3.2. Audit Committee Independence (ACI)  
Audit committee independence (ACI) is the proxy for the number of audit committee 
independent members in the audit committee. ACI is measured by taking the natural log of the 
number of independent directors.  
Audit Committee Independence (ACI)  
= (Ln (1+3ARF<,	.S	EB/<T<B/<B+	/E,<G+.,0	.B	+ℎ<	"A/E+	G.RRE++<<$,!)) 
3.3.3.3. Audit Committee accounting and financial expertise (ACFEX)  
Audit committee financial expertise is the percentage of the audit committee member’s 
financial expertise in accounting or finance or in both.  
3.3.3.4. Number of audit committee meetings in a year (NACM)  
Number of Audit committee meetings is the number of audit committee meetings in a 
fiscal year. Number of audit committee is estimated by taking the natural logarithm of the 
number of audit committee meeting in a financial year.  
Number of audit committee meetings in a year (NACM) 




3.3.4. Control Variables 
3.3.4.1. Firm Size (FS)  
The first control variable is firm size that controls the empirical results for the size effect 
in the regression test. According to Dechow et al. (1995) and Bedard et al. (2004), larger firms 
are in a stronger position to establish an effective internal control system. In addition, larger 
firms face higher scrutiny from the external stakeholders and market. As a result, the chances 
of opportunistic earnings management practices are lower; therefore, it presumes that firm size 
is negatively associated with earnings management.  Lin et al. (2009) state that small size 
companies are less effective as compared to large companies in cost management, because, 
large company’s production is higher, enjoying higher economies of scale and therefore, higher 
ability to establish an effective and strong corporate governance system (Bedard et al. 2004). 
In addition, as compared to large firms, small companies’ marginal cost is higher as a result of 
lower production and lower economies of scale compared to large firms, therefore, small firms 
are highly likely to engage in practices such as earnings management to communicate their 
desired message to the market. In addition, past research studies conclude that the relationship 
between the firm size and earnings management is inverse and negative (Klein 2002; Xie et al. 
2003). Finally, Fodio et al. (2013) state that firm size is relevant to both i.e., dependent variable 
(earnings management) and independent variables (audit committee characteristics). Firm size 
is estimated by taking the natural logarithm of the market value of the equity at the end of 
financial year, whereas the market value is the product of the number of outstanding shares and 
market price per share.  
Firm Size (FS) 
= aB	(8U$,!) 
3.3.4.2. Financial Leverage (LEV)  
The second control variable that is included in the regression model is leverage. 
Leverage controls the empirical results for the leverage effect in the regression test. It is 
believed by some of the scholars that usually firms with higher financial leverage face higher 
financial risk, and therefore, conveys a negative signal to the market. Therefore, to overcome 
the impact of the negative signal, these firms are highly likely to engage in earnings 
management (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Dechow et al. 1995). In addition, Bedard et al. 
(2004) state that there is a positive relationship between the firm’s financial leverage and 




control the results for financial leverage. Leverage is estimated by taking total debt as a 
percentage of the total capital at the end of the financial year, in which, total debt comprises of 
short-term and long-term debt and total capital includes short-term debt, long-term debt and 
equity. 
Financial leverage (LEV) 
= Total Debt (Long-term and short-term) / Total Capital 
3.3.4.3. Return on Assets (ROA) 
According to Klein (2002) Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) and Ali and Zheng (2015), 
ROA is a control variable for earnings management. ROA gives an idea as to how efficient 
management is at using its assets to generate earnings. Dechow et al. (1995) suggest that firm 
performance is supposed to have a positive association with discretionary accruals. Without 
controlling for ROA, discretionary accruals may reflect changes in the sample firm 






3.3.4.4. Audit Quality (AQ) 
Audit quality is measured by taking the natural log of the audit fees that is paid by the 
company to the external audit company. Higher audit fees paid suggests that the quality of the 
audit is high, and the company hired good audit companies for auditing their financial 
reporting. Theoretically, higher audit companies are in a better position to control unethical 
accounting practices and therefore, improves the quality of financial reporting (Becker, 
Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Zang, 2012).	 
3.3.4.5. Sales Growth Ratio (SG) 
Sales growth ratio is added in the empirical model as a control variable. Firms with 
higher sales growth have more growth prospects, therefore, a possibility arises that these firms 
might get engaged in earnings management to meet the stakeholder’s expectations (Hribar & 







3.3.4.6. Change in Operating Cash Flow (∆J#8) 
According to (Becker et al.1998), the impact of the operating cash flow on earnings 
management is negative.  They state that the management engage in earnings management 
when the operating cash flow is lower. Operating cash flows are estimated as follows: 
JT<,-+EBb	#-0ℎ	SD.c$,! = ∆JT<,-+EBb	#-0ℎ	SD.c$,!/	JT<,-E+Bb	#-0ℎ	SD.c$,!&" 
3.3.4.7. LOSS (LOSS) 
Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ROA is negative and 0 
otherwise. Those companies that are making losses are highly likely to engage in earnings 
management and manipulate the financial information. Therefore, LOSS is included in the 
empirical regression model as a control variable (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). 
1 = ROA is negative 
0 = ROA is zero or positive 
All variables are defined in Table 3.1.  
[TABLE	1] 
3.3.5. Conclusion  
Four discretionary accruals models that includes Jones model, modified Jones model, 
Kothari model and earnings management model are applied to test the impact of the audit 
committee attributes on the earnings management. Audit committee attributes comprise of 
ACS, ACI, ACFEX and NACM. In addition, leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), firm 
size (FS), audit quality (AQ), sales growth ratio (SG), change in operating cash flow (∆J#8) 






This chapter presents the detailed analysis of the relationship between earnings 
management and audit committee attributes based on the descriptive statistics, correlation 
matrix and regression tests.  
3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.2 presents the results of the descriptive statistics for the audit committee 
characteristics, earnings management and control variables for FTSE 350 listed companies 
from 2007 to 2018. The earnings management mean is 0.0002, which suggests that on average, 
FTSE 350 listed companies’ discretionary accruals are positive. In addition, the standard 
deviation is 0.8923, from which it can be concluded that the discretionary accruals are highly 
dispersed and therefore, the variation in discretionary accruals is higher (Greene, 2008). It can 
also be supported by the range, in which the lowest value is -25.3088 and the highest value is 
6.8399. In addition, the average audit committee size is approximately 4 in the FTSE 350 listed 
companies. Moreover, on average, 3 to 4 members of the audit committee are independent.  
[TABLE	3.2] 
3.4.2. Correlation 
Table 3.3 presents the results of the correlation coefficient matrix for the audit 
committee characteristics and control variables for FTSE 350 listed companies for a sample 
period that starts from 2007 to 2018. The correlation of the earnings management with ACS, 
ACFEX and NACM is negative, whereas the correlation of earnings management with ACI is 
positive, which suggests that higher board size, more members of the audit committee with 
finance and accounting background and higher number of audit committee meetings make the 
audit committee more effective in terms of controlling unethical accounting practices such as 
earnings management. These findings are also consistent with the regression results. In 
addition, the correlation of REM is positive with ACFEX and NACM, whereas, negative with 
ACS and ACI, from which it can be inferred that larger boards with higher number of 
independent directors are more effective in controlling real earnings management, whereas 
higher number of members with finance and accounting expertise and more frequent meetings 





3.4.3. Empirical Models 
The empirical model that is employed in this research study is based on the concept of 
ordinary least square (OLS) model, which decomposes the entire model into dependent and 
independent variables to test the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable 
(Greene, 2002). In this research study, earnings management is a dependent variable, which is 
a proxy for discretionary accruals, whereas independent variables comprise of audit committee 
attributes.  
 
'M$,!	= I0 + I1"#U0,1−1 + I2"#20,1−1 + I3"#8'g0,1−1 + I43"#M0,1−1 + j1a'40,1−1 +  
j'8U$,!&" + j);J"$,!&" + j,"k$,!&" + j-UK$,! + j7∆J#8$,! + j8aJUU$,!&" + ∑j9m&9  +	e$,!
    (3.2) 
Where: 
'M$,!    Earnings management for firm E in year +	
"#U$,!&"   Number of Audit committee members for firm E in the previous year 
"#2$,!&"  Proportion of independent directors on audit committee for firm E in 
the previous year 
"#8'g$,!&"  Audit Committee members accounting and financial expertise for firm 
E in the previous year 
3"#M$,!&"   Number of Audit committee Meeting for firm E in the previous year 
a'4$,!&"   Leverage for firm E in the previous year 
8U$,!&"   Firm Size for firm E in the previous year 
;J"$,!&"   Return on asset firm E in the previous year 
"k$,!&"   Audit Quality for firm E in the previous year 
UK$,!&"   Sales growth for firm E in the current year 
J#8$,!    Operating Cash Flow for firm E in year + 
aJUU$,!&"  Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if ROA is negative and 0 
otherwise for firm E in the previous year.  
∑j9m&9    Dummy Variable from 2008 to 2018 represent the number of years 
I0    Constant or intercept  




j1 To j8  Coefficient values for control variables 
e$,!    Residual or error term 
All variables are defined in Table 3.1. 
3.4.4. Regression Analysis – Discretionary Accruals 
Based on the results of Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and earnings 
management model, the impact of the ACS on the earnings management is negative and 
statistically significant at 1% of significance level. The findings suggest that the opportunistic 
earnings management practices are lower in those firms, in which the size of the audit 
committee is higher. In other words, large audit committees are effective in controlling earnings 
management. These findings are consistent with the empirical findings of the Vafeas (2005), 
Abbott et al. (2004) and Xie et al. (2003). 
The coefficient value of the ACI is positive and statistically significant at 1%, from this 
it can be inferred that firms with a higher percentage of independent directors in the audit 
committee are ineffective in controlling the earnings management. This is consistent with the 
previous empirical findings of the Lin et al. (2006).   
The impact of the ACFXP on the earnings management is negative and statistically 
significant at 1%. The results suggest that those audit committees in which, the number of the 
audit committee member’s with financial expertise in accounting or finance is higher, are more 
effective in controlling earnings management This is consistent with the previous empirical 
findings of the Bedard et al. (2004), Abbott et al. (2004), Xie et al. (2003), Bedard and Gendron 
(2010), Choi et al. 2007, Lin and Hwang, 2010 and Soliman and Ragab, 2014.   
The coefficient value of the number of audit committee meetings (NACM) is negative 
and statistically significant at 1% based on the regression results of Jones model, modified 
Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management model. The results and findings suggest 
that an audit committee is more effective in controlling earnings management, when it meets 
more frequently. This is consistent with the previous empirical findings of the Menon and 
Williams (1994), Xie et al. (2003), Li et al. (2012), Lin and Hwang (2010), Karamanou and 





3.4.5. Robustness test – Real Earnings Management 
To examine the consistency of our results, I run the robustness tests by testing the 
impact of the audit committee attributes on real earnings management. The real earnings 
management are measured by applying the Roychowdhury (2006) model.  
 
;'M$,!	= I0 + I1"#U0,1−1 + I2"#20,1−1 + I3"#8'g0,1−1 + I43"#M0,1−1 + j1a'40,1−1 +   
j'8U$,!&" + j);J"$,!&" + j,"k$,!&" + j-UK$,! + j7∆J#8$,! + j8aJUU$,!&" + 
∑j9m&9  +	e$,!    (3.3) 
Where: 
;'M$,!   Real Earnings management for firm E in year +	
"#U$,!&"   Number of Audit committee members for firm E in the previous year 
"#2$,!&"  Proportion of independent directors on audit committee for firm E in 
the previous year 
"#8'g$,!&"  Audit Committee members accounting and financial expertise for firm 
E in the previous year 
3"#M$,!&"   Number of Audit committee Meeting for firm E in the previous year 
a'4$,!&"   Leverage for firm E in the previous year 
8U$,!&"   Firm Size for firm E in the previous year 
;J"$,!&"   Return on asset firm E in the previous year 
"k$,!&"   Audit Quality for firm E in the previous year 
UK$,!&"   Sales growth for firm E in the current year 
J#8$,!    Operating Cash Flow for firm E in year + 
aJUU$,!&"  Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if ROA is negative and 0 
otherwise for firm E in the previous year.  
∑j9m&9    Dummy Variable from 2008 to 2018 represent the number of years 
I0    Constant or intercept  
I1 To I4   Coefficient for independent variables 
j1 To j8  Coefficient values for control variables 
e$,!    Residual or error term 





Based on the results of real earnings management model, the impact of the ACS on the 
earnings management is positive and statistically significant at 5% of significance level. The 
findings suggest that the real earnings management practices are higher in those firms, in which 
the size of the audit committee is higher. The coefficient value of the ACI is negative and 
statistically significant at 10%, which suggests that higher number of independent directors in 
the audit committee are effective in controlling the real earnings management. The impact of 
the ACFXP on the earnings management is positive, however, statistically insignificant. The 
results suggest that those audit committees in which, the number of the audit committee 
member’s with financial expertise in accounting or finance is higher, are more exposed to real 
earnings management. The coefficient value of the number of audit committee meetings 
(NACM) is positive and statistically insignificant based on the regression results of real 
earnings management model. The results and findings suggest that an audit committee is not 
effective in controlling real earnings management, when it meets more frequently.  
[TABLE	3.5] 
3.4.6. Conclusion 
Based on the findings and results of the four discretionary models that include Jones 
model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management model, the impact of 
the ACS, ACFXP and NACM on the earnings management is negative, whereas the impact of 
the ACI on the earnings management is positive. In contrast to the results of the discretionary 
accruals models, the results of the real earnings management model show that ACS, ACFXP 
and NACM are positively associated with real earnings management, whereas ACI is 















This study is initiated to study the impact of the audit committee attributes on the 
earnings management in FTSE 350 listed companies from 2007 to 2018. Audit committee 
attributes comprise of audit committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee 
member’s financial expertise and number of audit committee meeting during a year.  
Earnings management is estimated by applying four multiple regression models that 
include Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management model. 
Applying the first component principle on the results of Jones model modified Jones model 
and Kothari model the earnings management are estimated.  
The empirical findings of this study based on the four discretionary models that include 
Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management model show that 
ACS is negatively associated to earnings management and the result is statistically significant. 
The results suggest that those companies in which the audit committee size is large are more 
effective in controlling earnings management. The impact of the ACI on the earnings 
management is positive and statistically significant, from which, it can be inferred that the audit 
committee is role is ineffective and inefficient in controlling earnings management, when the 
number of the independent directors on the audit committee is higher. ACFXP and earnings 
management are negative related, and the results are statistically significant. The results 
suggest that those audit committees in which, the number of the audit committee member’s 
with financial expertise in accounting or finance is higher, are more effective in controlling 
earnings management. The coefficient value of the number of audit committee meetings 
(NACM) is negative and statistically significant at 1% based on the regression results of Jones 
model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management model. The results and 
findings suggest that an audit committee is more effective in controlling earnings management, 









4. Chapter Four – Earnings Management and Executive’s Compensation 
4.1. Introduction 
The structure of a company is based on the separation theorem that splits the ownership 
and control in a company (Demsetz, 1983). Shareholders finance the company; therefore, 
ownership lies in the hands of the shareholders, however this is with little or no control. The 
role of management on the other hand is to run, manage and take all the decisions on behalf of 
the company and shareholders. Given that control is in the hands of the managers, the decisions 
taken by the management should be in the best interest of the shareholders. The shareholders 
and other stakeholders are informed and updated on the operating performance of the company 
through financial statements. There is a possibility that instead of working in the best interest 
of shareholders, the management may pursue their own personal goals and objectives and 
convey their desired message to shareholders. Managers may manipulate the financial 
information by applying the managerial discretion provided in the accounting standards, which 
directly jeopardizes the interest of the shareholders. To overcome the consequences of the 
mismatch between the ownership and control between management and shareholders 
respectively, one of the devices employed in the corporate governance structure is the 
executive’s compensation plan. This aims to align the interest of the management with the 
shareholders, and internally motivate the management to work in the best interest of the 
shareholders (Rappaport, 1986). In this way, the incentive to manipulate the financial 
information diminishes and therefore directly enhances the quality of the financial reporting 
and in turn the transparency of the financial reporting processes increases. However, the 
question arises whether is the management still working in the best interest of the shareholders? 
The accounting literature documents that executive compensation has a substantial 
impact on the earnings manipulation, while the finance literature shows that executive 
compensation likewise affects the financial performance (Cornett, 2008). However, these two 
strands of literature, when considered together, raise another issue for study that does executive 
compensation arrangements affect the earnings management? 
There are two contradicting viewpoints regarding compensation. On one hand in line 
with the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), compensation is considered an important 
tool in aligning executives' incentives with shareholders' interests through a process of granting 
the executives an ownership stake in the company, bonuses and equity-based compensation. 
Another is the managerial power theory (Bebchuk et al. 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) 




get more compensation without causing public anger or what is referred by managerial power 
theorists as "outrage constraint" by employing opportunistic and unethical accounting practices 
such as earnings management. Therefore, the question arises that is it the cash-based executive 
compensation, equity-based executive compensation or are both the motivating and influencing 
factors towards discretionary accruals and earnings management?  
The supporters of the executive compensation claim that bonuses and equity incentives 
are needed components of executive compensation scheme that may be effective in linking an 
executive's personal benefits with the shareholders interest in a way that minimizes the risk of 
adverse consequences. Corporate governance literature supports this argument through 
providing evidence that good corporate governance structure can play a significant role in 
setting executive compensation in a way that mitigates the misalignment of interests between 
managers and shareholders (Core et al. 1999; Hartzel and Stark, 2003 and Sun and Cahan, 
2009). Moreover, the literature shows evidence that good corporate governance and executive 
compensation may help in curbing managers' actions regarding accounting manipulation 
(Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al. 2005).  
In addition, regulators, shareholder advocacy groups and the financial press raise 
concerns that bonuses and equity-based compensation offers motivations for managers to 
increase their personal financial benefits through manipulation of accounting results. 
Moreover, the academic literature provides considerable evidence for these concerns (e.g., 
Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Jiang 
et al. 2010).  
Despite evidence of earnings manipulation, little research examined the influence of 
executive compensation on earnings management. Moreover, most of the research studies used 
executive compensation as one value or used a few components from executive compensation. 
However, executive compensation consists of many elements such as salary, bonuses, stock 
options, stocks granted, long-term incentive plans and short-term incentive plans (Burns and 
Kedia, 2006; Healy, 1985 and Holthausen et al. 1995; Eckles and Halek, 2010). Moreover, the 
entire executive compensation can be divided between the fixed and variable components of 
compensation. Therefore, this research study aims to decompose the entire executive 
compensation into fixed and variable components of executive compensation, cash-based 
executive compensation and equity-based executive compensation. Further to test the impact 
of the different components of the executive compensation on the earnings management so as 




positively or negatively affects the discretionary accruals in listed companies on FTSE 350 
during 2007 to 2018.  
It is also important to mention that the successful completion of this research study 
contributes to a number of ways to the existing literature, which are as follows. 
First, the research that addresses the impact of the executive compensation on earnings 
management in the UK is minimal, therefore, this research study makes a significant 
contribution, as this research study is among the pioneer research studies that decomposes the 
entire executive compensation and individually tests the impact of each component of the 
executive compensation on the discretionary accruals.  
Second, in addition, discretionary accruals are predicted by applying four empirical 
regression models that comprise of Jones model (1991), modified Jones model (1996) Kothari 
model (2005) and Earnings management model. This is the first research study that estimate 
the earnings management by applying the first principal component values using the results of 
the Jones model (1991), modified Jones model (1996) and Kothari model (2005).  
Third, the chosen period is also important because a research study conducted from 
2007 to 2018 enables the research study to understand the impact of executive compensation 
on earnings management in the post-recession period. 
The sample for this research study comprised of companies listed in the FTSE-350 
index. FTSE-350 index is selected because it includes, by capitalization, the largest 350 
companies, which have their primary listings on the London Stock Exchange. Moreover, FTSE 
350 accounts for a significant portion of the UK economic output. Primarily, there are three 
reasons for focusing on large companies. Firstly, large companies usually disclose more 
information about executive compensation, which will help in performing the empirical tests. 
Secondly, some provisions of the corporate governance code may not be applied for small 
companies that lie outside this index. Finally, stakeholders have more concerns about large 
firms compared to small ones.  
In addition, it is important to mention that the research study conducted on FTSE 350 
on the topic of “Executive compensation and its impact on the earnings management” is the 
first research study that researches and investigates the impact of the components of the 
executive compensation on the discretionary accruals. Most of the research on the above-
mentioned topic is conducted in the US. Therefore, conducting a research studies on this topic 
bridges the gap and makes the UK market participants able to understand the importance and 




This study covers a period starting from 2007 to 2018 and employs the annual data 
because most companies prepare and publishing their financial statements annually. The 
financial and executive compensation data is collected from Bloomberg and DataStream. The 
results and findings show that CEO equity-based compensation, CEO bonus, CEO equity-
based compensation to total compensation ratio, executive’s equity-based compensation, 
executive’s salary and executive’s equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio are 
positively related to earrings management, whereas, CEO total compensation, CEO salary, 

























4.2. Literature Review 
4.2.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical, empirical and academic view of the scholars on 
the relationship between the earnings management and executive compensation. In addition, 
the executive compensation is decomposed in fixed and variables compensation, equity based 
and cash-based compensation, and CEO and executive compensation to better understand the 
various components of the executive’s compensation. Finally, based on the findings from 
literature and empirical results of researchers and scholars, the research hypotheses are 
developed.  
4.2.2. CEO’s and Executive Compensation  
To better understand the topic of executive compensation, the entire executive 
compensation is decomposed primarily in four components that include base salary, annual 
bonus plan, stock options and additional compensation such as restricted stock, long-term 
incentive plans, and retirement plans. Base salary and annual bonus plan constitute cash-based 
compensation, whereas stock options restricted stock and long-term incentive plans comprise 
of equity-based compensation.  
4.2.2.1. Cash based Compensation of CEO’s and Executive  
Cash based compensation includes salary and bonuses (Guidry et al. 1999). Salary is 
fixed and a periodic part of the compensation, in addition, executives receive a base salary, 
which is generally benchmarked against peer firms. It is a fixed component of the entire 
compensation; therefore, base salary does not change as the operating performance of an 
organization changes (Conyon, 2006). In contrary bonus is a variable component of the 
compensation and varies as per the performance, therefore, it can be stated that bonus is a 
performance-based component of the compensation (Gaver, Gaver, and Austin, 1995). In 
addition, both salary and bonus are short-term components of the compensation. Although, 
both salary and bonus are cash based and short-term incentives, however, the impact of salary 
and bonus on the discretionary accruals is contradictory. The empirical findings suggest that 
those firms are less exposed to earnings management, whose management’s salary is a higher 
proportion of the compensation, as their compensation does not change significantly as the 




the company’s operating performance and arises or increases as the company’s operating 
performance improves (Carter, et al. 2005; Healy, 1985).  
4.2.2.2. Equity-based compensation of CEO’s and Executive  
Stock based executive compensation comprises of stock option grants, un-exercisable 
options, exercisable options, restricted stock grants, and stock ownership (Cheng and Warfield, 
2005). Stock can be directly granted to top executives, whereas stock options are awarded to 
both executives and employees. Stock option is the right that the executives and employees can 
buy the company’s share at a certain price in the future (Conyon, 2006). Stock options are 
exercised when the options are in the money (Brealey, et al. 2012). Stock options are in the 
money when the strike price of the share in the option is less than the market price of the share. 
The employees and executives exercise their options, buy the company’s shares at a lower 
price, sell it back in the market with a higher price and generate return (Bodie, et al. 2014). 
There are some other special forms of executive compensation such as golden handshakes, 
which are paid to the CEOs and executives when they leave the company. Usually, golden 
handshakes are offered to executives for early retirement (Yermack, 2006).   
4.2.3. Theoretical framework 
4.2.3.1. Principal – Agent theory 
The leading theory that has historically supported research in the area of executive 
compensation is the principal-agent theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen and Murphy, 
2004; Murphy, 1999). Principal-agent theory primarily focuses on the separation theorem, 
according to which, the ownership and control are separated in the structure of a company. 
Shareholders are the owners; they finance an entity and therefore, are the principal.  
Management controls the company and acts as an agent of the shareholders in the company. 
The significance of the incentive plans and compensation contracts is to align the interests of 
the management with the shareholders and to influence the behaviour of management to work 
in the best interest of the shareholders.  
According to Besley and Ghatak (2005), the underlying assumptions are that: 
• Firms are profit seeking  
• Agents of the principal are both rational and rent seeking and  




In addition, it is also assumed that the agent’s utility is positively contingent on monetary 
incentives, whereas, with the agent effort, the agent utility is negatively contingent (Besley and 
Ghatak, 2005). In conclusion, it can be postulated that both agent’s effort and motivation 
increase as the agent receives additional reward. Therefore, the Principal-agent theory gives 
less importance to the objective of motivating agents and places a greater emphasis on the 
alignment of objectives of agents (management) and principal (shareholders), which can be 
achieved by offering monetary incentive and compensation to agents.  
4.2.3.2. Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry refers the inequality of information between the shareholders 
and management. Management runs and controls the company and therefore, knows more than 
the shareholders about the company. In addition, it is difficult and expensive for the principal 
to oversee and supervise the daily operations of the company and routine actions and decisions 
of the management (Eisenhardt, 1989). As management holds an internal position in the 
company and controls the company’s operation it therefore knows more than the shareholders. 
For this reason, management has advantages over shareholders, and therefore, the possibility 
arises that management may pursue their own personal interests such as higher remuneration, 
compensation and reputation instead of working in the best interest of shareholders by 
manipulating the financial information through unethical and opportunistic accounting 
practices (Scott, 2003).  
4.2.4. Earnings management, executive compensation and hypotheses  
The impact of the CEO’s compensation and other executive’s compensation is 
individually studied on earnings management to better understand what group of the executives 
i.e. CEO other executive or both influences, to a greater or lesser extent, the financial results 
and engage in earnings management. 
4.2.4.1. Total compensation and Earnings management 
According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), executives manipulate the financial 
information by applying managerial discretion to the accounting standards to report such a 
value of earnings, which maximizes the total compensation of the executives, therefore, they 
state that there is a positive relationship between the earnings management and total 
compensation. In addition, Healy (1985) states that the management or executives manage 




compensation, whereas, accruals are managed upwards, when the accounting profit prior to 
handling is inside the range eligible for compensation. In addition, Gaver et al. (1995) research 
study concluded that management is in a strong position to manipulate accounting numbers in 
order to enhance the entire compensation and maximize their wealth. Balsam (1998) also 
concluded that there is statistically a positive relationship between the total compensation and 
earnings management. In light of these empirical findings and results, it can be stated that 
executives are in a stronger position and are therefore, able to manipulate financial information 
and maximize their compensation. Therefore, the following hypotheses are presented.  
q<: The CEO total compensation is associated with the earnings management. 
q=: The Executives total compensation is associated with the earnings management.  
Executive compensation comprises of cash and equity incentive; moreover, the 
compensation is classified based on the fixed and variable proportions such as salary, which is 
fixed and bonus, which is a variable component of the compensation and varies as per the 
operating performance and accounting income of the company. Therefore, to better understand 
the impact of the executive compensation on the earnings management, the entire executive 
compensation is decomposed into various components, and the impact of each component of 
the compensation is studied and researched on earnings management. 
4.2.4.2. Equity-based compensation and Earnings Management 
According to Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), there is a positive relationship between 
the CEO’s and executive’s equity incentives and earnings management. Equity incentive is a 
variable component of the entire executive compensation, which is more closely tied to the 
performance of stocks and options in the capital market. According to Meek et al. (2007), there 
is a positive relationship between the short-term executive incentive plans and earnings 
management. Short-term incentive plans comprise of stock options, which are awarded to 
management based on the operating performance of the company. Paulsen (2001) empirical 
findings conclude that the impact of the stock options awarded to the executives positively 
affects the firm value and therefore, the market reacts favorably as it believes that the firm 
performance can be improved by attaching the executive compensation to the operating 
performance of the company. However, Burns and Kedia (2006) state that the short-term 
incentive plans can attract management to engage in earnings management in order to become 




and executives whose short-term incentive is closely linked to the operating performance are 
more likely to manage the operating results and earnings to maximize the value of their 
compensation. However, some of the scholars and researchers state that the impact of the stock 
options on the earnings management is negative as the cost of research and development is 
reduced by paying compensation in form of stock options instead of wages, which helps in 
reducing the overall cost and therefore, the earnings increase (Sun and Hovey 2012). 
Bergstresser and Philippon state that those firms in which, the CEO’s potential total 
compensation primarily came from equity compensation used more discretionary accruals and 
engaged in earning management. These CEO’s manipulate the financial performance and 
earnings by using discretionary components of earnings to artificially inflate the stock prices 
with the intention to gain from the desired change in the value of stock and options. In addition, 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) state that CEO’s with higher equity compensation are more likely 
to sell their shares in the future. Therefore, to increase the share price and eventually earn more 
from their shares in the future, the CEO’s tries to disclose as good as possible firm’s operating 
performance, which positively affect the share price and generate demand for the company’s 
shares in the stock market and finally put an upward pressure on the share price (Balachandran, 
et al. 2008). Higher demand followed by higher share price helps the CEO’s to sell their shares 
and options at higher prices. Artificial demand and increase in share price are achieved by 
manipulating the firm’s earnings by applying the discretionary accruals methods. Upon the 
findings and results of the above discussion, the first and second proposed hypotheses are as 
follows.  
q>: The CEO equity-based compensation is associated with the earnings management.  
q?: The Executives equity-based compensation is associated with the earnings management.  
Further, two hypotheses are developed that tests the relationship between the earnings 
management and the equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio, which are as 
follows: 
q@: The CEO equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio is associated with the 
earnings management.  
qA: The Executives equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio is associated with 




4.2.4.3. Cash-based compensation and Earnings Management 
Cash remuneration comprises of salary and bonus, in which, salary is fixed, and bonus 
is variable and depends upon the operating performance of a firm. As it is stated that salary is 
a fixed part of the cash remuneration and does not change as a result of the firm’s operating 
performance, so, there is no incentive of earnings management and, therefore, Gao and 
Shrieves (2002), state that the discretionary accruals are lower when the base salary is a higher 
proportion of the total compensation as compared to variable component of the compensation. 
In summary, literature generally concludes that the relationship between the CEO’s and 
Executive salary with discretionary accruals is negative. Therefore, it is proposed that:  
qB: The CEO’s fixed cash remuneration incentives (salary) is associated with the earnings 
management.  
qC: The executives s fixed cash remuneration incentives (salary) is associated with the 
earnings management.  
In contrast to management salary, bonus varies as per the firm’s operating performance 
of an entity, therefore, there is the possibility that the management engages in unethical 
accounting practices and opportunistic earnings management to make themselves eligible for 
bonuses (Guidry et al. 1999). Gao and Shrieves (2002) state that the impact of the CEO’s and 
executive bonus on the discretionary accruals is positive. In addition, those firms are more 
likely to engage in opportunistic earnings management, whose management executive 
compensation is more closely tied to the operating performance of the company. Cheng and 
Warfield (2005) research study also concluded that the impact of the executive bonuses on the 
earning management is statistically significant and positive. However, Holthaussen et al. 
(1995) findings show that the relationship between the bonuses and earnings management is 
positive, however, the results are statistically insignificant. Based on the above discussion and 
findings, the seventh and eighth hypotheses are as follows: 
qD : The CEO’s variable cash remuneration incentives (bonus) is associated with the 
earnings management.  
q<E: The Executives variable cash remuneration incentives (bonus) is associated with the 




4.3. Data and Methodology 
4.3.1. Data Sample  
The sample for this research study comprised of companies listed in FTSE-350 index. 
FTSE-350 index is selected because it includes, by capitalization, the largest 350 companies, 
which have their primary listings on the London Stock Exchange. Moreover, FTSE 350 
accounts for a significant portion of the UK economic output. Primarily, there are three reasons 
for focusing on large companies. Firstly, large companies usually disclose more information 
about executive compensation, which will help in performing empirical tests. Secondly, some 
provisions of the corporate governance code may not be applied to small companies that lie 
outside this index. Finally, stakeholders have more concerns about large firms compared to 
small ones.  
This study covers a period starting from 2007 to 2018 and employs the annual data 
because most of the companies prepare and publish their financial statements annually. The 
chosen period is also important because a research study conducted from 2007 to 2018 enables 
the research study to understand the impact of executive compensation on earnings 
management in the post-recession period. The financial and executive compensation data is 
collected from Bloomberg and DataStream. 
4.3.2. Dependent variable 
4.3.2.1. Earnings management  
Earnings management is a proxy for discretionary accruals that is predicted and 
estimated by applying three models that includes Jones model (JM), modified Jones model 
(MJM) and Kothari model (KM). Finally, earnings management (EARNMGT) is measured 
based on the results of above three models by applying the first principal component function 
(the detailed explanation of the earnings management measurement is provided in appendix 1).  
 
'M$,!= (&"P$,!* 0.577351) + (&"MP$,!*0.577354) + (&"Q$,!*0.577354) (4.1) 
Where: 
'M$,! Average discretionary accruals are estimated by applying the principal 
component function. 
&"P$,!  Discretionary accruals estimated by applying the Jones model.  




Q&"$,!  Discretionary accruals estimated by applying the Kothari Model. 
4.3.3. Independent variables 
4.3.3.1. CEO’s and Executives total compensation 
CEO’s and Executives total compensation is the total value that is received by the 
CEO’s and executives during a fiscal year.  Total compensation is estimated by using the 
natural logarithm of the total compensation. The natural logarithm is used for the total 
compensation to reduce the dispersion in the distribution of total compensation that is paid to 
the CEO’s and executives.  
CEO’s and Executives Total Compensation (TC) 
Total	Compensation	=	Ln	(7.+-D	#.RT<B0-+E.B$,!) 
4.3.3.2. CEO’s and Executives equity-based compensation  
CEO’s and Executives equity-based compensation is the difference between the total 
compensation and cash-based compensation that is paid to CEO’s and Executives during a 
year. Finally, the equity-based compensation is estimated by using the natural logarithm of the 
equity-based compensation.  
CEO’s and Executives equity-based compensation (EBC) 
Equity based compensation = Total Compensation – Cash based compensation 
Equity	based	compensation	=	Ln	('ÇAE+É − F-0</	#.RT<B0-+E.B$,!)	
4.3.3.3. CEO’s and Executives Base Salary 
CEO’s and Executive salaries are the fixed components of the entire compensation and 
are not dependent on the operating performance of an entity. Base salary is estimated by taking 
the natural logarithm of the base salary. 
CEO’s and Executives Base salary (SALARY) 
SALARY	=	Ln	(L-0<	U-D-,É$,!)	
4.3.3.4. CEO’s and Executives performance-based Bonuses 
CEO’s and Executives Bonuses are variable components of the total compensation and 
are directly proportional to the operating performance of an entity. Bonuses are estimated by 
taking the natural logarithm of the performance-based bonuses. 





4.3.3.5. CEO and Executives equity-based compensation to total compensation 
ratio 
Equity-based compensation to total compensation is estimated by taking the Equity-
based compensation as a proportion of the total compensation. 
CEO’s and Executives equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio 
= 'ÇAE+É	F-0</	G.RT<B0-+E.B$,!&"	 7.+-D	#.RT<B0-E+.B$,!&"d  
4.3.4. Control variables 
This research study uses a variety of control variables in accordance with the 
specifications of prior studies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Kang and Sivaramakrishnan, 
1995 and Dechow et al. 1995). To better understand the relationship between the control 
variables and earnings management, each one is explained in detail.  
4.3.4.1. Leverage (LEV) 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) report that managers use 
discretionary accruals to satisfy debt covenant requirements. Because more highly leveraged 
firms have greater incentives to increase earnings. Trueman and Titman (1986) argue that 
managing earnings enables managers to reduce estimates of various claimants of the firm about 
the volatility of its earnings process and so lowers their assessment of the probability of 
bankruptcy. Consequently, this provides an opportunity to borrow at lower interest rates and 
decreases cost of capital. Consistent with this debt hypothesis, it is believed that managers in 
more leveraged firms are more likely to adopt aggressive earnings management techniques to 
prevent violation of debt covenants (Watts and Zeimmerman, 1986). Firm financial leverage, 
measured as the ratio of debt to assets, is included, as a proxy for risk, because mangers are 
more likely to exercise their accounting discretion when they are closer to default on debt 
covenants (Press and Weintrop, 1990). Leverage is estimated by taking the total debt as a 
percentage of the total capital at the end of the financial year, in which, total debt comprised of 






Financial leverage (LEV) 
LEV = Total Debt (Long-term and short-term) / Total Capital 
4.3.4.2. Return on Assets (ROA) 
According to Klein (2002) Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002) and Ali and Zheng (2015), 
ROA is a control variable for earnings management. ROA gives an idea as to how efficient 
management is at using its assets to generate earnings. Dechow et al. (1995) suggest that firm 
performance is supposed to have a positive association with discretionary accruals. Without 
controlling for ROA, discretionary accruals may reflect changes in the sample firm 
performance. Dechow et al. (1995) finds that ROA has a significant positive relationship with 
discretionary accruals. Return on assets is the profitability ratio of Earnings before Interest and 





4.3.4.3. Firm Size (FS) 
Firm size is used in most Earnings Management studies as a control variable. Earlier 
studies found that firm size impact on Earnings Management is negative (Dechow, et al. 1995 
and Defond and Jiambalvo 1994). Therefore, firm size impact is negative on the discretionary 
accruals. According to academics and past literature, smaller companies are subject to less 
control from authority and therefore, engage in Earnings Management activities but some argue 
that earnings management activities increase as the size of a company increases (Guthrie and 
Sokolowsky, 2010 and Badolato et al. 2014). The empirical findings of the past research found 
that firm size has a significant positive relationship with Earnings Management. They claim 
that large firms face greater scrutiny from investors and are thus more likely to manage earnings 
to satisfy their forecast (Gonzalez and Meca, 2014; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). In contrast, 
Lee and Vetter (2015) in their study, “the influence of corporate governance on earnings 
quality‟, find that firm size does not have a significant impact on Earnings Management. 
However, most of the scholars and researchers have the opinion that firm size has an impact 
on earnings management and there is a relationship between the firm size and earnings 
management, therefore, this research study includes the firm size as a control variable. Firm 




the end of financial year (LNFSF,G). Taking the product of the number of shares outstanding and 
share market price estimate market value at the end of the financial year. 
Firm Size (FS) 
Firm	Size	=	aB	(8E,R	UEV<$,!)	
4.3.4.4. Audit Quality (AQ) 
Audit quality is measured by taking the natural log of the audit fees that is paid by the 
company to the external audit company. Higher audit fees paid suggests that the quality of the 
audit is high, and the company hired good audit companies for auditing their financial 
reporting. Theoretically, higher audit companies are in a better position to control unethical 
accounting practices and therefore, improves the quality of financial reporting (Becker, 
Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Zang, 2012).	 
4.3.4.5. Sales Growth Ratio (SG) 
Sales growth ratio is added in the empirical model as a control variable. Firms with 
higher sales growth have more growth prospects, therefore, a possibility arises that these firms 
might get engaged in earnings management to meet the stakeholder’s expectations (Hribar & 




4.3.4.6. Change in Operating Cash Flow (∆OCF) 
According to (Becker et al. 1998), the impact of the operating cash flow on earnings 
management is negative.  They state that the management engage in earnings management 
when the operating cash flow is lower. Operating cash flows are estimated as follows: 
JT<,-+EBb	#-0ℎ	SD.c$,! = ∆JT<,-+EBb	#-0ℎ	SD.c$,!/	JT<,-E+Bb	#-0ℎ	SD.c$,!&" 
4.3.4.7. LOSS (LOSS) 
Loss is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ROA is negative and 0 
otherwise. Those companies that are making losses are highly likely to engage in earnings 
management and manipulate the financial information. Therefore, LOSS is included in the 




1 = ROA is negative 
0 = ROA is zero or positive 
All variables are defined in Table 4.1.  
[TABLE	1] 
4.3.5. Conclusion  
To test the impact of the components of the executive compensation on the 
discretionary accruals, a sample comprising of all listed companies on the FTSE 350 from 2007 
to 2018. Moreover, to test the impact of the components of the executive compensation on the 
discretionary accruals, regression model is applied that tests the impact of the independent 
variables on the dependent variables. In this research study, discretionary accruals are a 
dependent variable, whereas, independent variables comprise of CEO total compensation, 
executive’s total compensation, CEO equity-based compensation, executives’ equity-based 
compensation, CEO salary, executive’s salary, CEO bonus and executives’ bonus. 
Discretionary accruals are predicted by applying four empirical regression models that 
comprise of Jones model (1991), modified Jones model (1996) and Kothari model (2005) and 
finally, earnings management model that is estimated by applying the results of the Jones model 
(1991), modified Jones model (1996) and Kothari model (2005) and the first principal 



















This chapter presents the analysis of the relationship between the components of executive 
compensation and earnings management based on the empirical findings and results of this 
research study. In addition, to understand the data distribution, features of the data and to better 
understand the relationship between the components of executive compensation and earnings 
management, the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix are presented.  
4.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the components of executive compensation, 
earnings management and control variables for FTSE 350 from 2007 to 2018. The discretionary 
accruals mean is approximately the same and lower based on the Jones model, modified Jones 
mode, Kothari model and EARNMGT model, however, the standard deviation is significantly 
higher, which suggests that the data for the discretionary accruals is highly dispersed in listed 
companies on FTSE 350. These findings can also be supported with the minimum and 
maximum values, as the range is substantially higher. The mean values of the CEO total 
compensation and Executive total compensation are very similar. Likewise, the mean of CEO 
and executive’s equity-based compensation are approximately equal, which suggests that on 
average, the total compensation and equity-based compensation of the CEO and Executives are 
the same, however, the standard deviation is substantially lower, which suggests that 
companies listed on FTSE 350 are paying similar total compensation and equity-based 
compensation to CEO’s and executives. It can also be observed from the salary and bonuses 
data that the CEO’s and executives are paid approximately equal pay, in addition, standard 
deviation is lower, which suggests that the bonuses paid to CEO’s and executives do not change 
in the listed companies on FTSE 350.  
[TABLE	4.2] 
4.4.2. Correlation  
It can be observed from the table 4.3 that the correlation of all the components of the 
executive compensation i.e. CEO total compensation, executives total compensation, CEO 
equity-based compensation, executives equity-based compensation, CEO salary, executives 
salary, CEO bonus, executives bonus, CEO equity-based compensation to total compensation 




positive, which suggests, that the earnings management increases when the components of the 
CEO’s and executive’s compensation are increasing. This is the primary hypothesis of this 
research study that CEO’s or executive’s compensation is an influencing factor for 
management to engage in opportunistic accounting practices with the intention to maximize 
their personal benefit and gain. The positive correlation of each components of the executive 
compensation with the earnings management supports the primary hypothesis of this research 
study. In contrast to earnings management, there is a negative correlation of CEO total 
compensation, executive’s total compensation, CEO equity-based compensation, CEO equity-
based compensation to total compensation and executive’s equity-based compensation to total 
compensation with real earnings management. There is a higher correlation between the CEO 
total compensation and executive’s total compensation, which suggests that both 
compensations are moving in the same direction. Earnings management correlation with 
leverage and firm size, sales growth ratio and change in operating cash flows is positive, 
whereas the correlation of earnings management with ROA, audit quality and loss are negative.  
[TABLE	4.3] 
4.4.3. Empirical Models 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model is applied to test the impact of the components of 
the executive compensation on the discretionary accruals. OLS is a regression model that tests 
the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable (Greene, 2008). To test the 
association of the CEO’s and executive’s compensation with earnings management, fixed 
effects regression model is applied. In this research study, discretionary accrual is dependent 
variable, which is estimated by applying three models that includes Jones model (JM), modified 
Jones model (MJM) and Kothari model (KM). Finally, earnings management (EARNMGT) is 
measured based on the results of above three models by applying the first principal component 
function. Whereas, CEO total compensation, executive’s total compensation, CEO equity-
based compensation, executive’s equity-based compensation, CEO salary, executive’s salary, 
CEO bonus and executive’s bonus. In addition, leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), firm 
size (FS), audit quality (AQ), sales growth ratio (SG), change in operating cash flow (∆J#8) 
and loss (LOSS) are included in the empirical model as control variables. Finally, time dummy 
variable is included in the model to control time specific effect in each year. To better 
understand the relationship between the CEO’s and executive’s compensation with earnings 




compensation components are regressed against the earnings management by applying 
equation 4.2, whereas, in the second regression model, executive’s compensation components 
are regressed against the earnings management by applying the equation 4.2, which are as 
follows: 
 
'M$,! = I0 + I1#'J7#0,1−1  + I2#'J'L#0,1−1  + I3#'JU"a";m0,1−1 +  I4#'JLJ3çU0,1−1 
+ I5#'J'#;0,1−1 + j1a'40,1−1 + j'8U$,!&" + j);J"$,!&" + j,"k$,!&" + j-UK$,! + j7∆J#8$,! 
+ j8aJUU$,!&" + ∑j9m&9   +	e$,!      (4.2) 
 
'M$,! = I0  + I1'g7#0,1−1 + I2'g'L#0,1−1 + I3'gU"a";m0,1−1 + I4'gLJ3çU0,1−1 + 
I5#'J'#;0,1−1 + j1a'40,1−1 + j'8U$,!&" + j);J"$,!&" + j,"k$,!&" + j-UK$,! + j7∆J#8$,! + 
j8aJUU$,!&" + ∑j9m&9   +	e$,!         (4.3) 
 
Where: 
'M$,!    Discretionary accruals for firm E in year + 
;'M$,!   Real Earnings Management for firm E in year +	
#'J7#$,!&"  CEO’s total compensation for firm E in the previous year  
'g7#$,!&"  Executive’s total compensation for firm E in the previous year  
#'J'L#$,!&"  CEO’s Equity-based compensation for firm E in the previous year  
'g'L#$,!&"  Executive’s equity-based compensation for firm E in the previous year  
#'JU"a";m$,!&"  Salary received by the CEO for firm E in the previous year  
'gU"a";m$,!&"  Salary received by the Executives for firm E in the previous year  
#'JLJ3çU$,!&"  Bonus received by the CEO for firm E in the previous year  
'gLJ3çU$,!&"  Bonus received by the Executives for firm E in the previous year  
#'J'#;$,!&"    CEO’s equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio for firm 
E in the previous year 
'g'#;$,!&"  Executive Equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio for 
firm E in the previous year 
a'4$,!&"  Leverage for firm E in the previous year   
8U$,!&"  Firm Size for firm E in the previous year  
;J"$,!&"  Return on asset firm E in the previous year  




UK$,!  Sales growth for firm E in the current year  
J#8$,!    Operating Cash Flow for firm E in year + 
aJUU$,!&"  Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if ROA is negative and 0 
otherwise for firm E in the previous year.  
∑j9m&9    Year Dummy fixed effect Variable from 2008 to 2018 represents the 
number of years to control time specific effect in each year 
I0    Constant or intercept  
I1 To I10   Coefficients for independent variables 
j1 To j8  Coefficient values for control variables 
e$,!    Residual or error term 
 
All variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
4.4.4. Regression Analysis – Discretionary Accruals  
The impact of the components of the executive compensation is tested on the 
discretionary accruals by employing a sample of companies comprising of FTSE 350 listed 
companies. Discretionary accrual is a dependent variable, whereas, five independent variables 
are employed that includes CEO total compensation, CEO equity-based compensation, CEO 
salary, CEO bonus and CEO’s equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio. 
Earnings management is predicted by applying three empirical regression models that comprise 
of Jones model (1991), modified Jones model (1996) and Kothari model (2005) and finally, 
earnings management model that is estimated by applying the results of the Jones model 
(1991), modified Jones model (1996) and Kothari model (2005) and the first principal 
component values.  
Based on the results and findings of the discretionary accruals Jones model (DJM), 
modified Jones model (DMJM), Kothari Model (DKM) and Earnings Management model 
(EARNMGT), CEO total compensation is negatively related to the discretionary accruals, in 
addition, the results are significant at 1% of significance level. The results suggest that when 
the CEO total compensation is higher, there are less or no earnings management and therefore, 
the financial reporting quality is higher.  
CEO equity-based compensation is positively associated with earnings management 
and the result is statistically significant at 1% of significance level. It can be inferred from the 




management in companies that are listed on FTSE 350 during 2007 to 2018. The results of this 
research study are consistent with the empirical findings of the Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006), Meek et al. (2007), Paulsen (2001), Cheng and Warfield (2005), Jensen (2001) and Sun 
and Hovey (2012). 
The CEO Bonus is positively related with earnings management; however, the result is 
statistically insignificant. The finding of this research study, which states that the CEO Bonus 
is positively related with earnings management, lends support to Gao and Shrieves (2002), 
Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Holthaussen et al. (1995).  
CEO Salary is negatively related with earnings management; however, the result is 
statistically insignificant.  It can be inferred from the empirical findings of this research study 
that the CEO’s fixed component of the total compensation i.e., CEO salary is helping in 
mitigating and controlling earnings management and discourages the management to engage 
in earnings management. The findings and results of this empirical study are consistent with 
the results and findings of Gao and Shrieves (2002). 
CEO equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio is positively associated 
with earnings management and the result is statistically significant at 1% of significance level. 
The findings suggest that higher CEO equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio 
cause an increase in the earnings management. The results of this research study are consistent 
with the empirical findings of the Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Meek et al. (2007), 
Paulsen (2001), Jensen (2001) and Sun and Hovey (2012). 
[TABLE	4.4] 
Based on the results and findings of the discretionary accruals Jones model (DJM), 
modified Jones model (DMJM), Kothari Model (DKM) and Earnings Management model 
(EARNMGT), the executive’s total compensation is negatively related with the earnings 
management, moreover, the results are statistically significant at 1% of significance level. From 
the findings, it can be inferred that the total compensation paid to executives can negatively 
affect the behaviour of the executives in manipulating the accounting earnings and engage in 
opportunistic earnings management practices. The empirical findings of this research study are 
in contradiction with the empirical findings of the Watts and Zimmerman (1986), Healy (1985), 
Gaver et al. (1995) and Balsam (1998).  
Executives equity-based compensation is positively associated with the earnings 




compensation does not help in mitigating and controlling the unethical accounting practices 
such as earnings management in companies listed on FTSE 350 during 2007 to 2018. The 
results of this research study are consistent to the empirical findings of the Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006), Meek et al. (2007), Paulsen (2001), Cheng and Warfield (2005), Jensen 
(2001) and Sun and Hovey (2012). 
Executives bonus is negatively associated with earnings management at a significance 
level of 1%, which suggests that bonus helps in mitigating and controlling the unethical 
accounting practices and helps in improving the quality of financial reporting in companies 
listed on FTSE 350 during 2007 to 2018. The finding of this research study, which states that 
the executive’s bonus is negatively associated with earnings management are in contradiction 
with the empirical findings of Gao and Shrieves (2002), Cheng and Warfield (2005) and 
Holthaussen et al. (1995).  
The executive’s salary is positively related with earnings management at a significant 
level of 1%. The findings of this research study are contrary to the empirical findings of Gao 
and Shrieves (2002). 
Executive’s equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio is positively 
associated with earnings management, however, the results are insignificant. It can be inferred 
from the findings that higher executive’s equity-based compensation to total compensation 
ratio cause an increase in the earnings management. The results of this research study are 
consistent with the empirical findings of the Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Meek et al. 
(2007), Paulsen (2001), Jensen (2001) and Sun and Hovey (2012). 
[TABLE	4.5] 
4.4.5. Robustness Test – Real Earnings Management 
To examine the consistency of our results, I run the robustness tests by testing the 
impact of the CEO’s and executive’s compensation on real earnings management. The real 
earnings management are measured by applying the Roychowdhury (2006) model.  
 
;'M$,! = I0 + I1#'J7#0,1−1  + I2#'J'L#0,1−1  + I3#'JU"a";m0,1−1 +  
I4#'JLJ3çU0,1−1 + I5#'J'#;0,1−1 + j1a'40,1−1 + j'8U$,!&" + j);J"$,!&" + j,"k$,!&" + 





;'M$,! = I0  + I1'g7#0,1−1 + I2'g'L#0,1−1 + I3'gU"a";m0,1−1 + I4'gLJ3çU0,1−1 + 
I5#'J'#;0,1−1 + j1a'40,1−1 + j'8U$,!&" + j);J"$,!&" + j,"k$,!&" + j-UK$,! + j7∆J#8$,! + 
j8aJUU$,!&" + ∑j9m&9   +	e$,!       (4.5) 
 
Where: 
'M$,!    Discretionary accruals for firm E in year + 
;'M$,!   Real Earnings Management for firm E in year +	
#'J7#$,!&"  CEO’s total compensation for firm E in the previous year  
'g7#$,!&"  Executive’s total compensation for firm E in the previous year  
#'J'L#$,!&"  CEO’s Equity-based compensation for firm E in the previous year  
'g'L#$,!&"  Executive’s equity-based compensation for firm E in the previous year  
#'JU"a";m$,!&"  Salary received by the CEO for firm E in the previous year  
'gU"a";m$,!&"  Salary received by the Executives for firm E in the previous year  
#'JLJ3çU$,!&"  Bonus received by the CEO for firm E in the previous year  
'gLJ3çU$,!&"  Bonus received by the Executives for firm E in the previous year  
#'J'#;$,!&"    CEO’s equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio for firm 
E in the previous year 
'g'#;$,!&"  Executive Equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio for 
firm E in the previous year 
a'4$,!&"  Leverage for firm E in the previous year   
8U$,!&"  Firm Size for firm E in the previous year  
;J"$,!&"  Return on asset firm E in the previous year  
"k$,!&"  Audit Quality for firm E in the previous year  
UK$,!&"  Sales growth for firm E in the current year  
J#8$,!    Operating Cash Flow for firm E in year + 
aJUU$,!&"  Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if ROA is negative and 0 
otherwise for firm E in the previous year.  
∑j9m&9    Year Dummy fixed effect Variable from 2008 to 2018 represents the 
number of years to control time specific effect in each year 
I0    Constant or intercept  
I1 To I10   Coefficients for independent variables 




e$,!    Residual or error term 
 
All variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
The relationship of the components of the CEO’s compensation is tested on the real 
earnings management by employing a sample of companies comprising of FTSE 350 listed 
companies. Real earnings management is a dependent variable, whereas, five independent 
variables are employed that includes CEO total compensation, executive’s total compensation, 
CEO equity-based compensation, executives’ equity-based compensation, CEO salary, 
executive’s salary, CEO bonus and executives’ bonus. Real earnings management is predicted 
by applying Roychowdhury (2006) model.  
Based on the results and findings of the real earnings management model (REM), CEO 
total compensation is negatively related to the discretionary accruals, however, the results are 
insignificant. The real earnings management results are consistent with the earnings 
management model, however, the real earnings management relationship with CEO total 
compensation are statistically insignificant.   
CEO equity-based compensation is negatively associated with real earnings 
management and the result is statistically insignificant. It can be inferred from the results that 
the real earnings management association with CEO equity-based compensation is in contrary 
to the result of earnings management.   
The CEO bonus is negatively related with real earnings management and the results are 
statistically insignificant, which suggests that the association between real earnings 
management with CEO bonus is in contradiction with the association between earnings 
management with CEO bonus.  
CEO Salary is positively related with real earnings management; however, the result is 
statistically insignificant. The results are in contradiction to the results of earnings 
management.  
CEO equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio is negatively associated 
with real earnings management and the result is statistically insignificant. It can be observed 
from the results that the association between CEO equity-based compensation to total 
compensation ratio is positive with earnings management and negative with real earnings 





Based on the results and findings of the real earnings management model (REM), the 
executive’s total compensation is negatively related with the real earnings management, 
however, the results are statistically insignificant. The results show that the findings of the 
earnings management model and real earnings management model are consistent.  
Executives equity-based compensation is negatively associated with the real earnings 
management; however, the results are statistically insignificant. It can be inferred from the 
results that the real earnings management association with executive’s equity-based 
compensation is in contrary to the result of earnings management.   
There is a negative association between executive’s bonus and real earnings 
management, in addition, the results are statistically insignificant. The real earnings 
management results are consistent with the earnings management model, however, the real 
earnings management relationship with executive’s bonus is statistically insignificant.   
The executive’s salary is positively related with real earnings management; however, 
the results are statistically insignificant. The findings of the real earnings management model 
are consistent with the earnings management model and in both models, the association of 
executive’s salary is positive, however, the findings of the real earnings management model 
are statistically insignificant.  
The association between executive’s   compensation to total compensation ratio and the 
real earnings management is negative, moreover, the results are statistically insignificant. The 
results and findings show that the real earnings management association with executive’s 
equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio is in contrary to the result of earnings 
management model.   
[TABLE	4.7] 
4.4.6. Conclusion 
The impact of the components of the executive compensation is tested on the 
discretionary accruals by employing a sample of companies comprising of FTSE 350 listed 
companies. Earnings management proxy for discretionary accruals is the dependent variable, 
whereas, ten (10) independent variables are employed that includes CEO’s total compensation, 
executive’s total compensation, CEO’s equity-based compensation, executives’ equity-based 
compensation, CEO’s salary, executive’s salary, CEO’s bonus, executives’ bonus, CEO’s 
equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio and executive’s equity-based 




equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio, executive’s equity-based 
compensation, executive’s salary and executive’s equity-based compensation to total 
compensation ratio are positively related to earrings management, whereas, CEO total 
compensation, CEO salary, executive total compensation and executive’s bonus are negatively 
related with the earnings management.  
In contrast to the results of the discretionary accruals models, the results of the real 
earnings management model show that CEO total compensation, CEO equity-based 
compensation, CEO bonus, CEO equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio, 
executive’s total compensation, executive’s equity-based compensation, executive’s bonus,  
and executive’s equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio are negatively 
associated with real earnings management, whereas, CEO salary and executive’s salary are 
















This research study is initiated to study the impact of the components of the CEO and 
executive compensation on the discretionary accruals in companies listed on FTSE 350. The 
sample period starts from 2007 to 2018 and employs the annual data because most of the 
companies are preparing and publishing their financial statements annually. The chosen period 
is also important because a research study conducted from 2007 to 2018 enables the research 
study to understand and explain the impact of executive compensation on earnings 
management in the post-recession period. The financial and executive compensation data is 
collected from Bloomberg and DataStream. 
To study the impact of the components of the CEO and executive compensation on the 
discretionary accruals, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model is applied. For this research study, 
discretionary accrual is a dependent variable, whereas, independent variables comprise of CEO 
total compensation, executive’s total compensation, CEO equity-based compensation, 
executives’ equity-based compensation, CEO salary, executive’s salary, CEO bonus and 
executives’ bonus. In addition, leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), firm size (FS), audit 
quality (AQ), sales growth ratio (SG), change in operating cash flow (∆J#8) and loss (LOSS) 
are included in the empirical model as control variables. Finally, time dummy variable is 
included in the model to control time specific effect in each year. Discretionary accruals are 
predicted by applying three models that includes Jones model (JM), modified Jones model 
(MJM) and Kothari model (KM). Finally, earnings management (EARNMGT) discretionary 
accruals model is measured based on the results of above three models by applying the first 
principal component function 
CEO equity-based compensation, CEO bonus, CEO equity-based compensation to total 
compensation ratio, executive’s equity-based compensation, executive’s salary and executive’s 
equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio are positively related to earrings 
management, whereas, CEO total compensation, CEO salary, executive total compensation and 








5. Chapter Five – Conclusion 
5.1. Findings 
This research study is initiated to understand the role of corporate governance in 
controlling unethical accounting practices such as earnings management and in enhancing the 
quality of financing reporting. To better understand the role and effectiveness of corporate 
governance in relation to earnings management, the corporate governance is decomposed in 
three (3) parts that comprise of board of directors, audit committee and compensation 
committee. In this research study, earnings management a proxy for the discretionary accruals 
is the dependent variable, whereas, board of directors’ characteristics, audit committee 
attributes and executive’s compensation components are independent variables. For this 
research study, a sample comprising of all listed companies on FTSE 350 is used. The sample 
period is from 2007 to 2018 and employs the annual data because most of the companies 
prepare and publish their financial statements annually.   
Earnings management is the dependent variable in all the three essays. In relation to 
predicting the earnings management, there is not even a single discretionary accruals model on 
which the scholars agree for predicting the discretionary accruals; moreover, each model 
carries its own drawbacks. Therefore, to overcome the existing concerns in the literature and 
minimize the error possibility, the first principal component rule is applied on the results of the 
three discretionary accrual models that comprises of Jones model (JM), modified Jones model 
(MJM) and Kothari model (KM) to measure the earnings management. The application of the 
first principal component rule is highly significant because, this model carries the components 
of more than one model and is more inclusive of other methods. In addition, it can be evidenced 
from the results that the earnings management model has the highest R-Square as compare to 
other three models that comprise of Jones model (JM), modified Jones model (MJM) and 
Kothari model (KM), which suggests that earnings management model explanatory power is 
comparatively higher and better reflect the relationship between the corporate governance 
characteristics and earnings management. Therefore, it can be stated that the new earnings 
management model being higher R-Square better reflect the relationship between the corporate 
governance characteristics and earnings management and enhances the validity and 
explanatory power of the model. 
Earnings management and board characteristics investigate and study the association 




study comprised of five characteristics that includes board independence, board size, CEO 
duality, number of board meetings and gender diversity. To test the association of the board 
characteristics and earnings management, five (5) hypotheses are developed. The findings 
show that board size and board independence are negatively associated with earnings 
management and the relationship is statistically significant, which suggests that larger boards 
with higher percentage of independent directors on the board are more effective in controlling 
earnings management practices. CEO duality and earnings management are positively related. 
The impact of the number of board meetings on earnings management is positive and is 
statistically significant. Based on the results, it can be inferred that when the board meets more 
frequency, the board loses its control over unnecessary practices such as earnings management. 
There is a negative and statistically significant association between gender diversity and 
earnings management, from which it can be inferred that when the percentage of women on 
the board is higher, the board role becomes more effective in terms of controlling earnings 
management. The collective impact of all board characteristics on earnings management is 
statistically significant, which suggests that there is a statistically significantly association 
between earnings management and board characteristics in FTSE 350 listed companies. In 
comparison to the results of the discretionary accruals models, the results of the real earnings 
management model show that board size, board independence, CEO duality and gender 
diversity are positively associated with real earnings management, however, the number of 
audit committee meetings are negatively related to real earnings management.  
Earnings management and audit committee investigate and study the association of the 
earnings management and audit committee characteristics in the companies listed on FTSE 350 
from 2007 to 2018. The empirical findings show that the audit committee size (ACS) is 
negatively associated to earnings management and the result is statistically significant. The 
results suggest that those companies in which the audit committee size is large are more 
effective in controlling earnings management. Audit committee independence (ACI) is 
positively related to earnings management and the relationship is statistically significant, from 
which, it can be inferred that when the number of the independent directors on the audit 
committee is higher, the audit committee role is ineffective and inefficient in controlling 
earnings management. Number of audit committee members with financial expertise (ACFXP) 
and earnings management are negative related, and the results are statistically significant. The 
results suggest that those audit committees in which, the number of the audit committee 




controlling earnings management. The coefficient value of the number of audit committee 
meetings (NACM) is negative and statistically significant based on the regression results of 
Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management model. The 
results and findings suggest that an audit committee is more effective in controlling earnings 
management, when it meets more frequently. In comparison to the results of the discretionary 
accruals models, the results of the real earnings management model show that ACS, ACFXP 
and NACM are positively associated with real earnings management, whereas ACI is 
negatively associated with real earnings management.  
Earnings management and executive’s compensation studies the relationship of the 
earnings management and executive’s compensation in the companies listed on FTSE 350 from 
2007 to 2018. It is stated that most of the research conducted uses the entire executive 
compensation as one value or tests a few components of the executive compensation. This 
research study decomposed the entire executive compensation into fixed and variable 
components (salary and bonus), in cash and equity based compensation, and in short-term and 
long-term compensation and examined the impact of the each compensation components on 
the earnings management to better understand what form of executive compensation 
significantly or insignificantly, and positively or negatively affects the discretionary accruals 
in the listed companies on FTSE 350 during 2007 to 2018. The empirical results and findings 
of this research study show that CEO equity-based compensation, CEO bonus, CEO equity-
based compensation to total compensation ratio, executive’s equity-based compensation, 
executive’s salary and executive’s equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio are 
positively related to earrings management, whereas, CEO total compensation, CEO salary, 
executive total compensation and executive’s bonus are negatively related with the earnings 
management. As compare to the results of the discretionary accruals models, the results of the 
real earnings management model show that CEO total compensation, CEO equity-based 
compensation, CEO bonus, CEO equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio, 
executive’s total compensation, executive’s equity-based compensation, executive’s bonus,  
and executive’s equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio are negatively 
associated with real earnings management, whereas, CEO salary and executive’s salary are 
positively associated with real earnings management.  
5.2. Limitations  
To study and research the association of the corporate governance and earnings 




listed companies on the FTSE 350 from 2007 to 2018. One of the major limitations that is faced 
in collecting data was the missing data problem. For some of the companies, the financial and 
corporate governance data were missing.  
5.3. Suggestions for future research 
This research study is conducted by only including the listed companies that are listed 
on the FTSE 350. In future, to expand the scale of the research study, the unlisted companies 
can be included in the sample study. Moreover, the relationship between the board 
characteristics and earnings management is studied by using five board characteristics that 
comprised of board size, board independence, CEO duality, number of board meetings and 
gender diversity. In future, the study can be expanded by including more board characteristics. 
In the research study of earnings management and audit committee attributes, the relationship 
of four audit committee attributes that include audit committee size, audit committee 
independence, audit committee member’s financial expertise and number of audit committee 
during a year are tested on the earnings management. In future, this research study can be 
conducted by adding more audit committee attributes. In the research study of earnings 
management and executive’s compensation, the components of the executive compensation are 
measured by using the natural logarithm, however, in future; the components of the executive 
compensation can be measured by the ratio of each component of compensation to total 
compensation.  
To better understand the UK stock market in comparison to other stock markets in 
relation to the association between the corporate governance attributes and earnings 
management, this research study can be conducted by conducting comparative analysis of the 
UK Stock market with other stock markets. In addition, this research study is conducted by 
employing a data sample comprised of all listed companies on the FTSE 350. To better 
understand the relationship between corporate governance attributes and earnings 
management, in future, this research study can be conducted as a comparative analysis of 
different sectors in FTSE 350. This can enable the research study to understand more 
specifically the relationship between corporate governance attributes and earnings 
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Table 2.1  
Variable Definition  
Variable Definition Symbol 
Earnings 
management  
Earnings management is a proxy for discretionary 
accruals that is estimated by applying three models that 
includes Jones Model (JM), Modified Jones Model 
(MJM) and Kothari Model (KM). Finally, earnings 
management is estimated based on the results of above 







Board Size Total Number of Directors serving on the board to 
participate in the decision making of the firm. Board 
size is the natural logarithm of the total number of board 




Board Independence is estimated by taking the number 
of independent directors as a proportion of the board 
size.  
L2$,! 
CEO Duality CEO Duality is a dummy variable being 1 for firms with 
CEO-Chairman Duality and 0 otherwise. 
#'J&$,! 
Number of 
Board meeting  
Number of Board Meeting is proxy for the board 
activity, which is the total number of meetings held 
during a particular financial year. Board activity is the 
natural logarithm of the number of board meeting in a 
financial year (a3(3LM$,!)). 
3JLM$,! 
Percentage of 
women on the 
board 
Gender Diversity is proxy for the percentage of women 
on the board. It is estimated by taking the number of 
independent directors as a percentage of the total 
number of directors in a board. 
K'3&24$,! 
Leverage Leverage is estimated by taking total debt as a 
percentage of the total capital at the end of the financial 
year, in which, total debt comprised of short term and 
long-term debt and total capital includes short term 






Return on assets 
 





The natural logarithm of market value of the equity at 
the end of financial year (a38U$,! ). The number of 
outstanding shares and market price per share estimates 
market value of equity at the end of the financial year. 
Return on asset is estimated by dividing operating profit 
by total assets.  
Audit quality is measured by taking the natural log of 
the audit fees in the previous year 
Sales growth is estimated by taking the percentage 




















Dummy variable which takes the value of 1if the ROA 
is negative and 0 otherwise.  
Operating cash flow is estimated by taking the change 
in Operating cash flow and dividend by the previous 





Year Dummy Year Dummy represent the number of years  m&$   
Notes: The table presents the definition and estimation methodology for dependent and 
independent variables used in the research study of analysing the impact of board 












































Table – 2.2 Descriptive Statistics – Earnings Management and Board Characteristics 
 
Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
 
REM 0.0063 -0.1255 0.4823 -1.7086 3.4519  
DAJ 0.0007 0.0302 0.5152 -14.6121 3.9252  
DAMJ 0.0002 0.0301 0.5152 -14.6125 3.9579  
DAK 0.0003 0.0297 0.5151 -14.6113 3.9639  
EM 0.0002 0.0522 0.8923 -25.3088 6.8399  
BS 1.9881 2.1972 0.6854 0.0000 3.0910  
BI 1.4959 1.6094 0.6152 0.0000 2.7726  
CEOD 0.0264 0.0000 0.5192 0.0000 1.0000  
NOBM 1.9527 2.0794 0.6154 0.0000 4.3694  
GENDIV 0.1432 0.1250 0.1293 0.0000 0.3333  
LEV 0.2280 0.2115 0.2048 0.0000 2.6667  
FS 7.6470 7.5559 2.4865 0.0000 14.8060  
ROA 0.0726 0.0555 0.1331 -0.5724 2.3546  
AQ -0.1142 0.0000 1.3224 -5.2983 6.3759  
SG 0.2964 0.0522 10.6208 -8.7897 59.6071  














Notes: The table presents summary statistics of dependent and independent variables used in 
the research study of analysing the impact of board characteristics on the discretionary accruals 
and real earnings management during the period of 2007 – 2018. All variables are defined in 




Table – 2.3 Correlation Matrix – Earnings Management and Board Characteristics 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 EM 1.00              
2 REM 0.00 1.00             
3 BS 0.02 0.02 1.00            
4 BI 0.10 0.04 -0.56 1.00           
5 CEOD -0.54 0.01 0.00 -0.09 1.00          
6 NOBM 0.11 0.00 0.32 -0.25 -0.09 1.00         
7 GENDIV -0.20 0.01 0.31 0.06 0.12 0.21 1.00        
8 LEV 0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 0.08 1.00       
9 FS 0.01 0.00 0.40 -0.05 0.00 0.44 0.28 0.19 1.00      
10 ROA -0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.09 0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.18 -0.14 1.00     
11 AQ -0.09 0.04 0.22 0.19 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.02 0.48 -0.14 1.00    
12 SG 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00   
13 ∆OCF 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.19 -0.08 -0.02 1.00  
14 LOSS -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.20 -0.08 0.36 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Note: This table presents the correlation among the variables used in this research study of analysing the impact of the board characteristics on 








Table 2.4 Earnings Management and Board Characteristics 
 
!"!,# = #$ + #%$%!,#&% + #'$&!,#&% + #('!()!,#&% + #)*($"!,#&% + #*+!*)&,!,#&% + 
-%.!,!,#&% + -'/%!,#&% + -(0(1!,#&% + -)12!,#&% + -*%+!,# + -+∆('/!,# + -,.(%%!,#&% + 
∑--5)- +	8!,#   
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES DAJ DAMJ DAK EM 
     
Constant -0.5620*** -0.561*** -0.5680*** -0.9760*** 
     
BS -0.1870*** -0.1870*** -0.1870*** -0.3240*** 
BI -0.6720*** -0.6720*** -0.6720*** -1.1640*** 
CEOD  0.2490***  0.2490***  0.2490***  0.4320*** 
NOBM  0.0390**  0.0397**  0.0398**  0.0686** 
GENDIV  -1.0520***  -1.0510***  -1.0510***  -1.820***  
 
LEV  0.1230**  0.1280**  0.1270**  0.2180** 
FS -0.0334*** -0.0338*** -0.0337*** -0.0582*** 
ROA -0.0840 -0.0819 -0.0111 -0.1020 
AQ -0.0527*** -0.0527*** -0.0525*** -0.0912*** 
SGR  0.0008  0.0008  0.0008  0.0014 
OCF  0.0167  0.0200  0.0211  0.0334 
LOSS  0.0248  0.0250  0.0255  0.0435 
     
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Statistics 31.47*** 31.51*** 31.41*** 31.45*** 
R-squared 0.4628 0.4613 0.4594 0.4612 
Observations 3,109 3,109 3,109 3,109 
     
Note: This table summarizes and presents the regression test results that estimate the impact of 
board size, board independence, CEO Duality, Number of board meetings and Gender diversity 
on discretionary accruals during the period of 2007 – 2018 for FTSE 350 Listed companies. 
The steric sign ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level 















Table – 2.5 – Real Earning Management and Board Characteristics 
 
0!"!,# = #$ + #%$%!,#&% + #'$&!,#&% + #('!()!,#&% + #)*($"!,#&% + #*+!*)&,!,#&% + 
-%.!,!,#&% + -'/%!,#&% + -(0(1!,#&% + -)12!,#&% + -*%+!,# + -+∆('/!,# + -,.(%%!,#&% + 





VARIABLES Real Earnings Management (REM)  
   
Constant -0.0995  
   
BS      0.0597**  
BI        0.1700***  
CEOD      0.0274**  
NOBM -0.0117  
GENDIV   0.0067   
 
LEV    0.0799* 
 
FS -0.0067  
ROA      0.1420**  
AQ  0.0048  
SGR  0.0001  
OCF -0.0393  
LOSS -0.0281  
   
Year Dummy                        Yes  
F-Statistics        3.2800***  






Note: This table summarizes and presents the regression test results that estimate the impact of 
board size, board independence, CEO Duality, Number of board meetings and Gender diversity 
on the real earnings management during the period of 2007 – 2018 for FTSE 350 Listed 
companies. The steric sign ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 





Variable Definition  
Variable Definition Symbol 
Earnings 
management  
Earnings management is a proxy for discretionary 
accruals that is estimated by applying three models that 
includes Jones Model (JM), Modified Jones Model 
(MJM) and Kothari Model (KM). Finally, earnings 
management is estimated based on the results of above 









Total number of the audit committee members in an 
audit committee. Audit committee size is the natural 
logarithm of the total number of audit committee 




Audit Committee Independence is measured by taking 
the natural log of the number of independent directors 






Number of Audit 
Committee 
meetings in a 
year  
Audit committee financial expertise is estimated by 
taking the number of audit committee member’s with 
financial expertise as a percentage of the audit 
committee size.  
Number of Audit committee meetings is the number of 
audit committee meetings in a fiscal year. Number of 
audit committee is estimated by taking the natural 
logarithm of the number of audit committee meeting in 






Leverage Leverage is estimated by taking total debt as a 
percentage of the total capital at the end of the financial 
year, in which, total debt comprised of short term and 
long-term debt and total capital includes short term 






Return on assets 
 









The natural logarithm of market value of the equity at 
the end of financial year (.*/%!,# ). The number of 
outstanding shares and market price per share estimates 
market value of equity at the end of the financial year. 
Return on asset is estimated by dividing operating profit 
by total assets.  
Audit quality is measured by taking the natural log of 
the audit fees in the previous year 
Sales growth is estimated by taking the percentage 
change in sales in the current year.  
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1if the ROA 
is negative and 0 otherwise.  
Operating cash flow is estimated by taking the change 
in Operating cash flow and dividend by the previous 



















Year Dummy Year Dummy represent the number of years  			5)!   
Notes: The table presents the definition and estimation methodology for dependent and 
independent variables used in the research study of analysing the impact of audit committee 

















































Table – 3.2 Descriptive Statistics - Earnings management and Audit Committee 
  
Mean Median Standard  Deviation Minimum Maximum  
 REM 0.0063 -0.1255 0.4823 -1.7086 3.4519  
 DAJ 0.0007 0.0302 0.5152 -14.6121 3.9252 
 
 DAMJ 0.0002 0.0301 0.5152 -14.6125 3.9579  
 DAK 0.0003 0.0297 0.5151 -14.6113 3.9639  
 EM 0.0002 0.0522 0.8923 -25.3088 6.8399 
 
 ACS 1.3730 1.3863 0.5304 0.0000 2.3979  
 ACI 1.3693 1.3863 0.5141 0.0000 2.1972  
 ACFEX 0.9707 1.0000 0.2804 0.0000 9.0000 
 
 NACM 1.4872 1.6094 0.8189 0.0000 14.6780  
 LEV 0.2280 0.2115 0.2048 0.0000 2.6667  
 FS 7.6470 7.5559 2.4865 0.0000 14.8060 
 
 ROA 0.0726 0.0555 0.1331 -0.5724 2.3546  
 AQ -0.1142 0.0000 1.3224 -5.2983 6.3759  
 SG 0.2964 0.0522 10.6208 -8.7897 59.6071 
 
 ∆OCF 0.0104 0.0042 0.0715 -1.3697 1.3744  
 LOSS  0.8871  1.0000  0.3165  0.0000  1.0000   
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of dependent and independent variables used in 
the research study of analysing the impact of Audit committee characteristics on the 













Table – 3.3 Correlation Matrix - Earnings management and Audit Committee 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 EM 1.00             
2 REM 0.00 1.00            
3 ACS -0.03 -0.02 1.00           
4 ACI 0.05 -0.02 0.51 1.00          
5 ACFEX -0.42 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 1.00         
6 NACM -0.41 0.02 0.38 0.37 0.38 1.00        
7 LEV 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 1.00       
8 FS 0.01 0.00 0.40 0.44 -0.01 0.44 0.19 1.00      
9 ROA -0.01 0.02 0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.04 -0.18 -0.14 1.00     
10 AQ -0.09 0.04 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.25 0.02 0.48 -0.14 1.00    
11 SG 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00   
12 ∆OCF 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.19 -0.08 -0.02 1.00  
13  LOSS  -0.01  0.00  0.03  0.05  0.01  0.03  -0.20  -0.08  0.36  -0.01  0.01  0.00  1.00  
Note: This table presents correlation matrix between the dependent and independent variables used in this research study of analysing the impact 
of the audit committee characteristics on earnings management during a period of 2007 – 2018. All variables are defined in Table 3.1.
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Table – 3.4 – Earnings Management and Audit Committee 
 
!"!,#	= $$ + $%%&'!,#&% + $'%&(!,#&% + $(%&)!*!,#&% + $)+%&"!,#&% + ,%-!.!,#&% +   
,')'!,#&% + ,(/0%!,#&% + ,)%1!,#&% + ,*'2!,# + ,+∆0&)!,# + ,,-0''!,#&% + ∑,-56- 
+	8!,# 
 Dependent Variables 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 
 DAJ DAMJ DAK EM 
Constant 0.4060*** 0.4070*** 0.4010*** 0.7010*** 
     
ACS -0.2650*** -0.2650*** -0.2650*** -0.4590*** 
ACI  0.2850***  0.2850***  0.2860***  0.4940*** 
ACFEX -0.2170*** -0.2170*** -0.2170*** -0.3760*** 
NACM -0.2100*** -0.2100*** -0.2100*** -0.3630*** 
     
LEV  0.0598  0.0647  0.0638  0.1090 
FS -0.0036 -0.0040 -0.0039 -0.0066 
ROA -0.0947 -0.0925 -0.0218 -0.1210 
AQ -0.0420*** -0.0420*** -0.0418*** -0.0727*** 
SGR  0.0007  0.0008  0.0007  0.0013 
OCF  0.0528  0.0562  0.0572  0.0960 
LOSS  0.0233  0.0234  0.0240  0.0408 
     
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Statistics 32.6200*** 32.6500*** 32.5200*** 32.5900*** 
R-squared 0.2733 0.2722 0.2713 0.2722 
Observations 3,109 3,109 3,109 3,109 
     
Note: This table summarizes and presents the regression test results that estimate the impact 
of audit committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee member’s 
financial expertise and number of audit committee meetings on discretionary accruals 
during the period of 2007 – 2018 for FTSE 350 Listed companies. The steric sign ***, **, 
and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All variables 







Table – 3.5 – Real Earnings Management and Audit Committee 
 
/!"!,#	= $$ + $%%&'!,#&% + $'%&(!,#&% + $(%&)!*!,#&% + $)+%&"!,#&% + ,%-!.!,#&% +   
,')'!,#&% + ,(/0%!,#&% + ,)%1!,#&% + ,*'2!,# + ,+∆0&)!,# + ,,-0''!,#&% + ∑,-56- 
+	8!,# 
                     Dependent Variables 
 
VARIABLES       Real Earnings Management (REM) 
   
Constant   0.0219 
   
ACS   0.0703** 
ACI  -0.0618* 
ACFEX   0.0374 
NACM   0.00483 
   
LEV   0.0742 
FS  -0.0027 
ROA   0.1420** 
AQ   0.0062 
SGR   0.0001 
OCF  -0.0413 
LOSS  -0.0313 
   
Year Dummy  Yes 
F-Statistics  3.1700*** 
R-squared  0.0003 
Observations   3,109.0  
Note: This table summarizes and presents the regression test results that estimate the impact 
of audit committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee member’s 
financial expertise and number of audit committee meetings on real earnings management 
during the period of 2007 – 2018 for FTSE 350 Listed companies. The steric sign ***, **, 
and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All variables 








Table 4.1  
Variable Definition  
Variable Definition Symbol 
Earnings 
management  
Earnings management is a proxy for discretionary 
accruals that is estimated by applying three models 
that includes Jones Model (JM), Modified Jones 
Model (MJM) and Kothari Model (KM). Finally, 
earnings management is estimated based on the 
results of above three models by applying the first 













CEO’s and Executives total compensation is 
estimated by using the natural logarithm of the total 
compensation that is paid to CEO’s and Executives. 
(Ln	(;?@AB	C?DEFGHA@I?G!,#)) 
CEO’s and Executive equity-based compensation is 
the difference between the total compensation and 
cash-based compensation. Finally, the equity-based 
compensation is estimated by using the natural 
logarithm of the Equity-based compensation that is 
paid to CEO’s and Executives.  









CEO’s and Executive Salaries are estimated by taking 
the natural logarithm of the base salary that is paid to 
CEO’s and Executives.  











CEO’s and Executive Bonuses are estimated by using 
the natural logarithm of the performance-based 
bonuses that is paid to CEO’s and executives. 
(Ln	(Q?GLHFH!,#))   
CEO’s and Executive’s Equity-based compensation 
to total compensation ratio is estimated by taking the 
Equity-based compensation as a proportion of the 






Leverage Leverage is estimated by taking total debt as a 
percentage of the total capital at the end of the financial 
year, in which, total debt comprised of short term and 
long-term debt and total capital includes short term 






The natural logarithm of market value of the equity at 







Return on assets 
 









outstanding shares and market price per share estimates 
market value of equity at the end of the financial year. 
Return on asset is estimated by dividing operating profit 
by total assets.  
Audit quality is measured by taking the natural log of 
the audit fees in the previous year 
Sales growth is estimated by taking the percentage 
change in sales in the current year.  
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1if the ROA 
is negative and 0 otherwise.  
Operating cash flow is estimated by taking the change 
in Operating cash flow and dividend by the previous 













Year Dummy Year Dummy represent the number of years  56!   
Notes: The table presents the definition and estimation methodology for dependent and 
independent variables used in the research study of analysing the impact of the component 





























Table – 4.2 Descriptive Statistics – Earnings Management and Executive 
Compensation 
 Mean Median Standard  Deviation Minimum Maximum  
REM 0.0063 -0.1255 0.4823 -1.7086 3.4519  
DAJ 0.0007 0.0302 0.5152 -14.6121 3.9252  
DAMJ 0.0002 0.0301 0.5152 -14.6125 3.9579  
DAK 0.0003 0.0297 0.5151 -14.6113 3.9639  
EM 0.0002 0.0522 0.8923 -25.3088 6.8399  
CEOTC 10.7666 13.9868 6.2775 0.0000 20.6866  
CEOEBC 9.0567 11.6451 5.8836 0.0000 17.9855  
CEOBONUS 9.4465 12.8022 5.9988 0.0000 16.1181  
CEOSALARY 10.7181 13.1480 5.2717 0.0000 20.6453  
CEOECR 0.1627 0.1118 1.1089 -33.3333 0.9789  
EXTC 11.6242 14.7091 6.3851 0.0000 21.8527  
EXEBC 9.9099 12.6115 6.0721 -3.5066 20.6452  
EXBONUS 10.4616 13.4814 5.9802 0.0000 21.0597  
EXSALARY 11.6336 13.8785 5.3384 -0.8749 21.2088  
EXECR -0.2790 0.1263 9.3199 -224.9528 0.9849  
LEV 0.2280 0.2115 0.2048 0.0000 2.6667  
FS 7.6470 7.5559 2.4865 0.0000 14.8060  
ROA 0.0726 0.0555 0.1331 -0.5724 2.3546  
AQ -0.1142 0.0000 1.3224 -5.2983 6.3759  
SG 0.2964 0.0522 10.6208 -8.7897 590.6071  
∆OCF 0.0104 0.0042 0.0715 -1.3697 1.3744  
LOSS 0.8871 1.0000 0.3165 0.0000 1.0000  
       
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of dependent and independent variables used 
in the research study of analysing the impact of the component of the executive 
compensation on the discretionary accruals for FTSE 350 Listed companies during the 
period of 2007 – 2018. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
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Table – 4.3 Correlation Matrix - Earnings Management and Executive Compensation 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 EM 1.00                   
2 REM 0.00 1.00                  
3 CEOTC 0.01 -0.02 1.00                 
4 CEOEBC 0.06 -0.01 0.52 1.00                
5 CEOBONUS 0.01 0.00 0.49 0.46 1.00               
6 CEOSALARY 0.01 0.01 0.45 0.37 0.38 1.00              
7 CEOECR 0.10 -0.01 0.11 0.23 0.05 0.08 1.00             
8 EXTC 0.02 -0.01 0.80 0.08 0.35 0.41 0.11 1.00            
9 EXEBC 0.03 0.00 0.49 0.32 0.42 0.36 0.20 0.42 1.00           
10 EXBONUS 0.02 0.00 0.39 0.35 0.49 0.37 0.08 0.32 0.38 1.00          
11 EXSALARY 0.10 0.01 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.52 0.09 0.43 0.45 0.42 1.00         
12 EXECR 0.00 -0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 1.00        
13 LEV 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.04 1.00       
14 FS 0.01 0.00 0.42 0.43 0.32 0.41 0.07 0.43 0.43 0.35 0.41 0.00 0.19 1.00      
15 ROA -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.02 -0.18 -0.14 1.00     
16 AQ -0.09 0.04 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.17 0.02 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.14 -0.01 0.02 0.48 -0.14 1.00    
17 SG 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00   
18 ∆OCF 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.08 0.19 -0.08 -0.02 1.00  
19 LOSS -0.01 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.04 -0.20 -0.08 0.36 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Note: This table present the correlation matrix between variable used in this research study of analysing the impact of the CEO’s and Executives 
compensation on earnings management during the period of 2007 – 2018. All variables are defined in Table 4.1.
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Table – 4.4 – Earnings Management and CEO’s Compensation 
 
!"!,# = #$ + #%$!%&$!,#&% + #'$!%!'$!,#&% + #($!%()*)+,!,#&% + #)$!%'%-.(!,#&% + 
#*$!%!$+!,#&% + /%*!0!,#&% + /'1(!,#&% + /(+%)!,#&% + /))2!,#&% + /*(3!,# + /+∆%$1!,# + 
/,*%((!,#&% + ∑/-,6-  +	9!,# 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 
 DAJ DAMJ DAK EM 
     
Constant  0.1710***  0.1730***  0.1670***  0.2950*** 
     
CEOTC -0.0150*** -0.0149*** -0.0149*** -0.0258*** 
CEOEBC  0.0246***  0.0246***  0.0246***  0.0426*** 
CEOBONUS  0.0008  0.0008  0.0008  0.0014 
CEOSALARY -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0021 
CEOECR  0.0203***  0.0203***  0.0203***  0.0351*** 
     
LEV  0.1550***  0.1600***  0.1590***  0.2730*** 
FS -0.0293*** -0.0297*** -0.0296*** -0.0511*** 
ROA -0.1630** -0.1610** -0.0902 -0.2390* 
AQ -0.0598*** -0.0598*** -0.0596*** -0.1030*** 
SGR  0.0005  0.0005  0.0005  0.0008 
OCF  0.0196  0.0229  0.0238  0.0383 
LOSS  0.0020  0.0022  0.0027  0.0039 
     
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Statistics 6.1800*** 6.2100*** 6.1300*** 6.1600*** 
R-squared 0.1011 0.1004 0.1001 0.1013 
Observations 3,109.0 3,109.0 3,109.0 3,109.0 
     
Notes: This table summarizes and presents the regression test results that estimate the impact 
of the CEO total compensation, CEO equity-based compensation, CEO Salary, CEO Bonus 
and CEO’s equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio on discretionary accruals 
during the period of 2007 – 2018 for FTSE 350 Listed companies. The steric sign ***, **, and 
* indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All variables are 









Table – 4.5 – Real Earnings Management and CEO’s Compensation 
 
+!"!,# = #$ + #%$!%&$!,#&% + #'$!%!'$!,#&% + #($!%()*)+,!,#&% + #)$!%'%-.(!,#&% 
+ #*$!%!$+!,#&% + /%*!0!,#&% + /'1(!,#&% + /(+%)!,#&% + /))2!,#&% + /*(3!,# + /+∆%$1!,# 
+ /,*%((!,#&% + ∑/-,6-  +	9!,# 
 
                        Dependent Variables 
 
VARIABLES  Real Earnings Management (REM) 
   
Constant  0.0552 
   
CEOTC  -0.0043 
CEOEBC  -0.0036 
CEOBONUS  -0.0009 
CEOSALARY   0.0042 
CEOECR  -0.0007 
   
LEV   0.0611 
FS  -0.0002 
ROA   0.1540** 
AQ   0.0083 
SGR   0.0000 
OCF  -0.0366 
LOSS  -0.0232 
   
Year Dummy  Yes 
F-Statistics  3.2000*** 
R-squared  0.02600 
Observations  3,109.0 
   
Notes: This table summarizes and presents the regression test results that estimate the impact 
of the CEO total compensation, CEO equity-based compensation, CEO Salary, CEO Bonus 
and CEO’s equity-based compensation to total compensation ratio on real earnings 
management during the period of 2007 – 2018 for FTSE 350 Listed companies. The steric sign 
***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All 










Table – 4.6 – Earnings Management and Executives Compensation 
 
!"!,# = #$ + #%!:&$!,#&% + #'!:!'$!,#&% + #(!:()*)+,!,#&% +  #)!:'%-.(!,#&% +  
#*!:!$+!,#&% + /%*!0!,#&% + /'1(!,#&% + /(+%)!,#&% + /))2!,#&% + /*(3!,# + /+∆%$1!,# + 
/,*%((!,#&% + ∑/-,6- +	9!,# 
 
 Dependent Variables 
 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 
 DAJ DAMJ DAK EM 
     
Constant 0.2010***   0.2020***  0.1960***  0.3460*** 
     
EXTC -0.0114*** -0.0113*** -0.0113*** -0.0197*** 
EXEBC  0.0049  0.0049  0.0049  0.0085 
EXBONUS -0.0065*** -0.0065*** -0.0065*** -0.0113*** 
EXSALARY  0.0296***  0.0296***  0.0296***  0.0513*** 
EXECR  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0005 
     
LEV  0.1250**  0.1300**  0.1290**  0.2220** 
FS -0.0378*** -0.0381*** -0.0381*** -0.0658*** 
ROA -0.1590** -0.1570* -0.0860 -0.2320* 
AQ -0.0590*** -0.0589*** -0.0587*** -0.1020*** 
SGR  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002 
OCF -0.0238 -0.0206 -0.0197 -0.0370 
LOSS  0.0198  0.0199  0.0204  0.0347 
     
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-Statistics 6.2500*** 6.2900*** 6.2200*** 6.2400*** 











Notes: This table summarizes and presents the regression test results that estimate the impact 
of the Executives total compensation, Executive’s equity-based compensation, Executives 
Salary, Executives Bonus and Equity-based compensation to total ratio on discretionary 
accruals during the period of 2007 – 2018 for FTSE 350 Listed companies. The steric sign ***, 
**, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All variables 










Table – 4.7 – Earnings Management and Executive Compensation 
 
+!"!,# = #$ + #%!:&$!,#&% + #'!:!'$!,#&% + #(!:()*)+,!,#&% +  #)!:'%-.(!,#&% +  
#*!:!$+!,#&% + /%*!0!,#&% + /'1(!,#&% + /(+%)!,#&% + /))2!,#&% + /*(3!,# + /+∆%$1!,# + 
/,*%((!,#&% + ∑/-,6- +	9!,#   
 
                   Dependent Variables 
 
VARIABLES  REM 
   
Constant   0.0531 
   
EXTC  -0.0040 
EXEBC  -0.0017 
EXBONUS  -0.0005 
EXSALARY   0.0018 
EXECR  -0.0005 
   
LEV   0.0625 
FS   0.0003 
ROA   0.1490** 
AQ   0.0080 
SGR   0.0000 
OCF  -0.0357 
LOSS  -0.0237 
   
Year Dummy  Yes 
F-Statistics  3.0800*** 
R-squared  0.0250 
Observations 
   
3,109.0 
  
Notes: This table summarizes and presents the regression test results that estimate the impact 
of the Executives total compensation, Executive’s equity-based compensation, Executives 
Salary, Executives Bonus and Equity-based compensation to total ratio on real earnings 
management during the period of 2007 – 2018 for FTSE 350 Listed companies. The steric 
sign ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 









Appendix 1 – Measuring Earnings management 
Discretionary accruals – Jones model (1991)  
DAJ is the value of discretionary accruals measured based on the Jones model (1991). 
First, firm specific total accruals (TACC) are measured as: 
 
&)$$! = (∆$;<<=>?	@AA=?A - ∆$@Aℎ -∆$;<<=>?	CD@EDCD?D=A) – 6=F	@>G	)HI<?	  (1) 
Second, discretionary accruals are estimated as the residuals of the regression model by 
applying the following equation.  
 
&)J!,#/&)!,#&% = #%(1/&)!,#&%) + #'(∆+=K!,#	/&)!#&%) + #((LL!!#	/&)!#&%) + 9#      (2) 
Where: 
&)!,#   Total accruals for firm M ̇at period ? 
)!,#&%   Total assets for firm M ̇at period ? 
∆+=K!,#	  Change in revenue for firm M ̇at period ?      
LL!!,#   Property plant and equipment for firm M ̇at period ? 
#% to #( Coefficients estimates for independent variables  
ε#   Error term  
 
Third, to estimate the Non-discretionary accruals (NDA), the coefficients from 
equation (2) are ploughed back into equation (3) to measure the firm specific non-discretionary 
accruals.  
 
-6)J!,#/&)!,#&% = #%(1/&)!,#&%) + #'(∆+=K!,#	/&)(!#&%) + #((LL!!#	/&)!#&%)  (3) 
Where: 
-6)!#  The Non-discretionary accruals for firm Ṁ for year t 
#$ - #(  The industry specific estimated coefficient that are estimated from the first 
equation  
 
Once the total accruals and non-discretionary accruals are estimated, the discretionary 
accruals are estimated by taking the difference of the total accruals and non-discretionary 




6)J!,# = &)J!#/)!,#&%  - -6)J!,#        (4) 
Where: 
6)!#   Discretionary Accruals  
&)!#/)!#&% Total accruals scaled by total assets at beginning of the year    
-6)!#  Non-discretionary accruals for firm Ṁ for year ? 
 
Discretionary accruals – Modified Jones Model (1995) 
 
DAMJ is the value of discretionary accruals estimated based on the modified Jones 
model (1995). First, firm specific total accruals (TACC) are measured as: 
 
&)$$! = (∆$;<<=>?	@AA=?A - ∆$@Aℎ -∆$;<<=>?	CD@EDCD?D=A) – 6=F@>G)HI<?   (5) 
	
One of the major limitations of the Jones model is its assumption that the total revenue 
is non-discretionary (Dechow et al. 1995). Dechow et al. (1995) model is primarily based on 
the assumption that total revenue is not non-discretionary whereas, a certain part of the entire 
revenue is discretionary, where managers exercise discretionary power over revenues 
manipulate the revenue. Based on this new development, Dechow et al. (1995) modifies the 
Jones model by adjusting the change in revenue for change in receivables and presents the 
evidence that their model is more powerful as compare to Jones model because their model is 
good at detecting cases of revenue manipulations. DAMJ estimates the coefficients of the total 
accruals by applying the following model.  
 
&)"J!,#/&)!,#&% = #%(1/&)!,#&%) + #'(∆+=K!,#	 − ∆+=R!,#	/&)!,#&%) + 
                              #((LL!!#	/&)!#&%) + 9#      (6) 
Where: 
&)!,#   Total accruals for firm M ̇at period ? 
)!,#&%   Total assets for firm M ̇at period ? 
∆+=K!,#	  Change in revenue for firm M ̇at period ? 
∆+=R!,#	            Change in trade receivables for firm Ṁ at period ? 
LL!!,#   Property plant and equipment for firm M ̇at period ? 
#% - #(  Coefficients estimates 
ε#   Error term  
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Next, to estimate the Non-discretionary accruals (NDA), the coefficients from equation 
(6) are ploughed back in equation (7) to measure the firm specific non-discretionary accruals.  
 
-6)"J!,#/&)!,#&% = #%(1/&)!,#&%) + #'(∆+=K!,#	 − ∆+=R!,#	/&)(!#&%) + 
                                   #(LL!!#	/&)!#&%)                                                          (7) 
 
Where: 
-6)!#  The Non-discretionary accruals for firm Ṁ for year t 
#$ - #(  The industry specific estimated coefficient that are estimated from the first 
equation  
 
Once the total accruals and non-discretionary accruals are estimated, the discretionary 
accruals are estimated by taking a difference of the total accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals. The residual term from the total accruals model represents the discretionary accruals 
(DA) 
 
6)"J!,# = &)"J!#/)!,#&%  - -6)"J!,#                                              (8) 
          
Where: 
6)"J!#  Discretionary accruals estimated based on modified Jones model 
&)"J!#/)!#&% Total accruals scaled by total assets at beginning of the year, estimated 
by modified Jones model     
-6)"J!# Non-discretionary accruals estimated by modified Jones model for firm 
Ṁ for year ? 
 
Discretionary accruals Kothari Model (1991) 
 
DAK is the value of discretionary accruals measured based on the Kothari model 






&)S! = (∆$;<<=>?	@AA=?A - ∆$@Aℎ -∆$;<<=>?	CD@EDCD?D=A) – 6=F@>G)HI<?      (9) 
	
According to DechSow et al. (1995) and Kasznik (1999), there is a positive statistically 
significant relationship between the discretionary accruals and return on assets (ROA), which 
cause miss-specification in the model. Therefore, Kothari adjusted the modified Jones model 
by adding ROA and estimated the coefficients of the total accruals by applying the following 
model.  
 
&)S!,#/&)!,#&% = #%(1/&)!,#&%) + #'(∆+=K!,#	 − ∆+=R!,#	/&)!#&%) +  
                              #((LL!!#	/&)!#&%) + #)+%)!#&% +	9#	                             (10) 
Where: 
&)!,#   Total accruals for firm M ̇at period ? 
)!,#&%   Total assets for firm M ̇at period ? 
∆+=K!,#	  Change in revenue for firm M ̇at period ? 
∆+=R!,#	            Change in trade receivables for firm Ṁ at period ? 
LL!!,#   Property plant and equipment for firm M ̇at period ? 
+%)!#&%          Return on assets of the previous year for firm Ṁ at period ? 
#% - #)  Coefficients estimates 
ε#   Error term  
 
Next, to estimate the non-discretionary accruals (NDAK), the coefficients from 
equation (10) are ploughed back into equation (11) to measure the firm specific non-
discretionary accruals.  
 
-6)"S!,#/&)!,#&% = #%(1/&)!,#&%) + #'(∆+=K!,#	 − ∆+=R!,#	/&)(!#&%) +    
                                   #((LL!!#	/&)!#&%) + #)+%)!#&%                                  (11) 
Where: 
-6)S!#   The non-discretionary accruals for firm Ṁ for year t 
#$ - #(  The industry specific estimated coefficient that are estimated from the 
first equation  
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Finally, the discretionary accruals are estimated by taking the difference of the total 
accruals and non-discretionary accruals. The residual term from the total accruals model 
represents the discretionary accruals (DA). 
 
 
6)S!,# = &)S!#/)!,#&%  - -6)S!,#                      (12) 
Where: 
6)S!#  Discretionary accruals estimated based on Kothari model 
&)S!#/)!#&% Total accruals scaled by total assets at beginning of the year, estimated 
by Kothari model 
-6)S!# Non-discretionary accruals estimated by Kothari model for firm Ṁ for 
year t 
 
Finally, Earnings management (EARNMGT) is measured at the first principal 
component of DAJ, DAMJ and DAK.  
 























Appendix 2 – Old Results and Analysis  
Earnings Management and Board Characteristics 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 presents the results of the descriptive statistics for the board characteristics, 
earnings management and control variables for all FTSE 350 listed companies. The mean value 
for discretionary accruals based on all four models of earnings management is zero and 
standard deviation is approximately 301. In addition, the inter quartile range is approximately 
28. Higher standard deviation and interquartile range suggests that the discretionary accruals 
among companies are highly diverse. The average of the board size and number of board 
meetings are 1.86 and 1.76 respectively. On average, 50% of the board comprised of 
independent directors, whereas approximately 12% of the board comprised of women 
directors. In addition, board independence and gender diversity interquartile range are highest, 
which shows that in FTSE 350 companies, there is substantial difference in terms of number 
of independent directors and number of women directors on the board.   
[TABLE	2] 
Table 3 presents the t-test and Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test results. Mean difference T-
Test is applied to test the difference of highest and lowest mean values in relation to earnings 
management. The results show that the board size, board independence, number of board 
meetings and gender diversity are statistically significant at 5% of significance level. Whereas, 
based on Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test results, the median difference between the highest and 
lowest values is insignificant for all the board characteristics.  
[TABLE	3] 
Correlation 
It can be observed from correlation matrix (Table 4), that the relationship of the 
earnings, management with total assets, property, plant and equipment, board size, board 
independence, number of board meetings, gender diversity and firm size is negative. Whereas 
the earnings management correlation with return on assets, CEO duality and leverage are 
positive. Negative correlation suggests that the strong presence of the above explanatory 
variables helps in controlling earnings management practices. Whereas those variables that 
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exhibit positive correlation with earnings management encourages earnings management 
practices. In addition, the strongest positive correlation exists between board size and board 
independence, board size and number of board meeting, and board independence and number 
of board meetings, from which, it can be inferred that the number of independent directors is 
increasing as the board size is increasing and as a result of large board size, the board activity 
is increasing in FTSE 350 companies.  
[TABLE	4] 
Empirical Models 
Applying three (3) regression models that comprised of Jones model (1991), modified 
Jones model (1996) and Kothari model (2005) tests the impact of board characteristics on 
earnings management. Finally, earnings management are estimated by applying the first 
principal component approach, which is estimating the discretionary accruals by taking 
weighted average of the discretionary accruals of the three models that comprised of Jones 
model (1991), modified Jones model (1996) and Kothari model (2005) and tested the impact 
of board characteristics on earnings management by applying the following empirical model. 
!)+-"3&!,# = #0 + #1'(1,2 + #2'^1,2 + #3$!%61,2 + #4-%'"1,2 + #53!-6^01,2 + #6*!01,2 
+  
                         #71(1,2 + ,6-  +	9!,# 
Where: 
!)+-"3&!,#   Earnings management for firm D in year ?	
'(!,#    Board Size for firm D in year ? 
' !̂,#    Board Independence for firm D in year ? 
$!%6!,#   CEO Duality for firm D in year ? 
-%'"!,#   Number of Board Meeting for firm D in year ? 
3!-6^0!,#   Gender Diversity for firm D in year ? 
*!0!,#    Leverage for firm D in year ? 
1(!,#    Firm Size for firm D in year ? 
,6-   Dummy Variable from 2007 to 2017 represent the number of years 
#0    Constant or intercept  
#1 To #7   Coefficient for independent variables 
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9!,#    Residual or error term 
All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Regression Analysis 
The impact of board independence on earnings management is negative and statistically 
significant at 1% based on the results of Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model 
and earnings management model. It can be inferred from the negative impact of board 
independence that when the percentage of independent directors is higher on the board, the 
board is more effective in controlling earnings management practices. This is consistent with 
previous empirical findings of the Dechow et al. (1996) Peasnell et al. (2000), Donnelly and 
Lynch, (2002) and Cornett et al. (2009), which study the impact of board independence on 
earnings management.   
The coefficient value for the board size based on the results of Jones model, modified 
Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management model are negative, which suggests that 
the impact of the board size on the earnings management is negative. The results are consistent 
with the previous empirical findings of the Ahmed et al. (2006), Fama et al. (1983), Defond et 
al. (1994), Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Xie et al. (2003) however, based on the results of 
all the four models, the impact is insignificant.  
The coefficient value for the CEO duality based on the results of Jones model, modified 
Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management model are positive, which suggests that 
when both positions i.e., CEO and board chairman is held by one person, the board of directors’ 
role in controlling earnings management is ineffective. The results are consistent with the 
previous empirical findings of the Jensen et al. (1976) and Dechow et al. (1996), however the 
impact is insignificant.  
The impact of the NOBM is positive on earnings management based on the results of 
Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and earnings management model as the 
coefficient of the NOBM is positive, moreover, based on the results of all the four regression 
models, the impact is statistically significant at 1% of significance level. Based on the results, 
it can be inferred that when the board meets for a higher number of times, the board loses its 
control over unnecessary practices such as earnings management to control. This is consistent 
with the previous empirical findings of the Jensen (1993), Lorca, et al. (2011), Gulzar and 
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Wang (2011) and Metawee (2013), which study the relationship of number of board meetings 
and earnings management.  
Based on the findings of the Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and 
earnings management model, the impact of the gender diversity on earnings management is 
negative, moreover, the impact is statistically significant at 10% of significance level. The 
results and findings suggest that when the percentage of women is higher on the board, the 
board role become more effective in terms of controlling earnings management. This is 






































Table 1  
Variable Definition  
Variable Definition Symbol 
Earnings 
management  
Earnings management is a proxy for discretionary 
accruals that is estimated by applying three models that 
includes Jones Model (JM), Modified Jones Model 
(MJM) and Kothari Model (KM). Finally, earnings 
management is estimated based on the results of above 







Board Size Total Number of Directors serving on the board to 
participate in the decision making of the firm. Board 
size is the natural logarithm of the total number of board 




Board Independence is the percentage of the 
independent directors on the board. Board 
independence is estimated by taking the number of 
independent directors as a percentage of the total 
number of directors in a board. 
' !̂,# 
CEO Duality CEO Duality is a dummy variable being 1for firms with 
CEO-Chairman Duality and 0 otherwise. 
$!%6!,# 
Number of 
Board meeting  
Number of Board Meeting is proxy for the board 
activity, which is the total number of meetings held 
during a particular financial year. Board activity is the 
natural logarithm of the number of board meeting in a 
financial year (*--'"!,#). 
-%'"!,# 
Percentage of 
women on the 
board 
Gender Diversity is proxy for the percentage of women 
on the board. It is estimated by taking the number of 
independent directors as a percentage of the total 
number of directors in a board. 
3!-6^0!,# 
Leverage Leverage is estimated by taking total debt as a 
percentage of the total capital at the end of the financial 
year, in which, total debt comprised of short term and 
long-term debt and total capital includes short term 
debt, long term debt and equity 
*!0!,# 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of market value of the equity at 
the end of financial year (*-1(!,# ). The number of 
outstanding shares and market price per share estimates 
market value of equity at the end of the financial year.  
1(!,# 
Year Dummy Year Dummy represent the number of years  ,6-  
 
Notes: The table presents the definition and estimation methodology for dependent and 
independent variables used in the research study of analysing the impact of board 
characteristics on the discretionary accruals during the period of 2006 – 2017.
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Table 2                                                                                                                                   
Descriptive Statistics 
  
Mean Q1 Median Q3 Maximum Minimum ST DEV Range IQ Range 
DAJ 0.00 26.82 42.94 55.51 2833.95 -5225.49 301.16 8059.45 28.69 
DAJM 0.00 26.79 42.97 55.53 2833.68 -5226.57 301.15 8060.25 28.74 
DAK 0.00 26.97 42.90 55.91 2834.51 -5225.85 301.14 8060.36 28.95 
EARNMGT 0.00 46.57 74.36 96.46 4908.71 -9051.64 521.60 13960.35 49.89 
TASSETS 7.23 6.29 7.44 8.80 14.81 -0.91 2.98 15.72 2.50 
PPE 5.05 3.01 5.38 7.09 12.37 -7.60 2.95 19.97 4.08 
ROA 6.61 0.42 4.75 9.59 235.46 -120.04 13.58 355.51 9.17 
BS 1.86 1.95 2.08 2.30 3.04 0.00 0.83 3.04 0.36 
BI 49.50 42.86 55.56 66.67 100.00 0.00 25.01 100.00 23.81 
CEOD 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.14 1.00 0.00 
NOBM 1.76 1.79 2.08 2.30 4.56 0.00 0.84 4.56 0.51 
ECOMP 7.42 0.00 0.45 2.36 5082.24 0.00 101.46 5082.24 2.36 
GENDIV 12.03 0.00 11.11 20.00 70.00 0.00 11.52 70.00 20.00 
LEV 0.22 0.02 0.19 0.32 2.67 0.00 0.22 2.67 0.30 
FS 6.55 6.06 7.24 8.41 12.54 0.00 3.20 12.54 2.35 
          
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of dependent and independent variables used in the research study of analysing the impact of board 
characteristics on the discretionary accruals during the period of 2008 – 2018. All variables are defined in Table 1.   
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Table 3 
T-Test for the difference of highest and lowest mean values 
MEAN 
 Highest Lowest T-Test 
BS 2.2817 2.0467  -5.3408** 
BI 62.2047 53.9961   5.8368** 
CEOD 0.0178 0.02            -0.2446 
NOBM 2.0191 1.8941   2.8519** 
ECOMP 8.1676 10.5853            -0.40614 
GENDIV 16.6904 14.7077             2.6664** 
		 		 		 		
    
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for the difference of highest and lowest median values 
MEDIAN 
  Highest Lowest T-Test 
BS 2.3979 2.1972 -1.5749 
BI 66.667 58.333 -0.0251 
CEOD 0 0 -0.5606 
NOBM 2.0794 2.0794 -0.8628 
ECOMP 0.5834 0.4227 -0.1383 
GENDIV 15.385 12.5 -0.7576 
        
Notes: The table presents the results of the T-statistics for mean differential and Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank Test for median differential. The steric sign ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 DAJ 1.000              
2 DAJM 1.000 1.000             
3 DAK 1.000 1.000 1.000            
4 EARNMGT 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000           
5 TASSETS -0.101 -0.101 -0.102 -0.102 1.000          
6 PPE -0.044 -0.044 -0.045 -0.045 0.760 1.000         
7 ROA 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 -0.025 -0.031 1.000        
8 BS -0.106 -0.106 -0.106 -0.106 0.101 0.114 0.022 1.000       
9 BI -0.128 -0.127 -0.128 -0.128 0.109 0.134 0.001 0.832 1.000      
10 CEOD 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.036 0.050 0.039 0.013 1.000     
11 NOBM -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 0.034 0.077 0.006 0.853 0.806 0.046 1.000    
12 GENDIV -0.086 -0.086 -0.087 -0.086 0.136 0.113 0.017 0.338 0.390 -0.056 0.282 1.000   
13 LEV 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.273 0.358 -0.120 -0.013 -0.021 -0.027 -0.010 0.010 1.000  
14 FS -0.076 -0.076 -0.077 -0.076 0.780 0.673 0.157 0.117 0.130 0.026 0.067 0.128 0.090 1.000 
 
Notes: The table presents Spearman’s rank correlation between the dependent and independent variables used in the research study of analysing 




Table 5  
Regression analyses on earnings management – Dependent variable is discretionary accruals 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
1 2 3 4 
 DAJ DAJM DAK EARNMGT 
     
Intercept     98.76***    98.67***  99.06*** 171.18*** 
     
BI     -1.65*** -1.65***    -1.65***   -2.86*** 
BS     -21.18       -21.28   -21.16   -36.73 
CEOD     35.52        35.54    35.19   61.35 
NOBM     35.96***        35.99***    36.10***   62.38*** 
GENDIV     -0.88*        -0.88*    -0.89*   -1.53* 
     
LEV    58.12** 58.11**    58.33** 100.78** 
FS    -6.27***  -6.27***    -6.36*** -10.91*** 
TD   YES        YES    YES   YES 
     
F-Statistics   5.70***      5.70***    5.75***  5.72*** 
R-Squared   0.0293      0.0293    0.0295  0.0294 
Adjusted R-Squared   0.0242      0.0242    0.0244  0.0242 
OBS   3419      3419    3419  3419 
  
This table summarizes and presents the regression test results that estimate the impact of Board 
independence, board size, CEO Duality, Number of board meetings and Gender diversity on 
discretionary accruals during the period of 2008 – 2018 for FTSE 350 Listed companies. The 
steric sign ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 





















Earnings Management and Audit Committee Characteristics 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the results of the descriptive statistics for the audit committee 
characteristics, earnings management and control variables for FTSE 350 listed companies for 
a period of eleven years that starts from 2008 to 2019. The earnings management mean is -
2.7377, which suggests that on average, FTSE 350 listed companies’ discretionary accruals are 
negative. In addition, the standard deviation is 3.8305, from which it can be concluded that the 
discretionary accruals are highly dispersed and therefore, the variation in discretionary accruals 
is higher (Greene, 2008). It can also be supported by the range, in which the lowest value is -
97 and the highest value is 223. In addition, the average audit committee size is approximately 
one, which shows that on average, the audit committee size is lower in the FTSE 350 listed 
companies. Moreover, on average, 54% members of the audit committee are independent, 
however, the standard deviation is 37, which suggests that there is significantly higher variation 
in the percentage of independent members on the audit committees of FTSE 350 listed 
companies. Audit committee member’s financial expertise on audit committee is 47% on 
average, from which, it can in inferred that approximately half of the audit committee 
member’s background is in accounting and finance.  
[TABLE	2] 
Correlation 
Table 3 presents the results of the correlation coefficient matrix for the audit committee 
characteristics and control variables for FTSE 350 listed companies for a period of eleven years 
that starts from 2008 to 2019. The correlation between the audit committee independence and 
audit committee member’s financial expertise is 0.77 significant at 1%, which suggests that the 
relationship between the audit committee independence and audit committee member’s 
financial expertise is highly positive. The second highest correlation is 0.59 that is significant 
at 1% of significance level and exists between the audit committee size and number of audit 
committee meeting in a year. From the correlation between the audit committee size and 
number of audit committee meetings, it can be inferred that audit committee members meet 
more frequently when the committee size is higher. However, the lowest correlation exists 




correlation between the firm size and financial leverage, it can be concluded that on average, 
large firms are less dependent on debt financing in FTSE 350 listed companies.  
[TABLE	3] 
Empirical Models 
The empirical model that is employed in this research study is based on the concept of 
ordinary least square (OLS) model, which decomposes the entire model into dependent and 
independent variables to test the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable 
(Greene, 2002). In this research study, earnings management is a dependent variable, which is 
a proxy for discretionary accruals, whereas independent variables comprise of audit committee 
attributes.  
 
+,-./01!,#     =  20 + 21,34&,' + 22,35&,' + 23,36+7&,' + 24.,3/&,' + 2564&,' +  
   268+9&,' + :;-  +	=!,# 
 
Where: 
+,-./01!,#   Earnings management for firm > in year ?	
,34!,#    Number of Audit committee members for firm > in year ? 
,35!,#  Proportion of independent directors on audit committee for firm > in 
year ? 
,36+7!,#  Audit Committee members accounting and financial expertise for firm 
> in year ? 
.,3/!,#   Number of Audit committee Meeting for firm > in year ? 
64!,#    Firm Size for firm > in year ? 
8+9!,#    Leverage for firm > in year ? 
:;-   Dummy Variable from 2008 to 2018 represent the number of years 
20    Constant or intercept  
21 To 27   Coefficient for independent variables 
=!,#    Residual or error term 






Based on the results of Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and earnings 
management model, the impact of the ACS on the earnings management is positive and 
statistically significant at 10% of significance level. The findings suggest that the opportunistic 
earnings management practices are higher in those firms, in which the size of the audit 
committee is higher. In other words, large audit committees are ineffective in controlling 
earnings management. These findings are consistent with the empirical findings of the Jensen 
(1993). 
The coefficient value of the ACI is negative, from this we can infer that firms with a 
higher percentage of independent directors in the audit committee are more effective in 
controlling the earnings management, however, the results are insignificant. This is consistent 
with the previous empirical findings of the Klein, (2002), Abbott et al. (2000), Xie et al. (2003), 
Bedard et al. (2004), Abbott, et al. (2004), and Yang and Krishnan, (2005).   
The impact of the ACFXP on the earnings management is positive, however, 
insignificant. The results suggest that those audit committees in which, the proportion of the 
audit committee member’s financial expertise in accounting or finance is higher, are more 
exposed to earnings management practices.  
The coefficient value of the number of audit committee meetings (NACM) is negative, 
however, based on the Jones model, modified Jones model, Kothari model and earnings 
management model are insignificant, which suggests that an audit committee is more effective 
in controlling earnings management, when it meets more frequently. This is consistent with the 
previous empirical findings of the Menon & Williams (1994), Xie et al. (2003), Li et al. (2012), 
Lin and Hwang (2010), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) and Klein (2002). 
The impact of the firm size (FS) and financial leverage (LEV) on the earnings 
management is positive, however, both variables impact on the earnings management is 
insignificant. From the results and findings of the four discretionary models, it can be stated 
that large leveraged firms in FTSE 350 are not effective in controlling the earnings 









Table 1  
Variable Definition  
Variable Definition Symbol 
Earnings 
management  
Earnings management is a proxy for discretionary 
accruals that is estimated by applying three models that 
includes Jones Model (JM), Modified Jones Model 
(MJM) and Kothari Model (KM). Finally, earnings 
management is estimated based on the results of above 









Total number of the audit committee members in an 
audit committee. Audit committee size is the natural 
logarithm of the total number of audit committee 




Audit committee independence is the percentage of the 
independent directors on the audit committee. Audit 
committee independence is estimated by taking the 
number of independent members as a percentage of the 





Audit committee financial expertise is the percentage of 
the audit committee member’s financial expertise in 
accounting or finance or in both. Audit committee 
financial expertise is estimated by taking the number of 
audit committee member’s with financial expertise as a 
percentage of the audit committee size.  
,36+7!,# 
Number of Audit 
Committee 
meeting  
Number of Audit committee meeting is the number of 
audit committee meetings in a fiscal year. Number of 
audit committee is estimated by taking the natural 
logarithm of the number of audit committee meeting in 
a financial year (Ln (1+.,3/!,#)). 
.,3/!,# 
Leverage Leverage is estimated by taking total debt as a 
percentage of the total capital at the end of the financial 
year, in which, total debt comprised of short term and 
long-term debt and total capital includes short-term 
debt, long-term debt and equity. 
8+9!,# 
Firm Size The natural logarithm of market value of the equity at 
the end of financial year (8.64!,# ). The number of 
outstanding shares and market price per share estimates 
market value of equity at the end of the financial year.  
64!,# 
Year Dummy Year Dummy represent the number of years  :;-  
 
Notes: The table presents the definition and estimation methodology for dependent and 
independent variables used in the research study of analysing the impact of audit committee 








Mean Median Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
DAJ -1.1585 0.2615 3.8305 129.0991 -56.4519 
DAMJ -1.0257 0.2615 3.8305 129.0994 -56.4520 
DAK -1.2789 0.2443 3.8002 129.6156 -56.2274 
EARNMGT -2.7377 0.4525 6.6055 223.9038 -97.6481 
ACS 1.0899 1.3863 0.7284 2.484900 0.00000 
ACI 0.5398 1.0000 37.5621 1129.270 -1051.28 
ACFXP 0.4658 0.7114 0.3484 1.00000 0.00000 
NACM 1.1843 1.6094 0.7908 2.89040 0.00000 
FS 7.1640 7.2388 2.2723 14.7449 0.00000 
LEV 1.8202 0.2594 61.070 2488.33 -30.6690 
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of dependent and independent variables used in 
the research study of analysing the impact of Audit committee characteristics on the 




Panel – 3A  
Correlation Matrix – Pearson  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 ACS 1.000 0.008 0.320*** 0.780*** 0.211*** -0.036** 
2 ACI 0.008 1.000 0.014 0.008 0.005 0.0000 
3 ACFXP 0.320*** 0.014** 1.000 0.303*** 0.385*** -0.032* 
4 NACM 0.780*** 0.008 0.303*** 1.000 0.262*** -0.036** 
5 FS 0.211*** 0.005 0.385*** 0.262*** 1.000 -0.077*** 
6 LEV -0.036** 0.000 -0.032* -0.036** -0.077*** 1.000 
Notes: The table presents Pearson’s rank correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables used in the research study of analysing the impact of Audit 
committee characteristics on the discretionary accruals during the period of 2008 – 
2019. The steric sign ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 





Panel – 3B 
Correlation Matrix – Spearman  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 ACS 1.000 0.277*** 0.279*** 0.593*** 0.266*** 0.224*** 
2 ACI 0.277*** 1.000 0.773*** 0.258*** 0.325*** 0.273*** 
3 ACFXP 0.279*** 0.773*** 1.000 0.257*** 0.322*** 0.268*** 
4 NACM 0.593*** 0.258*** 0.257*** 1.000 0.338*** 0.233*** 
5 FS 0.266*** 0.325*** 0.322*** 0.338*** 1.000 0.227*** 
6 LEV 0.224*** 0.273*** 0.268*** 0.233*** 0.227*** 1.000 
Notes: The table presents Spearman’s rank correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables used in the research study of analysing the impact of Audit 
committee characteristics on the discretionary accruals during the period of 2008 – 
2019. The steric sign ***, **, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 































Intercept 0.0144 0.0146 -0.1399 -0.0639  
ACS  0.1934*  0.1934*  0.2205*  0.3506* 
ACI -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 
ACFXP 0.0963 0.0962 0.1534 0.1997 
NACM -0.0571 -0.0572 -0.0988 -0.1230 
FS 0.0367 0.0367 0.0473 0.0697 
LEV 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
DT YES   YES  YES   YES  
F-Statistics 1.2000 1.2000 1.2600 1.2100 
R-Squared 0.0062 0.0062 0.0065 0.0062 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0010 0.0010 0.0013 0.0011 
OBS 3307.00 3307.00 3307.00 3307.00 
This table summarizes and presents the regression test results that estimate the impact 
of audit committee size, audit committee independence, audit committee member’s 
financial expertise and number of audit committee meetings on discretionary accruals 
during the period of 2008 – 2019 for FTSE 350 Listed companies. The steric sign ***, 
**, and * indicate two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All 





















Earnings Management and Executives Compensation 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the components of executive 
compensation, earnings management and control variables for FTSE 350 listed 
companies for a period of eleven years that starts from 2008 to 2018. The discretionary 
accruals mean is approximately the same and lower based on the Jones model, modified 
Jones mode, Kothari model and EARNMGT model, however, the standard deviation is 
significantly higher, which suggests that the data for the discretionary accruals is highly 
dispersed in listed companies on FTSE 350. These findings can also be supported with 
the minimum and maximum values, as the range is substantially higher. The mean 
values of the CEO total compensation and Executive total compensation are very 
similar. Likewise, the mean of CEO and executive’s equity-based compensation are 
approximately equal, which suggests that on average, the total compensation and 
equity-based compensation of the CEO and Executives are the same, however, the 
standard deviation is substantially lower, which suggests that companies listed on FTSE 
350 are paying similar total compensation and equity-based compensation to CEO’s 
and executives. It can also be observed from the salary and bonuses data that the CEO’s 
and executives are paid approximately equal pay, however, the bonuses paid to 
executive’s are highly dispersed which suggests that the bonuses paid to executives in 
the listed companies on FTSE 350 differs significantly different across the companies. 
Moreover, it can be observed from table 2 that the dispersion in the leverage data is 
substantially higher, from which, it can be inferred that there is high variation in the 
debt to capital ratio among the listed companies on FTSE 350.  
[TABLE	2] 
Correlation  
It can be observed from the table 3 that the correlation of all the components of 
the executive compensation i.e., CEO total compensation, executive’s total 
compensation, CEO equity-based compensation, executives’ equity-based 
compensation, CEO salary, executive’s salary, CEO bonus and executives’ bonus with 
earnings management is positive, which suggests, that the earnings management 
increases when the components of the executive compensation are increasing. This is 
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the primary hypothesis of this research study that CEO’s or executive’s compensation 
is an influencing factor for management to engage in opportunistic accounting practices 
with the intention to maximize their personal benefit and gain. The positive correlation 
of each components of the executive compensation with the earnings management 
supports the primary hypothesis of this research study. In addition, the highest positive 
correlation exists between the CEO’s total compensation and CEO’s equity-based 
compensation, moreover, the correlation is also substantially higher between the total 
executive’s compensation and executive’s equity-based compensation, which suggests 
that the total compensation of the CEO and executives is increasing when the equity-
based compensation of the CEO and executives are increasing. The correlation between 
the earnings management and leverage, and earnings management and firm size is 
negative, which illustrates that companies with higher debt or larger size are more 
effective in controlling the earning management and improving the quality of financial 
information.   
[TABLE	3] 
Empirical Models 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model is applied to test the impact of the 
components of the executive compensation on the discretionary accruals. OLS is a 
regression model that tests the impact of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable (Greene, 2008). In this research study, discretionary accrual is dependent 
variable, which is estimated by applying three models that includes Jones model (JM), 
modified Jones model (MJM) and Kothari model (KM). Finally, earnings management 
(EARNMGT) is measured based on the results of above three models by applying the 
first principal component function. Whereas, CEO total compensation, executive’s total 
compensation, CEO equity-based compensation, executives’ equity-based 
compensation, CEO salary, executive’s salary, CEO bonus and executives’ bonus. In 
addition, leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA) and firm size (FS) are included in the 
empirical model as control variables. Finally, time dummy variable is included in the 





+,-./01!,#     =  20 + 213+C13&,' + 22+713&,' + 233+C+D3&,' + 24+7+D3&,' +  
                                    253+C4,8,-:&,' + 26+74,8,-:&,' + 273+CDC.E4&,' +  
                                    28+7DC.E4&,' + !18+9&,' + F2-C,&,'  + F364&,' + :;-  +	=!,# 
Where: 
+,-./01!,#   Discretionary accruals for firm > in year ?	
3+C13!,#   Total compensation received by CEO’s for firm > in year ? 
+713!,#   Total compensation received by Executives for firm > in year ? 
3+C+D3!,#  Equity-based compensation received by CEO’s for firm > in year 
? 
+7+D3!,#  Equity-based compensation received by Executives for firm > in 
year ? 
3+C4,8,-:!,#  Salary received by the CEO for firm > in year ? 
+74,8,-:!,#   Salary received by the Executives for firm > in year ? 
3+CDC.E4!,#  Bonus received by the CEO for firm > in year ? 
+7DC.E4!,#   Bonus received by the Executives for firm > in year ? 
8+9!,#    Leverage is debt to capital ratio for firm > in year ? 
-C,!,#   Return on assets for firm > in year ? 
64!,#    Firm size for firm > in year ? 
:;-   Dummy Variable from 2008 to 2018 represent the number of 
years to control time specific effect in each year 
20    Constant or intercept  
21 To 28   Coefficients for independent variables 
!1 To !3  Coefficients for control variables 
=!,#    Residual or error term 
All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Regression Analysis 
The impact of the components of the executive compensation is tested on the 
discretionary accruals by employing a sample of companies comprising of FTSE 350 
listed companies. Discretionary accrual is a dependent variable, whereas, eight (8) 
independent variables are employed that includes CEO total compensation, executive’s 
total compensation, CEO equity-based compensation, executives’ equity-based 
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compensation, CEO salary, executive’s salary, CEO bonus and executives’ bonus. 
Earnings management is predicted by applying four empirical regression models that 
comprise of Jones model (1991), modified Jones model (1996) and Kothari model 
(2005) and finally, earnings management model that is estimated by applying the results 
of the Jones model (1991), modified Jones model (1996) and Kothari model (2005) and 
the first principal component values.  
Based on the results and findings of the discretionary accruals Jones model 
(DJM), modified Jones model (DMJM), Kothari Model (DKM) and Earnings 
Management model (EARNMGT), the impact of the CEOTC on the discretionary 
accruals is negative, however, the impact is insignificant. Whereas the impact of the 
EXTC on the discretionary accruals is positive and statistically significant at 1%. From 
the findings, it can be inferred that the total compensation paid to executives can 
positively affect the behaviour of the executives in manipulating the accounting 
earnings and engage in opportunistic earnings management practices. The empirical 
findings of this research study are consistent with the empirical findings of the Watts 
and Zimmerman (1986), Healy (1985), Gaver et al. (1995) and Balsam (1998).  
Based on the findings of the four discretionary accruals models, the impact of 
both CEO equity-based compensation and Executives equity-based compensation on 
the discretionary accruals is negative, however, the relationship of the CEO equity-
based compensation and executives equity-based compensation with earnings 
management is insignificant, which suggests that equity-based compensation helps in 
mitigating and controlling the unethical accounting practices and helps in improving 
the quality of financial reporting in companies listed on FTSE 350 during 2008 to 2018. 
The results of this research study are contrary to the empirical findings of the 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Meek et al. (2007), Paulsen (2001), Jensen (2001) 
and Sun and Hovey (2012). 
According the results of DJM, DMJM, DKM and EARNMGT models, the 
impact of the CEOSALARY on the earnings management is positive and statistically 
significant at 1%; however, the impact of the EXSALARY on the earnings management 
is negative and statistically significant at 1%. It can be inferred from the empirical 
findings of this research study that the CEO’s fixed component of the total 
compensation i.e., CEO salary is influencing the CEO’s to engage in earnings 
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management. The result of this research study, which concludes that the impact of the 
EXSALARY on the earnings management is negative, is consistent with the results and 
findings of Gao and Shrieves (2002). 
The results of the DJM, DMJM, DKM and EARNMGT models illustrate that 
CEOBONUS negatively affect the discretionary accruals, whereas EXBONUS impact 
is positive on the discretionary accruals, however, the impact of the CEOBONUS is 
insignificant and EXBONUS impact is statistically significant at 5%. The finding of 
this research study, which states that the EXBONUS impact on the discretionary 
accruals is positive, lends support to Gao and Shrieves (2002), Cheng and Warfield 















Table 1  
Variable Definition  
Variable Definition Symbol 
Earnings 
management  
Earnings management is a proxy for discretionary 
accruals that is estimated by applying three models 
that includes Jones Model (JM), Modified Jones 
Model (MJM) and Kothari Model (KM). Finally, 
earnings management is estimated based on the 
results of above three models by applying the first 














CEO’s and Executives total compensation is 
estimated by using the natural logarithm of the total 
compensation that is paid to CEO’s and 
Executives. (Ln	(1I?JK	LIMNOPQJ?>IP!,#)) 
CEO’s and Executive equity-based compensation 
is the difference between the total compensation 
and cash-based compensation. Finally, the equity-
based compensation is estimated by using the 
natural logarithm of the Equity-based 
compensation that is paid to CEO’s and 
Executives.  









CEO’s and Executive Salaries are estimated by 
taking the natural logarithm of the base salary that 
is paid to CEO’s and Executives.  





CEO’s and Executive Bonuses are estimated by 
using the natural logarithm of the performance-










Leverage is estimated by taking total debt as a 
percentage of the total capital at the end of the 
financial year, in which, total debt comprised of 
short-term and long-term debt and total capital 
includes short-term debt, long-term debt and 
equity. 
Return on assets is the ratio of Earnings Before 
Interest and Taxes (EBIT) and total assets at the 







Firm Size The natural logarithm of market value of the equity 
at the end of financial year (8.64!,#). The number 
of outstanding shares and market price per share 
estimates market value of equity at the end of the 
financial year.  




Year Dummy Year Dummy represents the number of years.  :;-  
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Notes: The table presents the definition and estimation methodology for dependent and 
independent variables used in the research study of analysing the impact of the 
component of the executive compensation on the discretionary accruals during the 















































Table – 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
DJM 0.0003 494.0364 4604.7072 -80549.212 41201.9920 
DMJM 0.0005 495.4934 4605.6615 -80546.024 41205.0974 
DKM 0.0006 490.0033 4603.4959 -80474.366 41278.1926 
EARNMGT 0.0007 853.7730 7974.6674 -139474.241 71411.7540 
CEO.TC 14.3799 14.3265 0.8887 9.9035 20.6866 
Ex.TC 15.0586 15.0211 0.9393 10.0858 21.8527 
CEO.EBC 12.6486 12.8391 1.9728 5.8377 17.9273 
EX. EBC 13.4539 13.5773 1.8097 6.9078 18.9361 
CEO Salary  13.2762 13.2516 0.6001 5.9269 20.6453 
Ex. Salary 14.0265 13.9886 0.7101 9.5468 21.2088 
CEO Bonus 13.1689 13.1994 0.9949 5.7236 16.1181 
Ex. Bonus 13.7770 13.8141 1.0697 9.3927 21.0597 
LEV 43.7580 38.0690 38.9109 0.0054 609.5952 
ROA 7.4641 5.4813 15.3156 -120.0436 236.7815 
FS  8.2243  7.9652  1.8075  1.0656  14.6511  
Notes: The table presents summary statistics of dependent and independent variables 
used in the research study of analysing the impact of the component of the executive 
compensation on the discretionary accruals for FTSE 350 Listed companies during the 
period of 2008 – 2018. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
	 166	
Table 3 
Correlation Matrix – Pearson  
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 EARNMGT 1.0000 0.0315 0.0310 0.0181 0.0226 0.0217 0.0031 0.0238 0.0289 -0.0343 0.0190 -0.2024 
2 CEO.TC 0.0315 1.0000 0.9489 0.9254 0.8886 0.8667 0.7939 0.6684 0.6808 0.0037 0.0341 0.0663 
3 Ex.TC 0.0310 0.9489 1.0000 0.8768 0.9096 0.8154 0.8417 0.6265 0.6798 0.0096 0.0235 0.0678 
4 CEO.EBC 0.0181 0.9254 0.8768 1.0000 0.9250 0.7853 0.7194 0.6191 0.6278 0.0029 0.0320 0.0481 
5 EX. EBC 0.0226 0.8886 0.9096 0.9250 1.0000 0.7483 0.7446 0.5814 0.6231 0.0075 0.0221 0.0406 
6 CEO Salary  0.0217 0.8667 0.8154 0.7853 0.7483 1.0000 0.9202 0.7310 0.7494 0.0100 0.0290 0.0722 
7 Ex. Salary 0.0031 0.7939 0.8417 0.7194 0.7446 0.9202 1.0000 0.6707 0.7479 0.0098 0.0149 0.0863 
8 CEO Bonus 0.0238 0.6684 0.6265 0.6191 0.5814 0.7310 0.6707 1.0000 0.9025 0.0078 -0.0390 0.0287 
9 Ex. Bonus 0.0289 0.6808 0.6798 0.6278 0.6231 0.7494 0.7479 0.9025 1.0000 0.0077 -0.0319 0.0518 
10 LEV -0.0343 0.0037 0.0096 0.0029 0.0075 0.0100 0.0098 0.0078 0.0077 1.0000 -0.2039 -0.0141 
11 ROA 0.0190 0.0341 0.0235 0.0320 0.0221 0.0290 0.0149 -0.0390 -0.0319 -0.2039 1.0000 -0.0109 
12 FS -0.2024 0.0663 0.0678 0.0481 0.0406 0.0722 0.0863 0.0287 0.0518 -0.0141 -0.0109 1.0000 
              
Notes: The table presents the correlation coefficient between the dependent and independent variables used in the research study, which is analysing 
the impact of the components of the executive compensation on the discretionary accruals during the period of 2008 – 2018.  All variables are 
defined in Table 1. 
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Table 4 




Variables 1 2 3 4 
 
        DAJ      DAJM       DAK  EARNMGT 
Intercept   1945.4340*** 1984.3820*** 2069.2960*** 
3463.6800**
* 
CEOTC   -81.3224  -84.1268 -85.2899 -144.7682 
EXTC    199.0868***   202.2365***  203.3800*** 349.1353*** 
CEOEBC   -58.3987  -58.2068 -57.9779 -100.7987 
EXEBC   -23.6488  -23.8404 -24.0018 -41.2765 
CEOSALAR
Y  209.0119***   208.5957*** 208.6136*** 361.5593*** 
EXSALARY -254.5939*** -254.6812*** -254.8206*** -441.1634*** 
CEOBONUS   -56.1309  -55.9554  -55.9177 -97.0000 
EXBONUS    80.6313**   80.3921**   80.3116**  139.3388** 
LEV   -4.1929*  -4.2687*  -4.2640* -7.3473* 
ROA    4.4722   5.3024  -3.9958  3.3371 
FS -365.5816*** -368.5860***  -369.7813*** -637.3831*** 
DT        Yes      Yes       Yes      Yes 
     
F-Statistics 7.6300*** 7.7500*** 7.6600*** 7.6600*** 
R-Squared      0.0541 0.0549 0.0543 0.0543 
Adjusted R-
Squared      0.0470 0.0478 0.0472 0.0472 
OBS      2,824 2,824 2,824 2,824 
 
Notes: This table summarizes and presents the regression test results that estimate the 
impact of the CEO total compensation, CEO equity-based compensation, CEO Salary, 
CEO Bonus, Executives total compensation, Executives equity-based compensation, 
Executives Salary and Executives Bonus on discretionary accruals during the period of 
2008 – 2018 for FTSE 350 Listed companies. The steric sign ***, **, and * indicate 
two-tailed significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. All variables are defined 
in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
